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Abstract  
This thesis explores how gender affects the votes of Norwegian Supreme Court judges in 
cases of disputed child custody in the period from 1968 to 2011. 
 
A typology of four common approaches to the study of gendered behaviour is tested. The 
Different Voice approach assumes that men and women reason in a fundamentally different 
way. Within the Representative approach, gender groups are perceived as social classes. The 
Informational approach assumes that the differences between male and female judges are due 
to information they gain from social interaction throughout life. Finally, the Organisational 
approach assumes that any initial gender differences are subdued by professional experience. 
 
Hypotheses inferred from each theoretical approach are tested by employing multi-level 
logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable is the individual judge’s propensity to 
vote for the feminine party. The data is organised in a two-level hierarchical model, where 
factors related to judges and their votes are placed at level 1. Factors related to panel 
composition or case particularities are placed at level 2. Because this structure does not 
control for inter-individual dependencies, an important part of the analysis is to identify and 
control for the effect of critical actors, i.e. judges who vote consistently either in favour or 
disfavour of the female party. An important methodological conclusion is that this seems to be 
a prudent manner of controlling for inter-individual dependencies and expose spurious effects. 
 
The data consists of 750 votes in 150 child custody cases. This is the entire population of 
cases between 1968 – the year justice Lilly Bølviken was appointed the first female judge in 
the Norwegian Supreme Court – and 2011. 
 
The analysis shows that female judges are less likely to vote in favour of the feminine party. 
Gender only explains a fraction of the differences in judges’ voting pattern. It is, however, 
likely to affect judges in their exercise of judicial discretion and in cases of dissent. Both the 
Informational and Organisational approaches seem ill fit to explain the observed gendered 
behaviour in these cases. Although both have some weaknesses, both the Different Voice and 
Representational approaches seem fruitful in this respect. 
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On translations, abbreviations and the likes 
For translations of names of institutions and organisations to English, the official translations 
from these organisations’ web pages have been used, where available. These sources are not 
referred, however.  For legal concepts, Åge Lind’s English terms list in Jusleksikon by Jon 
Gisle et al. (2010) has been an important source of translations, and also not consistently 
referred. Where concepts have already been established in the relevant literature, the 
translations will diverge from Lind’s terms. An example of this is the translation of the 
concept reelle omsyn, which Lind translates to public policy considerations. This is translated 
to equitable considerations by, among others, Grendstad et al. (2011b). To promote 
conceptual clarity in such cases, the priority falls on the translation used in relevant literature.  
 
The Norwegian terms in the thesis are written in the Nynorsk variant of Norwegian, in which 
e.g. the Supreme Court is called (Noregs) Høgsterett, while it would be called (Norges) 
Høyesterett in the Bokmål variant. 
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1 Introduction 
In a commentary in Aftenposten, one of the prime Norwegian newspapers, journalist Inge D. 
Hanssen (2010) summarised the process of a of disputed child custody case after the split 
between a girl’s two parents1. The case was one out of very few such cases to have gone the 
long way through three court levels, from the district court, tingretten, via the court of appeals 
lagmannsretten, to the Supreme Court of Norway, Noregs Høgsterett.  
 
An important property of these cases, as Hanssen describe them, is the high level of judicial 
discretion needed to cast a verdict
2. The judges are bound to evaluate what is in “the best 
interest of the child”, a concept criticised for its ambiguity (e.g. Skivenes, 2010). The few 
concrete factors upon which the judges can evaluate the goodness of an outcome are normally 
distorted by the high level of conflict and accusations common to child custody cases.  
 
Despite this, the judges of the court are bound to reach a conclusion, and in matters of judicial 
discretion, they are also theoretically bound by the legal method to seek a conclusion they 
find morally good (see Eckhoff and Helgesen, 1997:357-60). Journalist Hanssen’s 
observation was that in the particular case at hand, the judicial discretion had seemingly been 
exercised differently at all three levels of court. Consequently, the outcome of the case had 
changed completely at every appeal. What more, Hanssen thought he saw a simple pattern in 
the exercise of discretion: 
 
“Could it be that judges’ gender matters when discretion is exercised? The district 
court judge is female. She found for mother. The three appellate judges who found that 
the daughter ought to live with her father are all male. The five Supreme Court judges, 
who finally found for mother, are all female. Coincidental?”   
(Hanssen, 2010, my translation) 
 
The present thesis provides an answer to Hanssen’s open question. An analysis of the entire 
population of child custody cases before Høgsterett between 1968 and 2011 shows that the 
pattern Hanssen has seen is indeed coincidental. The tendency in the Supreme Court of 
Norway is, in fact, opposite of what one would have expected from this particular case.  
                                                 
1
 The case in question has the reference number Rt-2010-216 and is one of 150 cases included in this analysis.  
2
 The high need for judicial discretion is likely to be a property of most Supreme Court cases. 
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1.1 The research question and its contribution 
 
How does gender affect the voting pattern of Norwegian Supreme Court judges 
 in cases of disputed child custody? 
 
Since 2010, research on judicial behaviour in Norway has been expanded to include advanced 
statistical analyses of justices’ voting pattern in the Supreme Court of Norway, Høgsterett. 
Previous statistical analyses have mainly focused either on dissent or on ideological voting in 
cases where the public interest is a party. In most of these analyses, gender is included either 
in the form of individual judges’ gender or as a measure of the gender division in each 
presiding panel.  
 
Where Grendstad et al. (2011b) found no significant effect of individual judges’ gender in 
their analysis of non-unanimous cases in Høgsterett, more recent studies that include larger 
selections of cases have shown that gendered behaviour in the Supreme Court of Norway is an 
issue that deserves further analysis. Jacobsen (2012) found that individual judges’ gender 
might affect judges’ propensity to vote in favour of the state in civil cases. Similarly, a study 
by Skiple (2012) indicates that the likelihood for a judge to vote in favour of the public 
interest is higher in panels where the majority of judges are female.  
 
This thesis makes three major contributions to the field of judicial behaviour in Norway. First, 
the thesis contributes with a theoretical expansion of the field of judicial behaviour, by 
introducing and testing four general theories of gendered behaviour in the court. Second, the 
thesis contributes with a wider empirical understanding of how gender affects judges’ votes in 
the Supreme Court of Norway. Finally, the thesis contributes to the methodology of the field, 
by introducing a mechanism to test for the impact of critical actors in judicial panels. 
 
The judicial branch in Norway has the prerogative of legal interpretation. Høgsterett is the 
court of last resort, and knowledge of the extent to which non-legal factors might affect the 
voting pattern of the judges in this court is therefore important. This analysis sheds some light 
on one of these factors. 
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1.2 Disposition 
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical base for the thesis. The chapter starts with a presentation of a 
fourfold typology of the most common approaches to gendered judicial behaviour. Based on 
this typology, hypotheses are inferred from each general approach, to allow for empirical 
testing.  
 
Chapter 3 explains the methodological rationale behind the thesis’ empirical analysis. The 
first part of the chapter, section 3.1, is a short review of the methodological development of 
the field, with the purpose of positioning the thesis in the literature. Following this, in section 
3.2, is an extensive presentation of logistic multi-level regression analysis. Here, central 
technical concepts related to the analysis are introduced and elaborated upon. Finally, in 
section 3.3, a four-step analytical strategy is presented. In this final section, the course of the 
analysis is explained step-by-step. 
  
An overview of the data the analysis builds upon can be found in Chapter 4. The first part of 
this chapter, section 4.1, introduces the main data sources of the analysis. The following 
section 4.2 provides a detailed description of the three phases of data collection conducted in 
preparation of the analysis. In the third part of the chapter, section 4.3, potential sources of 
bias are addressed, before the analysis’ variables are given operational definitions in section 
4.4. 
 
The analysis itself is described in Chapter 5, providing an empirical evaluation of the 
hypotheses derived from the typology of gendered behaviour. The first part of the chapter, 
section 5.1 is a descriptive analysis of each variable in the analysis. In the following, section 
5.2, the analysis is conducted as described in the analytical strategy presented in chapter 3. 
 
The conclusions and implications of this empirical evaluation are discussed in chapter 6, 
along with suggestions for future research. 
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2 Theories of gendered judicial behaviour 
The study of how gender affects the behaviour of judges is a highly specialised sub-genre of 
the vast field of judicial behaviour, in which the methodology and theories of the social 
sciences are implemented to study the behaviour of the upholders of the law.  
 
Boyd et al. (2010) has developed a typology identifying four mutually exclusive conceptions 
of the causes and effects of gendered behaviour within this literature. These are the Different 
Voice approach; the Representative approach; the Informational approach, and finally; the 
Organisational approach. This typology makes out the basic theoretical structure of the 
present thesis, and in the following, the typology will be presented and adapted to the context 
of the Norwegian judicial system. 
 
Table 2.1 on the following page provides a summary of the theoretical basis for the present 
thesis. The four general approaches presented in that table are explained and elaborated upon 
in section 2.1.  
 
In addition to the four general approaches, three additional concepts, Critical actors, critical 
mass and tokens are also presented and fitted into the typology in Table 2.1. These three 
concepts are elaborated upon in section 2.2. 
 
Finally, expected effects in the form of testable hypotheses derived from the four theoretical 
approaches are presented in section 2.3. 
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Table 2.1: Typology of four approaches to gendered behaviour. 
Case fields: All issues Gender-related issues No issues 
Theoretical 
approaches 
Different voice 
(Gilligan, 1982) 
Representational  
(Pitkin, 1967) 
Informational 
(Peresie, 2005, Boyd et al., 2010) 
Organisational 
(Steffensmeier and Herbert, 1999) 
Summarized 
theories 
The male and female perspective 
is fundamentally different in all 
types of issues.  
Gender groups are perceived as 
social classes. In gender-related 
issues, judges will favour their own 
social group’s interest. 
Through socialisation, men and 
women gain different information 
about gender-related issues and will 
thus perceive these differently. 
Men and women are taught the same 
curriculum and have identical jobs. 
Thus, gender should not affect their 
professional behaviour. 
LEVEL 1: 
Individual 
effects of 
gender 
Women will vote significantly 
different from men in all case 
fields. 
Women will vote significantly 
different from men within gender-
related issues.  
Women might vote significantly 
different from men within gender-
related issues.  
None expected.  
LEVEL 2: 
Collegial 
effects of 
gender 
None expected.  
Men and women approach law 
completely differently. 
None expected.  
A logical consequence is, however, 
that some (but not a majority of) men 
also might represent “the female 
side” within gendered issues. 
Yes.  
Through deliberation, men and 
women will influence each other’s 
perspectives and behaviour. 
None expected. 
Critical actors 
None expected 
However, they are not logically 
excluded insofar as they have a 
voting pattern similar to that of 
their own gender group’s norm. 
Yes. 
 We might expect some persons to 
more clearly represent their class or 
group. This might also include 
individuals from the opposite gender. 
We should not expect critical actors 
to have any no collegial effects, 
however. 
Yes. 
Any actor entering a deliberative 
forum can bring an informational 
background along, which affects their 
perception. Notably, this information 
can be shared through deliberation, 
and we should therefore expect 
collegial effects. 
None expected. 
However, critical actors are not 
logically excluded.  
Critical mass 
None expected.  
However, tokenism has been 
used to explain lack of female 
divergent behaviour in some 
literature in this tradition. 
Not excluded. 
Assuming rationality, we can expect 
any gender effect to be strengthened 
where women have reached a critical 
mass where they are able to win 
through. 
Not excluded.  
Assuming rationality, we can expect 
any gender effect to be strengthened 
where women have reached a critical 
mass where they are able to win 
through.  
Not applicable. 
Supported 
models of 
judicial 
behaviour 
Attitudinal model 
See Segal and Spaeth (2002) 
Strategic-internal model 
See Dyevre (2010) 
The legal model 
See Gillman (2001)  
or Segal and Spaeth (2002) 
Main sources: The main structure is provided by Boyd et al. (2010). Also Steffensmeier and Herbert (1999), Palmer (2001) and  Allen and Wall (1993). 
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2.1 Four approaches to gendered behaviour 
2.1.1 The Different Voice approach 
Inspired by Carol Gilligan’s seminal book (1982), the Different Voice tradition of studying 
gendered judicial behaviour has its main purpose in testing the assumption that the male and 
female jurisprudences are different at their core. Gilligan, a psychologist, made the case that 
from the earliest time of childhood, men and women develop distinct world-views, which 
continue through adult life. In 1986, Sherry developed a theoretical framework for studying 
gendered judicial behaviour, drawing heavily on Gilligan’s theories. She contends that the 
difference in male and female jurisprudence can be equalled to two paradigms, where “the 
masculine vision parallels pluralist liberal theory [while] the feminine vision is more closely 
aligned with classical republican theory” (1986:543). Where women seek connection, 
contextuality and responsibility, men seek autonomy, abstraction and rights. A feminine 
jurisprudence is thus assumed to be based on communitarianism rather than the individualism 
of masculine jurisprudence. In Behuniak-Long’s (1992:427) words,  a feminine jurisprudence 
rejects “an adversarial, dichotomous, zero-sum game perspective of the issues [...M]aternal 
legal thinking can suggest innovative resolutions that offer concessions to both sides.” (see 
also Palmer, 2001:94). This feminine perspective is assumed to “extend well beyond areas 
traditionally seen as affecting women, and in fact encompass all legal issues” (Sherry, 
1986:581).  
 
In Boyd et. al’s (2010) typology of gendered judicial behaviour, the different voice approach 
thus assumes that on the individual level, we find significantly different behaviour between 
female and male justices across most (or all) areas of the law. On the collegial level, however, 
we should expect no significant differences, since male and female justices are unlikely to 
influence one another. 
2.1.2 The Representational approach 
The representational approach, a social classes theory, can be traced back to Pitkin’s (1967) 
“The Concept of Representation”. The basic theoretical assumption is that female judges are 
representatives of women as a social class, and will work towards the common goals of their 
class – i.e. to further the goals of women’s liberation or in other ways front the common 
interests of women (Boyd et al., 2010:390-1). Consequently, like in the different voice 
approach, we should assume that male and female judges behave differently. But it is only in 
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those areas-of-law where we can make the case that women’s interests confronts either men’s 
or the established society’s interest that we can assume that female judges will rule in a 
manner different from that of male judges
3
. In this thesis, these kinds of issues will be 
conceptualised as gender-related issues, gender-related cases, or the like. Some examples 
Boyd et al. (2010:391) draws from the US context are abortion, affirmative action, sex 
discrimination in employment, and sexual harassment in the work place. 
 
Assuming that women represent their own class, we must also assume that men represent 
theirs, and the purist interpretation of this model is similar to the different voice approach in 
that we expect no panel effects (men will not be affected by women’s positions and vice 
versa). A necessary logical consequence of this approach is, however, that also some men can 
function as representatives of women as a class (and vice versa). This can be documented 
through history, where e.g. British liberalists like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill 
promoted of the movement for women’s suffrage, where dramatists like Henrik Ibsen 
promoted women’s liberation through seminal plays like A Doll’s House. Notably, in 1884, 
social-liberalist (and man) Hagbard Emanual Berner was elected the first ever chairperson of 
the newly founded Norwegian Association for Women’s Rights4, promoting women’s rights. 
2.1.3 The Informational approach 
The basic assumption in this approach, as it is presented by (Boyd et al., 2010:391) is that 
women – as the “newcomers” on the bench – possess “unique and valuable” information that 
men do not have. As with the representational approach, we thus assume the individual 
gender effect to be limited to a certain set of gender-related areas of law where women and 
men might possess different information. When modelling and empirically testing the 
representational and the informational approaches against each other, the main difference 
between the two is that with an informational approach we have to assume so-called panel 
effects or collegial effects, that female judges, bringing their gender-specific information to 
the bench will affect male judges’ perspectives5 (and vice versa).  
                                                 
3
 Also, consequently, however more or less untouched by literature, we should assume that men act as 
representatives of their own class. Their class is in this perspective assumed to be the dominant class, and thus 
also the representative of established society. 
4
 Norsk kvindesaksforening.  
5
 These kinds of panel effects have only recently become the focus of attention in analyses of judicial behaviour, 
but they have been found in several analyses, see i.e. Peresie (2005), Baldez et al. (2006), Cameron and 
Cummings (2003), Ostberg and Wetstein (2007), Sullivan (2002). In the Norwegian context no-one has analysed 
this in a gender perspective, but for reference see also Jacobsen (2012), Skiple (2012) and Bentsen (2012) 
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Boyd et al. (2010:391, note 7) finds it reasonable to also limit the number of gender-related 
cases to one very specific area of law, gender discrimination in the employment context. They 
specify, however, that this very strict interpretation has been a debated issue when presenting 
their paper to professional audiences. Arguing their case, they point to public opinion data, 
which indicates no significant differences between male and female perception of e.g. 
abortion, but “considerable differences” with respect to gender discrimination in the work 
force. However, because the Informational approach is the only approach that can be 
identified by collegial effects of gender, Boyd et al. leaves the debate without any further 
arguments.  
 
This leaves an unanswered question as to why only gender discrimination in the work place 
should be a gender-related issue and not e.g. violence or child-care, which are areas where – 
in general – men and women seem to have both differing opinions and roles. Hirsch (2010:22-
23) shows that there are significant differences between men and women as to whether they 
commit violence and which kinds of violence they commit. Equally, there are significant 
differences as to whether they fear violence and what sort of violence they fear. Similarly, 
when it comes to child-care, Vaage (2012) shows that, although differences between the sexes 
are evening out, the general trend is still that women and men have clearly different roles with 
regard to the household and child-care
6
.  
 
Summing up, Boyd et al.’s argument for limiting the number of potential gender related cases 
to only one case field can also be used for other case fields. As such, in the present thesis, the 
concept of gender-related issues is understood to be equally wide in both the Informational 
approach and in the Representational approach, and the main difference between the two is 
found in whether we can observe collegial effects of gender. 
2.1.4 The Organisational approach 
If the Different Voice approach could be classified as a typical maximalist approach to 
gendered behaviour, the Organisational approach should by understood as a typical 
minimalist approach (Steffensmeier and Herbert, 1999). On one side, any general differences 
                                                 
6
 In 2010, where women spend 28 per cent more time working in the household than men, men spent 38 per cent 
more time on income work than did women (Vaage, 2012:13-14). Similar differences are found for the mean 
time men and women spend with their children (Vaage, 2012:219, 224). 
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found between men and women are assumed to simply reflect the influence of the constraints 
and opportunities to which a person has been exposed. On the other side, in a professional 
setting, like a judicial collegium, we should assume that “professional training and identical 
constraints imposed by and rules overcome any biological, psychological, or experience-
based differences between the sexes” (Steffensmeier and Herbert, 1999:1165). As long as 
female and male judges are taught the same curriculum in law school and have similar jobs 
received through the same channels, gender should not have any effect on how they exercise 
their profession.  
2.2 Three additional concepts: Tokens, critical mass and critical actors 
Suggestions have been made that women assimilate male attitudes over time
7. “Women who 
become federal judges may simply adapt to the requirements of the male oriented power 
structure [...] They may not find an opportunity to depart from those rules to express a 
different voice” (Davis (1994:171), see also Menkel-Meadow (1989:313-14)). This entails 
that the first women on the bench are so-called tokens (see Martin and Pyle (2000:1214), 
footnote 62, 68-70). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the first female judge on the US Supreme 
Court, justice Bertha Wilson on the Canadian Supreme Court and justice Lilly Bølviken in 
Høgsterett in Norway are assumed to have adapted to a male set of thinking and behaving to 
achieve their positions. The tokenist perspective thus entails that we can expect little traceable 
gender effect in the behaviour of these three judges who are likely to have adapted to the male 
paradigm
8
 of jurisprudence.  
 
One logical consequence of the token argument is the critical mass argument: As the sheer 
number of female judges rise and reach a critical mass, “assimilation may be replaced by 
transformation” (Davis, 1994:172) and female judges will be able and willing to act on their 
female jurisprudence. According to Martin and Pyle (2000:1219), “studies indicate that as 
women's numbers move beyond tokenism, and as younger females who are educated after the 
women's movement become judges, differences based on gender emerge more clearly.” 
Equally, McCall and McCall (2007) finds that “women justices, controlling for institutional, 
political, and legal constraints, are more likely to rule in favour of the criminal defendant than 
their male brethren in cases decided after 1991 but not before.” They also “conclude the 
                                                 
7
 Note that Ostberg and Wetstein (2007) found no evidence for attitudinal assimilation during the judge’s time on 
the bench in the Supreme Court of Canada, but in the tokenist perspective, this assimilation has probably 
happened a long time before the women reach the highest and most prestigious court in the country. 
8
 Sherry (1986) introduced the concept of a male paradigm of jurisprudence. 
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influence of gender may be evident in a wider variety of cases than those dealing with 
women’s lives but that this influence is dependent upon the existence of a critical mass of 
women on the state court benches.” 
 
Another logical consequence of the token argument is the critical actors argument. If the early 
judges are likely to have made their position through adapting to a male paradigm, we could 
equally assume that some judges (perhaps in a second wave of female judges) would be 
strongly oriented towards a “female jurisprudence”. Promoting a critical actor, such as the 
highly outspoken and notorious dissenter, justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubé who served on the 
Supreme Court of Canada from 1987 to 2002, should thus introduce a voice critical of the 
male paradigm of the court.  
 
In the perspective provided to us by the Different Voice approach, critical actors are 
problematic. With this approach, we assume that male and female reasoning is fundamentally 
different. As such, we should assume that if critical actors exist, these judges would exhibit a 
voting pattern similar to the general pattern in their own gender group. Specifically, if male 
judges are generally found to vote more in favour of the non-female party than female judges 
do, we expect a male critical actor to show the same individual pattern.  
 
The concept of critical actors is a less problematic concept within the Representational 
approach, where differences in male and female jurisprudence are assumed to be based in 
class orientation. Certain actors are likely to represent a class or group more clearly, and, as 
has been discussed in section 2.1.2, this can include actors who belong to a different class or 
group. As such, we can expect critical actors, and we can expect both male and female judges 
to stand out as critical actors for a “female jurisprudence”. Because the male paradigm should 
be assumed the norm of the court, most critical actors (who by definition diverge from the 
norm) should be assumed to stand out as critical actors for the female party. 
 
Finally, within the Informational approach we should expect critical actors to behave on the 
basis of their informational background. Within this approach, we assume that any gender 
effect we find is related to the informational background common to the members of the two 
gender groups. As such, any one of the judges who bring with them particular information on 
a subject will potentially act upon this information. Additionally, insofar as a judicial panel is 
a deliberative forum, we should expect critical actors to affect their peers voting pattern by 
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sharing their particular perspectives. Thus, this is the only approach that opens for general 
collegial effects of critical actors. 
 
The introduction of the concept of critical actors also has a methodological function, as a 
control mechanism for inter-individual dependencies. In that respect, the subject will be 
further elaborated upon in chapter 3, section 3.2.4. 
2.3 Expected effects – hypotheses  
Table 2.2: Summary of the expected effects within four approaches to gendered behaviour 
Theory Measure/variable Expected effect 
Expected individual effects 
Different voice, Informational, 
Representational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Organisational 
Gender 
H1: “Male and female judges vote 
significantly different from each 
other” 
Representational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Organisational 
Gender 
H2: “Female judges are 
significantly more likely than male 
judges to vote in favour of the 
female party” 
Organisational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Different voice, Representational, 
Informational. 
Gender 
H3: “Any difference found in the 
voting pattern of male and female 
judges is purely random” 
Informational, Representational 
 
Disfavouring: 
 Organisational 
Critical actors 
H4: “Some individual judges – so-
called critical actors – will vote 
consistently either in favour or 
disfavour of the female party 
throughout all cases” 
Representational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Organisational 
Critical actors 
H5: “A large majority of the judges 
who are identified as critical actors 
will vote consistently in favour of 
the female party throughout the 
cases” 
Different voice 
 
Disfavouring: 
 
Critical actors 
H6: “Any judges identified as 
critical actors will vote consistently 
in favour of their gender group’s 
preferred party” 
Expected collegial/panel effects 
Informational, Representational,  
 
Disfavouring: 
Different Voice 
Female majority 
H7: “Any individual gender effect 
will be strengthened in panels with 
a critical mass – a majority – of 
women.” 
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Informational 
 
Disfavouring:  
Representational, Different voice, 
Organisational 
Gender percentage
9
 
H8: “Controlling for any 
individual effect of gender, the 
voting pattern of judges is affected 
by the gender balance of the panel 
in which they vote.” 
Informational 
 
Disfavouring:  
Representational, Different voice, 
Organisational 
One woman present 
H9: “Having at least one woman 
present will affect the voting 
behaviour of all judges in the 
panel.” 
Informational 
 
Disfavouring:  
Representational, Different voice, 
Organisational 
Presiding judge female 
H10: “Controlling for any 
individual effect of gender, the 
gender of the presiding judge will 
affect the voting pattern of other 
judges in the panel.” 
Organisational, Representational 
Different voice 
 
Disfavouring: 
Informational. 
One woman present 
Female majority 
Gender percentage 
H11: “The voting pattern of judges 
is not affected by the gender 
balance in the panel” 
Informational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Representational, Organisational, 
Different voice 
Critical actors present 
& 
Gender 
H12: “Parts of any individual 
gendered voting pattern found in 
the analysis can be explained by 
the presence of a critical actor in 
the panel in which they cast their 
vote.” 
Informational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Different voice, representational, 
organisational 
Critical actors present 
H13: “The presence of a critical 
actor in a panel significantly raises 
the likelihood of a judge voting in 
favour of the critical actor’s 
preferred party.” 
Expected effects of case particularities 
Different voice 
 
 
Gender of opposing party’s 
lawyer 
H14: “Any individual gender effect 
is strengthened if the party which 
female judges are more likely to 
vote in favour of is represented by 
a female lawyer” 
Representational Opposing party is public/male 
H15: “Any individual gender effect 
will be strengthened when 
controlling for whether the female 
party’s opposing party is a male 
individual or a representative of 
the public.” 
Informational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Representational, Different voice 
Time variables 
H16: “Any individual gender effect 
will be alleviated by the number of 
years women has served alongside 
men in the court” 
                                                 
9
 In this selection only one single panel consists of only women, so a variable accounting for all-women panels is 
excluded.  
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2.3.1 The individual level 
Effects of gender on the individual level 
The Different Voice approach proclaims that men and women have fundamentally different 
world-views and will reason in a different manner in all case fields. However, the approach 
does not provide any clear indication as to which general direction we might expect e.g. 
female judges to vote in cases of child custody.  
 
Insofar as the selection of cases is limited to gendered issues, the Informational approach also 
suggests that female and male judges might reach differing conclusions in the same cases. 
Here, however, this is assumed to be because of their informational background and not on 
fundamentally differing world-views. Similar to the Different Voice approach, the 
Informational approach does not indicate any clear direction of the effect: 
 
H1: “Male and female judges vote significantly different from each other”  
 
The Representational approach, also limited to gendered issues, proposes that female judges 
will support the interests of women as a social group or a class. However, it differs in that it 
specifies a direction of the gender effect, insofar as we can assume that a representative of 
women’s interests would vote in favour of the female party in cases where women’s interest 
are at play. 
 
H2: “Female judges are significantly more likely than male judges to vote in favour of the 
feminine party” 
 
The Organisational approach differs from the previous three approaches in not expecting any 
significant differences between the voting patterns of male and female judges. This approach 
assumes that, insofar as the judges have been taught the same curriculum and have similar 
qualification, there should be no difference between the professional behaviour of male and 
female judges. Therefore, what we infer from the Organisational approach is in effect the 
null-hypothesis of the first two hypotheses. 
 
H3: “Any difference found in the voting pattern of male and female judges is purely random” 
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Critical actors on the individual level 
The concept of critical actors does not fit perfectly within the typology of four approaches to 
gendered judicial behaviour. The concept is in use within all the three traditions that expect 
gender effects, but only fits well logically within the Representational and Informational 
approaches. 
 
Insofar as the Representational approach assumes, in a class perspective, that female justices 
will function as representatives of their gender’s general interests, it is reasonable to assume 
that some judges are more class-conscious than others are. What ought to be noted is that the 
representational approach does not exclude the possibility that male judges function as class 
representatives for “the female class”10. 
 
Likewise, within the informational approach we must assume that individuals might bring 
particular information, such as particular life experiences, or the likes, to the bench. With this 
approach, individual critical actors can act on far wider grounds than just their gender, and 
both male and female judges can have individual experiences, or the likes, that affect their 
general attitudes to questions of child custody. 
 
We can therefore infer the following common hypothesis for these two approaches. 
 
H4: “Some individual judges – so-called critical actors – will vote consistently either in 
favour or disfavour of the female party throughout all cases” 
 
Because the Representational approach assumes that judges are affected by their ideological 
support for certain social groups or classes, it is reasonable to assume that some actors are 
more engaged in this ideology, or more “class-conscious” than others are. As has been argued 
for earlier, acting as a representative of the “female class” would not necessarily be bound 
merely to female judges. Judges of both genders can be inclined to support a particular group 
they identify with or perceive to be in need of their support. Because the norm of the court 
should be the “male paradigm”11, we should expect most critical actors – insofar as being a 
critical actor means having a voting pattern that disaccords with the normal pattern - to act as 
                                                 
10
 For a discussion, see section 2.1.2.  
11
 See section 2.1.2.  
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representatives of the female interest. Based on this reasoning we can infer the following 
additional hypothesis on behalf of the Representative approach. 
 
H5: “A large majority of the judges who are identified as critical actors will vote consistently 
in favour of the female party throughout the cases” 
 
Because the Different Voice approach assumes that men and women have a fundamentally 
different way of reasoning, there is no reason to assume that we will find any particular 
critical actors in addition to the expected gender effect. However, the approach does not 
logically exclude the existence of critical actors, insofar as they vote in accordance with the 
trend predicted for their gender group.  
 
H6: “Any judges identified as critical actors will vote consistently in favour of their gender 
group’s preferred party” 
 
Finally, on behalf of the Organisational approach, we should expect to find no critical actors 
diverging consistently from the norm. Like the Different Voice approach, however, this 
approach neither excludes the concept of critical actors. Insofar as judges are professional 
actors, any significant and consistent individual divergence should be understood in terms of 
professional disagreement and not in a gendered or social context. While inferring a 
hypothesis regarding critical actors on behalf of this approach is problematic, a rejection of 
the previous three hypotheses would clearly favour the Organisational approach. 
2.3.2 The panel level 
The collegial effect of gender 
Both the Representational and Informational approach conceptualise gender differences in a 
rational actors perspective. The first assumes that judges deliberately act as representatives of 
a particular social group, while the second assumes that judges act upon a particular insight 
leading them to assume that certain outcomes are better than others are, and to act upon this 
sentiment. If we assume rationality, we cannot exclude that judges behave tactically, and e.g. 
do not vote for their preferred option unless they believe they might win through.  
 
This stands in opposition to the Different voice approach, which conceptualise gender 
differences as fundamental differences between men and women. Although the concept of 
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tokens has been used in parts of the early Different voice literature to explain the lack of 
significant gender effects
12
, logically we should not expect the effect of gender to be reliant 
on the amount of women in a panel. For the Organisational approach, assuming no gender 
effects in the first place, the concept of a critical mass is not very meaningful.  
 
On behalf of the Representational and the Informational approaches, the following hypothesis 
can therefore be inferred.  
 
H7: “Any individual gender effect will be strengthened in panels with a critical mass – a 
majority – of women.” 
 
The main concept in the Informational approach is the ability judges have to affect each 
other’s behaviour through deliberative forums, which the judicial panel is assumed to be. As 
such, we should also expect that introducing female members to the court would affect the 
overall voting pattern of judges. Not only should the general voting pattern be affected by the 
number of women in a panel, but we should also see an effect of having just one woman (or 
more) present.  
 
H8: “Controlling for any individual effect of gender, the voting pattern of judges is affected 
by the gender balance of the panel in which they vote.” 
 
H9: “Having at least one woman present will affect the voting behaviour of all judges in the 
panel.” 
 
Because of the strong focus on informational exchange in the Organisational approach, 
particularities of the deliberative forums in which the exchange takes place is also highly 
relevant. The presiding judge prepares and leads the deliberation between the judges in the 
panel. We can therefore imagine that the presiding judge has the possibility to put constraints 
on – or in other ways affect – the deliberation within the panel. Therefore, a female presiding 
judge should be assumed to have a better possibility to affect her peers with her own 
informational background than a female (non-presiding) judge. 
 
                                                 
12
 See section 2.1.1.  
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H10: “Controlling for any individual effect of gender, the gender of the presiding judge will 
affect the voting pattern of other judges in the panel.” 
 
As has been touched upon with regard to hypothesis 7, the Different Voice approach does not 
assume any collegial effects of gender because men and women ration fundamentally 
different. Similarly, the Organisational approach expects no more gender effects on the panel 
level than on the individual level. For the Representational approach, the assumptions are 
fairly similar, although this approach does not exclude that some men can act on behalf of the 
“female class”. This last idea is covered by the concept of critical actors, however. On behalf 
of these three approaches we infer the following hypothesis, which in effect is the null-
hypothesis of the previous hypotheses. 
 
H11: “The voting pattern of judges is not affected by the gender balance in the panel” 
The collegial effect of critical actors 
Whereas we can assume the existence of critical actors within both the Representational and 
Informational approach, with regard to collegial effects, the two approaches differ. The 
Informational approach is the only to assume general collegial effects between gender groups. 
A logical consequence of this is that, within the Representational approach, we should not 
expect critical actors to affect their peers in panel, while in the Informational approach, this is 
a natural consequence of deliberation. On behalf of the Informational approach we can 
therefore infer the two following hypotheses. 
 
H12: “Parts of any individual gendered voting pattern found in the analysis can be explained 
by the presence of a critical actor in the panel in which they cast their vote.” 
 
H13: “The presence of a critical actor in a panel significantly raises the likelihood of a judge 
voting in favour of the critical actor’s preferred party.” 
Case particularities 
The final group of hypotheses is related to particularities of the case at hand, also measured by 
variables on the panel level.  
 
Insofar as the Different Voice approach assumes that male and female reasoning differs in a 
fundamental manner, we can imagine that women are better equipped to convince other 
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women than other men. Therefore, we can assume that parties represented by female lawyers 
are more likely to be favoured by the female judges in the panel. Because female lawyers 
before Høgsterett are still the anomaly, we can assume that any differences between judges 
are strengthened when a female lawyer is present.  
 
H14: “Any individual gender effect is strengthened if the party which female judges are more 
likely to vote in favour of is represented by a female lawyer” 
 
Because the Representational approach is oriented towards a class conflict between the 
genders, we can assume that any gender effect found would be strengthened in cases where 
the female party is pitted against a male party, rather than a representative of the public 
interest. 
 
H15: “Any individual gender effect will be strengthened when controlling for whether the 
female party’s opposing party is a male individual or a representative of the public.” 
 
Finally, inferring from the Informational approach, we should expect the time dimension to 
affect judicial behaviour. The longer time men have served by women in court, their 
“informational background” should even out through repeated deliberation. The first year of 
this selection is set to the year when the first permanent female Høgsterett judge was 
appointed, and for every year after that, we can assume the deliberative effect to even out the 
differences between male and female judges. 
 
H16: “Any individual gender effect will be alleviated by the number of years women have 
served alongside men in the court” 
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3 Methods: A quantitative approach to gendered behaviour 
During the last decade, and particularly since 2010, research on judicial behaviour in Norway 
has gradually been expanded to include advanced statistical analyses of justices’ voting 
pattern in Høgsterett. The introduction of more advanced statistical analyses has evolved the 
field from being limited either to the analysis of judicial argumentation or basic counts of the 
outcomes of selected cases. Now, more quantitative and variable-oriented analyses are 
conducted, a development Supreme Court Justice Skoghøy (2011:720) finds fruitful
13
. What 
is more, with increased sample-sizes and the introduction more advanced methodology, such 
as multi-level analysis, the study of judicial votes need no longer be limited to non-unanimous 
panels. 
 
In the social sciences, the general methodological approaches to achieve causal inferences 
have traditionally been understood in a dichotomous terminology. On one side are the 
quantitative and variable-oriented analyses, normally of a large number of units (so-called 
Large-N studies). On the other side we find the qualitative analyses, focusing on either a few 
or just one unit alone (Small-N) (Grønmo, 2004). The debate over which general research 
design is the better to achieve inference is too extensive for the purpose of this thesis
14
. Rather 
than attempt an argument for the superiority of a certain general approach, this chapter is 
devoted to the argument that a quantitative approach, or specifically, a logistic multi-level 
analysis is in itself suitable to answer the research question at hand
15
 
 
The first part of this chapter provides a short overview of the methodological development of 
the study of judicial behaviour in Norway. The second part of the chapter provides a more 
thorough description and analysis of the method of choice in in this thesis, logistic multilevel 
regression analysis. Third and finally, an analytical strategy is presented. 
                                                 
13
 Notably, Skoghøy is specifically arguing for the study of non-unanimous panels. 
14
 See e.g. Przeworski and Teune (1970), King et al. (1994),  Ragin (2004), George and Bennet (2005) or 
Gerring (2007). 
15
 Duly noted, qualitative research designs can be very fruitful in similar analyses. One example is lawyer Ketil 
Lund (1987), who made use of legal methods to illuminate Høgsterett’s propensity to favour the public (vs. 
private) interest in a qualitative study of five controversial cases. MaritSkivenes (2010) conducted a discourse 
analysis of three cases before Høgsterett based on Habermasian deliberation theory. Rather than focusing on 
how the legal method is implemented, as Lund did, her focus is on the logical consistency of the judges’ 
argumentation. None of these specific methods are, however, suitable to draw causal inference on how male and 
female judges vote in panels. 
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3.1 The development of quantitative studies of judicial behaviour in Norway 
Norwegian Supreme Court justice Jens Edvin A. Skoghøy (2011) suggests three 
methodological approaches to the study of judicial behaviour. The first approach he suggests 
is more or less limited to scholars of law and fits into what would be called a qualitative 
approach, “to analyse the written argumentation for the verdicts” (Skoghøy, 2011:714, my 
translation).  
 
The second suggested approach is a very basic form of quantitative analysis, the counting of 
“how large a part of  the disputes between citizens and the public are won by the public” 
(Skoghøy, 2011:718, my translation). The first example Skoghøy (2011) provides of a 
quantitative approach to the study of judicial behaviour is an analysis conducted by then chief 
justice
16
 Terje Wold (1964). Wold literally counts the number of cases won and lost by the 
state vs. the private party where this dichotomy was relevant. Wold concluded that the 
variance in outcome was small enough to dismiss any accusations of favouring public parties 
over private. Studies with fairly similar methodology have been presented by then president 
of the Norwegian Bar Association, Anders Ryssdal (2006). The latter, however, included all 
public parties, i.e. also municipalities and counties
17
, not just representatives of the state. The 
latter also found that public parties won more often than private parties did. 
 
Skoghøy lends his preference to the third proposed approach, to investigate the votes given 
by judges in the relevant cases and try to find out whether these votes are connected to the 
judges’ background – i.e. a variable-oriented, large-scale analysis. The prime example of this 
approach, according Skoghøy, is the study by Tellesbø (2006), building on data from similar 
analyses by then Supreme Court justice Jan Skåre and Siri Berg-Hansen (1999) and professor 
of law, Asbjørn Kjønstad (1999). Tellesbø’s analysis is a basic count of judicial votes set in 
connection with factors related to the judges’ background. Tellesbø’s analysis indicated that 
the degree to which judges voted either in favour or disfavour of the public party seemed to 
vary with the judges’ social identification.  
 
Arguably, however, the most thorough theoretical and empirical analysis of judicial behaviour 
conducted by legal scholars is presented by Henry Østlid (1988) study of dissent in his book 
                                                 
16
 «Høgsterettsjustitiarius», president of the court. 
17
 Kommune and fylke. 
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Dommeratferd i dissenssaker. Although the analyses presented in this book are also guided by 
the same methodological principles as the formerly mentioned analyses, the selection of cases 
and case fields is much larger than in the former analyses. Among the main implications, 
Østlid finds that female judges seem to be more lenient in criminal cases
18
, and that age, 
professional background and political attitude seem to affect the dissenting behaviour of 
judges. 
 
Notably, all the aforementioned legal analyses of judicial behaviour focus on cases of dissent, 
in which it is reasonable to assume that potential attitudinal differences would be strong. This 
was also the case in the first analysis of judicial behaviour in Høgsterett conducted by 
scholars of political science. Professors Gunnar Grendstad, William Shaffer and Eric 
Waltenburg (2011b) improved the methodological state of the field when they made use of 
logistic regression analysis to study the behaviour of Norwegian Supreme Court judges. With 
judges’ individual vote (in favour or disfavour of the public party) as dependent variable, 
Grendstad et al. test the predictive power of individual judge’s income, gender, former work 
experience, appointing government and geographical background. The analysis indicates that 
the latter two variables have a significant effect on judges’ voting pattern. The effect of 
appointing government was confirmed by Grendstad et al. (2012).  
 
Finally, Bentsen (2012), Jacobsen (2012) and Skiple (2012) introduced a further 
methodological advancement in analysing the behaviour of judges in multilevel regression 
analyses with the second level of analysis identical with the judicial panels. The main reason 
behind the fast methodological improvements in the latter years can be found in the 
development of the “Doranoh” database, initiated and run by Grendstad et al. (2013a). This 
will be further elaborated upon in the chapter 4. 
3.2 The method of choice – logistic multi-level regression analysis 
As stated, the chosen research design for this analysis is quantitative. More specifically, the 
main method of exploring the research question is regression analysis, assuming a two-level 
hierarchical structure of the data and logistically recoding the dependent variable. This branch 
of quantitative methods is described in detail e.g. by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008), Hox 
(2010) and Centre for Multilevel Modelling (2013). The present chapter provides discussions 
                                                 
18
 Notably, only three female judges are part of Østlid’s analysis.  
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of methodological problems arising when studying and modelling judicial behaviour and 
describes how these problems can be accounted for.  
 
The first part draws up a basic outline of how the data should be organised, including a 
discussion of what exactly is being studied (the dependent variable) and how the explanatory 
factors ought to be classified. The second part provides a theoretical argument for assuming a 
multi-level structure of the data when analysing it. The third part, introducing the concept of 
cross-classification, is a problematisation of the assumed multi-level structure of the data. The 
fourth part similarly problematizes the data structure, introducing the question of how to 
account for the temporal dimension. In the fifth part, the procedure of logistic recoding of the 
dependent variable is briefly introduced, and finally, in the sixth part the analytical strategy is 
presented in a summarized form. 
3.2.1 Modelling judicial behaviour and accounting for dependencies 
Both ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression analysis assumes absence of 
autocorrelation or serial correlation
19
, meaning that all observations are independent from 
each other (Skog, 2009:380, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008:323). Because there are strong 
theoretical reasons to assume that these assumptions are broken in two distinct manners in the 
present selection, a multi-level structure of the data is assumed. First, judges cast their votes 
in panels normally consisting of five peers (in this selection, all votes are cast in five-judge 
panels). Since dissent is not the norm, any observation on the dependent variable is likely to 
provide a fairly efficient prediction of four other observations (all observations in a 
unanimous panel are equal). We should therefore expect inter-panel dependencies, a concept 
that will be elaborated upon in section 3.2.3. Second, the votes are cast by the same judges in 
different panels, and the chance that judges have a consistent voting pattern should be 
controlled for. Auto-correlation is normal when measuring the same units repeatedly, and is 
likely to lead to underestimated standard errors, heightening the risk for type 1 errors (Skog, 
2009:251-2, Hox, 2010:5). If this is the case in the present selection, a judge’s vote in one 
case can predict the same judge’s votes in another case. This will be elaborated upon in 
section 3.2.4 on inter-individual dependencies. 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Autocorrelation is the most common term for this concept (see e.g. Eikemo and Clausen (2007), Skog (2009) 
and Bull (2001)), however, in his introduction to econometrics, Baum (2006) uses the term serial correlation. 
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3.2.2 Three classes of independent variables 
Since the purpose of this thesis is to analyse to which degree gender affects the behaviour of 
individuals in the court of last resort in Norway, the dependent variable of this analysis, like 
in the analyses by Grendstad et al. (2011b), Skiple (2012), Jacobsen (2012) and Bentsen 
(2012) is the vote of individual judges. As such, when modelling judicial behaviour, we 
should in principle assume that it is the votes themselves and not the judges per se who are 
being studied and analysed. Furthermore, we are trying to predict or at least explain any 
variance in the votes by different factors or explanatory variables. If we accept the premise 
that it is the votes being analysed and not the judges, there are only three possible types or 
classes of explanatory factors available for the analysis. These are illustrated in Figure 3.1 
below. 
  
The first class of explanatory factors are properties of the voting judge, such as gender, former 
work experience or geographical background. The second class is properties of the panel in 
which the vote is cast, such as whether there is a majority of women in the panel or whether 
the chief justice is present. The third and final class is properties of the case in question, such 
as whether the case is a matter of civil or criminal law or whether it is a so-called gender-
related issue. This last class would also contain legal factors that are difficult to measure in 
Large-N analyses, such as how law is applied by the judges. For the purpose of practical 
statistical modelling, the last two classes are simply assumed to be the same class because 
they are intertwined: When identifying each panel with a unique number, this number equally 
serves as identification for the case; they perfectly overlap. These two classes of factors will 
Figure 3.1: The vote is a factor of both individuals and collegium/case 
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Panel X 
Figure 3.2: Votes are cast within panels 
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be referred to combined as panel level - or collegial factors/variables, while the first class 
(properties of the judge) will be referred to as individual factors/variables (See Figure 3.1). 
3.2.3 Inter-panel dependencies – votes are cast within panels 
An important property of votes cast in 
Høgsterett is that they are cast within panels of 
judges
20
. A property of these panels is that they 
are deliberative, which is the feature Skivenes 
(2010) made proper use of in her qualitative 
study of the deliberative quality of three child 
custody cases. Another important property is that the deliberations of a panel of judges always 
have to end up in a majority-supported conclusion
21
. This feature is particular to the justice 
system in comparison with many other deliberative forums of decision-making, e.g. 
parliament, where conclusions can be limitlessly postponed if the cases at hand are too hard to 
handle. In the words of the judges themselves, invariably more than 50% of the judges in 
absolutely all panels agree with each other “in the essentials and the result”22. We should 
therefore assume that the mean level of agreement within the panels of judges is very high, 
and when modelling the variance in votes, we need somehow to account for this structure. 
Thus, we assume that votes are clustered within panels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Most verdicts cast in Høgsterett – and all verdicts in the present selection – are cast in five-judge panels. The 
two alternative panel sizes are the grand chamber (“Storkammer”) of eleven judges and the plenary session 
(“Plenum”) of all members of the judicial collegium, giving an indication of the perceived importance of the 
cases in question. In addition, there is the three-judge appeals chamber, only evaluating whether to allow 
appeals. The fact that there are only five-judge panels in this particular selection is coincidental. 
21
 Notably, although the judges are bound to reach a conclusion in the case at hand, the precedent from a 
judgement can still be vague and unclear, comparable to the outcome of a parliamentary debate in which 
majority is hard to achieve. The matter at hand here is that some conclusion will get majority support, not 
whether the quality of this conclusion is good or bad. 
22
 The reports of the judgements in Høgsterett are written by the first voting judge (førstvoterende). If they do 
not dissent, the remaining four judges’ consent is represented by the formalised phrase “I, in the essentials and 
the result, agree with the first voter” (“Jeg er i det vesentlige og i resultatet enig med førstvoterende”).  
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3.2.4 Inter-individual dependencies and cross-classification 
Accepting the premise that the object of study is the votes themselves and not the judges, in 
addition to accounting for inter-panel dependencies, we also need to account for inter-
individual dependencies. As such, it would be 
reasonable to assume that there are three levels to 
the analysis. We would assume that votes are cast 
“within” judges, who work within panels. Such a 
three-level hierarchical model is exemplified in the 
leftmost classification diagram in Figure 3.4. Votes 
are cast by – or clustered within – judges, who in 
turn work in – or are clustered in – panels.  
 
However, this only works until we add more than 
one panel to the model. The problem arising when 
studying several panels is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
For every panel of judges drawn in Høgsterett, the 
choice of judges to take part in the panel is 
conducted in a near arbitrary manner
23
. A 
necessary result of this is that the composition of 
panels varies from case to case. As such, the properties of judges cannot be assumed to be 
uniformly and hierarchically positioned within panels. Rather, we see in Figure 3.3  that the 
two classes of explanatory factors form a pattern similar to that of woven fabric. This is a 
typical pattern of a cross-classified data structure, as illustrated in the middle classification 
diagram in Figure 3.4. The variance in the dependent variable is indeed explained by two 
different classes of explanatory factors, but these classes are not hierarchically related to each 
other
24
. Hox (2010:172-3) suggests that it makes sense, in an example similar to the present 
data pattern, to view the data as a cross-classification where factors related to the 
measurement occasions (i.e. panels) individual subjects (i.e. judges) are both treated as 
second level variables without any direct hierarchical relation to each other.  
                                                 
23
 For a detailed review of the process of allocating judges to panels, the so-called controlled lottery, see 
Grendstad et al. (2013b) 
24
 See e.g. Leckie (2013:8) or Fielding and Goldstein (2006), see Stata output in the appendix, section 7.1, for 
reference. 
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Assuming a cross-classified, multi-level structure of the data, however, leads to large and 
complicated models, which in turn strains both hard- and software much more than a simpler 
hierarchical model (Hox, 2010:185-7). Attempting to run these analysis with the available 
computer power as proven to be futile. 
 
The common practice in multi-level analyses of judicial behaviour in Høgsterett has been to 
model the dependent variable (the individual vote) as properties of the judge
25
, and assuming 
a two-level hierarchical structure of the data. Thus, the cross-classified nature of the data is 
ignored. This solution has been chosen in the present thesis as well, however doing so still 
leaves a need to somehow control for potential intra-individual dependencies in votes cast by 
the same judges.  
Critical actors as a measure of inter-individual dependencies 
As has been touched upon earlier in this chapter, exploring the existence and potential effects 
of critical actors in this thesis has two purposes. The first purpose is the obvious one 
conceptualised in the theory chapter (section 2.2), to identify whether critical actors can be 
said to exist in the selected data and to analyse whether these actors have any effect on their 
peers’ voting behaviour. The second purpose, however, is methodological. The critical actor 
analysis serves to control for inter-individual dependencies, as described in section 3.2.1.  
Step 2 of the analytical strategy is centred on the identification of critical actors in the 
selection, while in step 5, the general effect of gender is controlled for the effect of any 
critical actors. See sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 under Analytical strategy for an elaboration. 
                                                 
25
 See Bentsen (2012), Skiple (2012) and Jacobsen (2012). 
Figure 3.4: Three potential multi-level structures 
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3.2.5 The temporal dimension 
Thus far, the temporal dimension has been left out of the discussion. Data has been collected 
from 1968
26
 to 2011, which is a considerable span in time. The starting year, in addition to 
being the year when Lily Bølviken was appointed first female judge on the Høgsterett bench, 
also connotes drastic attitudinal change. This was a year of social tumults, which – in 
hindsight – seems to have forespoken drastic changes in the common perception of gender, 
equality, sex, etc. In the following decades, women have gained representation in executive 
position formerly understood as part solely of the male domain. A somewhat similar change 
has happened in men’s position in social spheres formerly understood to be female. In 1968, 
the idea that fathers would be allocated a particular father’s quota of paid parental leave 
would probably seem absurd to most Norwegians, while this – in 2011 – was the reality. This 
anecdote does not provide any evidence, but serves to illustrate that we ought to assume that 
the popular opinions on child care and gender roles might have changed radically from the 
start of this period to its end. Equally, we should assume that judges are equally affected by 
such general attitudinal changes as anyone else living in Norway. We should thus somehow 
control for this temporal dimension when analysing gendered judicial behaviour. To do so, 
two time variables are added as control variables to provide a crude measure of the temporal 
dimension. One of these is a metric variable where the distance between each value is one 
year. The other is a dichotomous dummy variable, approximately splitting the selection in two 
groups over the temporal dimension. 
3.2.6 Logistic transformation of the dependent variable 
Because the dependent variable proposed for this analysis is dichotomous, the dependent 
variable is logistically transformed
27
 to avoid breaking the assumptions of linearity, 
homoscedastic errors and normality (Hox, 2010:112). Specifically, this is needed to make 
estimation of the model possible. In addition, it counters false estimations of the coefficients 
because of non-linearity (Skog, 2009:238) and false estimations of the standard errors and 
thus p-values because of heteroscedasticity (Skog, 2009:246-7)  and non-normality (Skog, 
2009:249).  
                                                 
26
 This is the year Lilly Bølviken was appointed the first female judge on the Høgsterett bench.  
27
 See Skog (2009:354-8 & 240-6) for a thorough explanation of this process. 
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3.2.7 Additional assumptions 
At every step of the analysis, the data has been tested for multicollinearity, which is 
particularly important with variables measuring similar or the same phenomena. Chen et al 
(2003:chap2) recommends running collinearity diagnostics using the command collin in Stata, 
presenting the variance inflation factor (VIF) also recommended by Acock (2010:262-3) and 
Eikemo and Clausen (2007:126-7). In addition, all variables included in the analysis have 
large enough amounts of observations to avoid indications of discrimination problems, as 
these are described by Eikemo and Clausen (2007:129-30).  
3.2.8 In summary: A model of gendered behaviour in the court room 
The present analysis assumes a two-level hierarchical structure of the data, with judges and 
their votes on the first level – referred to as the individual level. These observations are 
clustered in cases or panels on the second level – referred to as the collegial level. This chosen 
structure is equal to the two-level hierarchical model presented in Figure 3.4 on page 29. 
 
This structure, clustering the data only in panels and not in judges, builds on the assumption 
that votes are properties of the judge alone. In fact, however, it is reasonable to assume that 
they are a function of factors related to both the judge, and the panel (both related to the 
composition of the panel and the particularities of the case at hand). As discussed, this is a 
pragmatic choice to avoid large and complicated models, although it does ignore the cross-
classified nature of the data. 
 
To alleviate this problem, the analysis of potential critical actors is given a methodological 
function in addition to being of empirical interest in itself. Adding controls to the model for 
those judges who stand out as critical actors, also serves as a control for potential intra-
individual dependencies.  
 
Finally, the temporal dimension is controlled for, by two control variables measuring time.  
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3.3 Analytical strategy 
To recapitulate, the research question for this thesis is “How and why does gender affect the 
judges of the Supreme Court of Norway?” The first two steps of the analysis are directly 
linked to this question: In the first step, an empty, unrestrained model is run to calculate the 
intra-class correlation. In the second step, the general effect of gender is analysed, first on the 
individual level, then on the collegial level. This part of the analytical process is theory testing 
and deductive and results in a temporary model of the significant effects on individual judges’ 
voting pattern in cases of child custody. 
 
In the third step, however, the analysis crosses over into an explorative and inductive subject. 
This step is related to the identification of potential critical actors, as argued for in the theory 
chapter, section 2.2 and the methods chapter, section 3.2.4. This process leads to a list of 
judges whose voting pattern is significantly consistent throughout the cases in this selection. 
 
In the fourth step, the deductive and the inductive processes are combined, as the effect of 
critical actors is added as control variables to the final model in step two.  
 
The general analytical strategy in all steps of the process, however, follow the 
recommendations given by Hox (2010:56-59): The analyses are run block-wise, starting with 
an empty model
28
 containing no explanatory variables, then gradually adding variables, first 
on the individual level, then on the collegial level. Multi-level models are quite complex not 
only with regard to the number of parameters, but also in terms of interpretation (Hox, 
2010:55). This general strategy of adding one and one variable makes it possible to evaluate 
whether to keep or abandon each variable at every step of the process, thus keeping the model 
as parsimonious as possible.  
3.3.1 Hypothesis testing and model comparison 
For hypothesis testing two different statistical tests will be applied
29
. First, for testing the 
null-hypothesis for individual explanatory variables the z-ratio ( ̂     ̂ ) of each variable’s 
                                                 
28
 This is also variably referred to as an unconstrained model or intercept-only model.  
29
 Note that a third method of hypothesis testing, the Wald test, could also have been applied to test the null-
hypothesis for entire blocks of explanatory variables. This type of significance testing is especially useful where 
one categorical explanatory variable is represented by a set of dummy variables (Steele, 2009a:30). This is not 
the case in any part of this analysis. As such, the Wald test would not provide any information significantly 
different from what we get from the LR test. See also Steele (2009a:31).  
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estimated coefficient is compared to a standard normal distribution (Steele, 2009a:29-30). 
Noteworthy, this test statistic (p-value) procedure by this procedure is a function of both the 
coefficient and its standard error, meaning it can easily be affected by broken assumptions 
that affect predicted standard errors, such as multicollinearity (see e.g. Skog (2009:286-288) 
or Field (2009:224)). 
 
Second, a likelihood ratio (LR) tests is recommended by Hox (2010) to measure the change in 
goodness of fit between nested blocks in multilevel analyses. The LR test is analogous to the 
F-test used to compare linear (non-logistic) regression models, and conveniently produces a 
test statistic (p-value), which can be interpreted as a measure of whether there is a significant 
increase in explanatory power between the two blocks. See e.g. Hox (2010:47-50) or Steele 
(2009a:30-31).  
 
In addition, two different goodness-of-fit measures will be presented for each block of the 
analysis. Although not intrinsically interpretable (Field, 2009:781), information criteria, such 
as Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and Schwartz’s Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
provide useful statistics for comparing different models’ goodness of fit. Low values of AIC 
and BIC
30
 indicate good fit in the sense that estimated values are close to observed values 
(Field, 2009:304). This is a practical tool for comparing non-nested models and can be used to 
compare model fitness between the different empty models. AIC/BIC will also be calculated 
in the following steps of the process and used as a reference, together with the LR-test (see 
step 2 of the analytical strategy), to compare model fitness. 
 
3.3.2 Step 1: The empty, unconstrained models 
As argued for in sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, there are strong theoretical reasons to assume inter-
panel and inter-individual dependencies. These assumptions can be tested by calculating the 
intra-class correlation (ICC) in empty or unconstrained models
31
 where the dependent 
                                                 
30
 It is normal to include both information criteria, although they normally provide similar estimates. While BIC 
is slightly more conservative than AIC, both are corrected for model complexity by adjusting for the number of 
parameters estimated in the model (Field, 2009:781-2). An additional problem with BIC particular for multi-
level models is that it relies on N, but it is unclear which level we should retrieve N from. Here, level 1 N is 
being used, which is normal. See a discussion of BIC in StataCorp (2011: 157-161).  
31
 See footnote 28. 
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variable is grouped around either judges or panels. This is the first step of the analysis, found 
in section 5.2.1.  
The intra-class correlation 
In two-level regression analyses, we define a second level, or a “class” (e.g. the panels which 
judges vote within) and a first level (e.g. the judges themselves and their votes, see Figure 
3.4). The intra-class correlation (ICC)
32
 is calculated by dividing the level-2 (residual) 
variance in the dependent variable by the total variance in the dependent variable. This 
provides a standardised coefficient, which can be interpreted as a percentage measure of how 
much of the total variance in the dependent variable happens between, rather than within, any 
group or class that we have defined. (Leckie, 2010a:7).  
 
If there is as good as no within-group variance, e.g. all judges always vote the same as their 
peers in panel, the ICC would be very close to 1. This indicates that a large part of the 
explanation of how the outcome in the dependent variable varies is to be found in differences 
between the level-2 units (e.g. panels), rather than between the level-1 units (e.g. judges). If, 
on the other hand, the within-group variance were high, the ICC would be closer to zero. This 
would indicate that a large part of the difference is to be found in differences between the 
level-1 units of the analysis, rather than the level-2 units. 
 
As such, it can be said to measure the level of autocorrelation in the dependent variable within 
certain “classes” or groups of observations. When modelling a dichotomous outcome, such as 
whether judges vote for or against a feminine party grouped or nested within panels, we can 
therefore interpret the ICC as a measure of the level of agreement within these panels. The 
basic interpretation is that if the ICC is high, there is a high level of agreement, thus little 
dissent in the panels. If there is a high level of agreement, a large part of the explanatory 
factors ought to be sought in differences between the panels (related to panel composition or 
case particularities, see section 3.2.2). If we model the votes grouped or nested within judges, 
we can interpret the ICC as a measure of the level of judge self-agreement, i.e. whether the 
                                                 
32
 Steele (2009b:16-17) more precisely refers to this as the Variance Partition Coefficient (VPC). The VPC is 
equal to the ICC in simple multi-level models (Steele, 2008:8) and is commonly referred to as the ICC. Both 
VPC and ICC will therefore be referred to as ICC in this thesis. The formula is 
  
 ̂
  
 ̂    
 ̂, where   
 ̂ is the level-2 
residual variance and    ̂ is the level-1 residual variance (Steele, 2008:8). 
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overall judge votes similarly over different cases. Which type of model best serves this 
analysis is determined in the first step of the analysis, in section 5.2.1. 
 
An important property of the ICC in logistic analyses is that the level 1 residual variance is 
fixed at 3.29 as a result of the logistic recoding of the outcome (see Steele (2009b:17)). As 
such, the intra-class correlation in logistic analyses is mainly affected by changes in the 
second level variance term, whereas it “normally” would rely on variance terms from both 
levels (Hox, 2010:59). In the present analysis, we therefore expect the ICC to remain 
approximately unchanged when we add a variable that explains level-1 variance. If we add a 
variable that explains (and thus controls for) level-2 variance, we expect it to decrease. 
Panels 
According to (Acock, 2010:237-9), the ICC can be interpreted as a percentage measure of 
agreement within groups. Therefore, if the ICC is high in an empty model where the votes are 
grouped by the panels in which they are cast, this is interpreted as a high mean level of 
agreement within the panels of judges, indicating that we need to look to the collegial or case 
level to explain the main variance in the dependent variable. 
Individuals 
Similarly, a high ICC in an empty model where the votes are grouped according to the voting 
judges is interpreted as a high level of mean “agreement” between votes given by specific 
judges. Simplified, this shows that the vote given by an individual judge in one case is similar 
to votes given by the same judge in other cases. The practical interpretation of this is the 
degree to which the mean judge gives the same vote (in either favour or disfavour of the 
feminine party) in subsequent cases. 
Cases of dissent 
For the reference, it is also interesting to calculate the ICC including only cases of dissent. 
Given that the ICC is a measure of agreement within panels, we should assume a much lower 
ICC in this part of the selection. In addition, to have a measure of the general degree of intra-
individual dependency, we calculate the ICC of an empty model in which the judges are 
assumed to be the second level of analysis  
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3.3.3 Step 2: The general effect of gender 
Gender on the individual level 
In step 2, level 1 variables are added block-wise to the model in accordance with the general 
strategy recommended by Hox (2010) and presented in the first paragraph of the analytical 
strategy.  
Gender on the collegial level 
When adding variables on the second level of analysis, in addition to the LR-test and the AIC, 
we can expect the ICC to provide interesting information on the comparison of blocks. The 
ICC is a function of the level 2 residual variance divided by the total residual variance (both 
levels). Since the dependent variable has been recoded with a fixed logistic normal 
distribution, the level 1 residual variance is also fixed
33
 and contributes little information. As 
such, we should expect little or no change when adding variables on the first level of analysis. 
When controlling for a significant variable on the second level, however, we should expect 
the residual variance on this level to go down and consequently also see a reduced ICC, 
leaving a larger share to be explained by the first level variables.  
 
Those variables found to have a significant effect on the dependent variable are then included 
in a new model which is compared through an LR-test to the end model of the previous step. 
This procedure is repeated for all following steps. 
3.3.4 Step 3: Identifying critical actors 
The process of identifying critical actors is elaborate and starts with the identification of 
critical individual judges through dummy variable coding. First, every judge appearing at 
least 10 times in the selected panels is identified by a dummy variable. For example, any 
observation where chief justice Tore Schei has given a vote, the dummy variable “Schei” is 
coded 1. All other observations on this variable are coded 0. Second, we wish to measure any 
potential effect of the critical actors on their peers. To do this, a dummy variable is coded 1 
where the judge is present in the panel and coded 0 in those panels where the judge did not 
partake. Referring the former example, in all five observations in any panel in which chief 
justice Schei took part, the dummy variable “Schei in panel” is coded 1. All other 
                                                 
33
 The ICC is calculated by
  
 
  
    
 , and the level 1 residual variance (  
   is fixed at 3.29 (    ). For further 
explanation, refer to Steele (2009b:7.2) or Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008:256-7). 
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observations on this variable are coded 0. In the terminology of Hox (2010:2-4), the first kind 
of variable described here is a global variable, referring only to its own level of analysis, 
while the second kind is a structural variable, a variable constructed by aggregating 
information from a  lower to a higher level of analysis.  
 
These dummy variables’ potential of predicting the outcome of the dependent variable is then 
tested first in bivariate models and then trivariate models
34
. The bivariate models predict the 
outcome only based on the individual-identifying variable. If this variable is found to 
significantly
35
 predict the outcome in the dependent variable, this is interpreted as a consistent 
voting pattern, i.e. that the judge has been voting fairly consistently either for or against the 
feminine party (depending on the direction indicated by the coefficient). This is the criteria set 
for identifying a judge as a potential critical actor.  
 
The next step, to analyse whether the critical actors affect their peers is conducted in the 
trivariate models. These are similar to the bivariate models, but also include the aggregate 
variable measuring the judge’s presence in a panel. Notably, the individual-identifying 
variable is always included to avoid measuring a judge’s effect “on herself”. Technically, 
once again referring the example of chief justice Schei, by including the individual-
identifying variable “Schei” while testing the aggregate variable “Schei in the panel”, we keep 
the Schei-variable constant while measuring the effect of Schei on his peers. If this panel 
variable is found to predict the outcome significantly, this is interpreted as showing that the 
judges who have been serving in the same panel as the judge in question have been voting 
consistently in the direction indicated by the coefficient. If the direction is similar to that of 
the individual-identifying variable, this is interpreted as an indication that the judge in 
question has affected his peers’ vote.  
 
This process is too elaborate to be included in the analysis chapter, where only a table 
including the effect of those judges identified as potential critical actors are included. 
However, a full set of analyses is included in the appendix. 
                                                 
34
 These are, of course, also two-level hierarchical models, assuming properties of the judges to belong to level 1 
of the analysis and properties of the panel/case to belong to level 2. 
35
 On a significance level of five per cent.  
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3.3.5 Step 4: Adding the effect of critical actors on the gender model 
In step 4, the general effect of gender is controlled for the effect of those judges identified as 
critical actors in step 2, thus intertwining the two main parts of the analysis.  
 
When comparing the goodness of fit of non-nested models, Hox (2010:50-1) recommends a 
comparison of AIC
36
 for the two models. Hox suggests that, in comparison between two 
models we should choose the most parsimonious. The AIC tends to be reduced when the 
deviance goes down, which indicates a better fit, thus the model with the lowest AIC is 
preferred. 
3.3.6 Step 5: Varying slopes  
At all former steps of the process, we have allowed only the intercept to vary between panels. 
Following Hox’s the suggested analytical strategy, the next natural step in the process is to 
measure whether any of the explanatory variables’ slopes vary significantly between the 
panels (Hox, 2010:58). If the effect of gender differs from panel to panel, this could be 
identified at this stage of the process. Notably, since only the average slope of the individual-
level variables omitted in step 3 have been tested, these can be analysed again at this stage. 
 
The danger of over-parameterisation, leading to various estimation problems is imminent at 
this stage. Thus, explanatory variables should be tested for varying slopes one by one. Those 
variables found to have significantly varying slopes are then included in a new model which is 
compared to the final model of the previous step through an LR-test 
3.3.7 Step 6: Cross-level interactions 
If significantly varying slopes are identified in the previous step, we should try to identify 
why the effect varies from panel to panel. Referring the example from the previous step, if the 
effect of gender is found to differ between panels, this is where we can identify which 
properties of the panel affects the slope variation, thus giving us a measure of the effect of 
gender within different ideal-typical panels. There are no specific theoretical reasons to 
assume cross-level interactions in this analysis. 
  
                                                 
36
 Akaike’s Information Criterion. This is preferred over Schwartz’s Bayesian IC because of the ambiguity 
related to calculation of the latter which is a function of (among others) N. In e.g. a two-level model, however, it 
is unclear whether N refers to the first or second level. In practice, however the two perform equally well, but 
with a slight advantage for BIC (Hox, 2010:51).  
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4 Data  
The data collection for this thesis has been a very demanding job. First, there was a need to 
operationalise the concept gendered issue in the Norwegian context, where many of the issues 
known from e.g. the US and Canadian courts are less frequently heard in court. In the 
following, a lot of work was laid down in finding the relevant information through the legal 
database Lovdata, and developing search criteria that would find all relevant cases within the 
operational definitions of the case categories. Finally, the data had to be manually copied into 
the Doranoh database structure
37
.  
 
This chapter presents the data collection process and the data that has been analysed. First, the 
main data sources are introduced. Second, the collection process is elaborated upon from 
contextualisation of gendered issues to the collection and quantification of the data. Third, 
potential sources of bias in the data are discussed. Finally, the variables in the analysis are 
presented and given operational definitions. 
4.1 Data sources 
There are two main sources to the data that forms the basis for this thesis. One source is the 
Norwegian legal database Lovdata
38
, in which all judicial decisions and votes in the 
Norwegian justice system is digitalised and made publically available. The second source is 
the Doranoh
39
 database (Grendstad et al., 2013a). Some background information has also 
been gathered on individual judges where this has been lacking in Doranoh. The main source 
of this has been a range of Norwegian newspapers, through the digital newspaper archive 
service Retriever. 
 
Doranoh has provided two kinds of data otherwise unavailable. The first is voting information 
in cases that, for different reasons, have been left out of Lovdata, generally referred to as star 
cases
40
. The second is information about the individual justices of Høgsterett, making 
possible the analysis of how properties of individual judges affect their voting pattern.  
 
                                                 
37
 Already working as a research assistant for the Doranoh project was very helpful in this respect.  
38
 For detailed information, see the English Lovdata web page: http://lovdata.no/info/lawdata.html  
39
 The data in the Doranoh database (“DOmmerAtferd i NOrges Høyesterett”) has been collected through the 
research project Judicial Behaviour in the Supreme Court of Norway, led by professors Gunnar Grendstad, 
William R. Shaffer and Eric N. Waltenburg. The undersigned to this thesis has taken part in extensive data 
collection for this project as a research assistant from 2011 to 2012 – in addition to working on this thesis. 
40
 The name refers to the (star shaped) asterisk added to the end of these cases’ reference number in Lovdata.  
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In addition to providing data, the flexible design of Doranoh has provided the infrastructure 
necessary for advanced quantitative research on judicial behaviour in Høgsterett. As such, all 
data collected from the qualitative Lovdata database has been quantified through the Doranoh 
infrastructure, and is stored in this database both for future research and for the purpose of 
data reliability. Without this infrastructure, the analyses in this thesis would have been very 
hard to conduct. 
 
Quite a lot of data had to be collected for the analyses in this thesis. Because Doranoh is a 
relatively new database, some categories of information are somewhat underdeveloped. 
Particular for these analyses are the lack of data on consensus panels and the lack of data on 
the parties meeting before the court. For the cases included in this thesis, both of these 
lacunae have been filled manually by registering qualitative data from the Lovdata database to 
the Doranoh infrastructure.  
 
Fundamental to adapting the theoretical framework presented in the theory chapter to a 
Norwegian-specific context has been the selection of an area of law to focus the analysis on. 
Gendered case categories like e.g. abortion or discrimination in the work place are less 
dominant in the Norwegian court system than in e.g. the US American courts. The process of 
developing an operational case category for a relevant gendered issue has also taken a lot of 
resources.  
 
The first purpose of this data section is to give an account of the data collection process by 
elaborating on the issues mentioned above. The second purpose is to present the 
operationalization of the concepts, case categories and variables forming the basis of analysis. 
4.2 Data collection  
4.2.1 Phase one: Contextualising the concept of gender-related issues 
Although gendered judicial behaviour has never been the main focus of any analysis of the 
Norwegian Supreme Court, a few articles have brought footnoted hints and the like, as to 
where gender effects potentially could be found (see e.g. Drammens tidende (2009) or 
Skivenes (2010)). This was combined with a run-through of the “main register” of Norsk 
retstidende before and after 1996, to get an impression of which categories the legal 
community operates with when defining an area of law and how they operationalize these 
categories. From this process emanated a list of six categories of cases which might both be 
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assumed to be gender-related and which could allow for statistical analysis with testable 
hypotheses: 
 
1. Cases related to the child care service41 
2. Criminal trials related to sex42 motivated crimes 
3. Criminal trials with young defendants 
4. Cases related to confirmation of fatherhood  
5. Cases related to the freedom of speech 
6. Cases related to pornography 
4.2.2 Phase two: Exploring the possibilities for analysis 
These six case category suggestions formed the basis for an iterative and time-consuming 
process of searching the Lovdata database for any relevant cases. Similar to the first phase, 
this part of the data collection was explorative, and the criterions for which cases to include 
and exclude were set and revised several times during and as a part of the search. The purpose 
of this was three-fold:  
a) to collect exhaustive lists of all cases in the selected time period that fit within the 
selected six case categories;  
b) to be familiarised with the selected areas of law, and; 
c) to evaluate the extent to which these categories held enough cases to allow for a solid 
multi-level regression analysis. 
 
As presented earlier in this chapter, the purpose of Lovdata is to be a judicial archive for 
practising lawyers, and not at a source for rigorous analysis. Making a selection of cases 
through Lovdata, while avoiding any sort of incidental selection bias is therefore a challenge. 
The selection was therefore conducted in three steps. First, complex search criterions were 
constructed on the basis of relevant keywords for each area of law. These were then used for 
automatic searches through the case abstracts
43
 in Lovdata. Second, the case abstracts in 
Lovdata have been scanned for relevant references to the law
44
. Third and finally, every case 
                                                 
41
 Barnevernet 
42
 Sex as in sexual relations, not gender. 
43
 The abstract in Lovdata are manually written when the cases are added to Lovdata from Norsk retstidende. 
44
 When documents are added to Lovdata, legal references are automatically extracted from the transcribed legal 
argumentation of the judges and added to the case abstract. 
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in the automatic selection have been manually controlled and read through to exclude all 
cases that prove to be irrelevant.  
 
Three of the case categories were abandoned early on in the process due to difficulties of data 
collection or small number of cases considered by Høgsterett in the selected period. 
Specifically, while developing efficient search criteria to find all criminal cases involving 
young defendants proved difficult. the number of cases involving the freedom of speech is 
low
45
 and the number of pornography cases even lower in the period. The three remaining 
categories are deemed fit for quantitative analysis: 
 
1. Cases of sexually motivated crime  
2. Cases related to confirmation of fatherhood 
3. Cases of disputed child custody46 
 
Because of the relative difference in nature between these three case fields, coding a common 
dependent variable to include all in the same analysis is difficult. As such, to avoid having to 
run three completely separate analyses, the case selection was narrowed down to only one 
category: cases of disputed child custody.  
 
Although labour-intensive, the double search for both references to manually written 
keywords and to law references and subsequent manual proofreading should guarantee that 
the case selection includes an exhaustive list of cases within the chosen category. Thus, the 
case selection in this thesis does not discriminate between cases perceived to be more or less 
interesting in a legal perspective. In addition, the selection makes out the entire universe of 
child custody cases between 1987 and 2011.  
4.2.3 Phase three: Collecting and quantifying the case information 
Having a list of cases is not enough to run an analysis. The third phase of the process is 
collection and quantification of the qualitative data from Lovdata into the Doranoh database. 
                                                 
45
 This is despite a the presence of a few high profile cases, such as the White Electoral Alliance case (Hvit 
valgallianse), Rt-1997-1821 
46
 Note that this case category is an expansion of the first category in the first selection, which just included cases 
related to the childcare services. By also including disputes between parents, this selection now includes all cases 
of dispute over whom the care of a child should befall. 
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While voting data was added where this was missing
47
, all the data on the parties and their 
lawyers have been collected for this thesis specifically. Some background information has 
also been gathered on individual judges where this has been lacking in Doranoh.  
 
The next step of the process is the operationalisation of variables and concepts, which will be 
elaborated upon in section 4.4, after a presentation of potential sources of bias related to the 
case selection. 
4.3 Potential sources of bias 
4.3.1 Potential bias in case abstracts  
All searches in Lovdata have been limited to the case abstracts. These abstracts are manually 
written, not by the judges but partly by the Norsk retstidende editorial staff and partly by the 
Lovdata staff, and thus also of varying quality. The thorough data extraction process is meant 
to ensure an exhaustive extraction of cases within the chosen case category, but can of course 
not guarantee against lacking information in case abstracts. This potential bias is attempted 
alleviated by an operationalisation of the case field which relies on both the automatically 
collected law references
48
 and the manually written abstracts.  
4.3.2 Consensus and dissent 
Much of the focus of scholars of judicial behaviour has been put on cases of dissent. Some 
scholars argue that the primary objects to study judicial behaviour in is cases of dissent or 
non-unanimous cases. The fact that the justices are in dissent is assumed to indicate that the 
formalised legal sources do not provide clear cut answers, thereby making the justices’ 
individual preferences more prominent in explaining the cast votes (see e.g. Grendstad et al. 
(2011a:20) or Østlid (1988)). Focusing merely on dissent cases was also argued to be a way of 
objectivising analyses by Norwegian Supreme Court justice Jan Skåre (1997). In addition, 
when conducting large-N analyses, this is a way of saving resources related to data collection, 
since unanimous cases make out the absolute majority of cases before Høgsterett. Thus, 
because little data on cases of consensus (non-unanimous cases) in Høgsterett has been 
available through Doranoh
49
, dissent cases alone have been the focus of research. Focusing 
merely on a small part of the available data can be problematic, however. 
                                                 
47
 Particularly for unanimous cases.  
48
 Lovdata automatically collects law references from the published legal arguments.  
49
 The database was expanded in 2011, see Bergset (2011). 
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When studying gender effects in judicial panels, Peresie (2005:1764-5) points out that non-
unanimous cases by definition involve disagreement. As such, any theoretical approach to 
gendered behaviour which assume gender differences, must also assume that justices are also 
more likely to disagree over gender lines in non-unanimous cases.  
 
Say, for example, that no effects are found when modelling the judicial vote on an aggregate 
of the gender variable (a measure of the gender balance in the panels). This reason for this 
might be that when judicial panels are divided, male and female judges tend to end up on 
opposite sides, as is the case both in Skivenes’ (2010) small-N selection and in Kjønstad’s 
(1999:101-2) argument for potential gendered behaviour. Even though this was the case, we 
still had no reason to assume that female and male judges were not perfectly able to 
compromise in unanimous cases, where perhaps the number of female judges in panel might 
affect the voting pattern of male judges (or the other way around). Seemingly, if gender 
differences prove to be strong in the following analysis, including only cases of dissent, could 
lead to a faulty conclusion that gender only can explain variation within the panels, and not 
between the panels. This is similar to what King et al. (1994:129-137) refers to as selection on 
the dependent variable. 
 
As such, excluding cases of consensus means excluding a large selection of cases where an 
aggregate panel effect of gender might explain more of the gendered voting behaviour of 
judges. This is particularly a concern for the Informational approach to gendered behaviour, 
in which we need to assume that judges affect their peers’ attitudes through deliberation in the 
panels. When studying panel effects, cases of consent are particularly interesting, as it is 
interesting to observe whether unanimous judicial decisions can be the result of other factors 
than merely legal factors. 
 
Despite the extra cost of data collection, based on the above methodological considerations 
both cases of consensus and dissent are included in the present analysis. 
4.3.3 Limited to a single case field 
Another potential bias, the narrow selection of cases in the present thesis, is similar to what 
King et al. (1994:137-8) refers to as selection on an explanatory variable. The case field is 
chosen because it is a gendered issue and because there are theoretical reasons to assume that 
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gender effects can be observed in these kinds of cases. As such, the analysis is searching for 
gendered differences only where differences are likely to be found. However, since this 
selection procedure does not predetermine the outcome of the analysis, this does not cause 
any inference problems, according to King et al.  
 
In addition, Peresie (2005:1765) argues that several analyses of gendered judicial behaviour 
are flawed because they include a broad range of case types, rather than focusing on particular 
case fields. It would be unreasonable to assume that legal factors, such as the sources of law, 
did not make out a large part of the explanatory factors for judicial behaviour in Høgsterett 
(see e.g. Epstein and Knight (2013), Sunde (2012b) or Bentsen (2012)). As such, it is 
reasonable to assume that potential individual effects, i.e. gendered effects, are reliant upon 
particularities of the cases being studied, such as the case field. By including too broad a 
range of cases and not controlling for the impact of case particularities, gendered effects 
restricted to specific case fields (such as cases of child custody) are minimised.  
 
That said, within the theoretical framework of this thesis, the Different voice approach 
assumes gendered effects to be found within all types of cases, while the other two models 
restrict these effects to gender-related issues. An analysis including – and controlling for – 
both gendered and non-gendered issues would therefore strengthen the validity of the results. 
The choice to, despite this, narrow the selection down to a single case field, is a matter of 
pragmatism due to the heavy workload associated with the collection of data. 
4.3.4 Potential bias: Lack of important control variables 
Peresie (2005:1765) argues that the analyses of Farhang and Wawro (2004) and Massie et al. 
(2002) are empirically flawed in that they have failed to control for enough individual 
characteristics of the justices. This results in potential over-estimation of gender effects, or 
all-out spurious effects (Grønmo, 2004:295, 366-8, Skog, 2009:37-45). She recommends 
including control variables representing judges’ past careers, age, and federal appellate 
experience in addition to ideology and race. In the Norwegian context, race would more or 
less be a constant. The remaining four factors are included in the analysis, however. This can 
never serve as a guarantee against spurious effects, however. 
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4.4 Operational definitions of variables 
4.4.1 Dependent and explanatory variables 
Table 4.1: Operationalisation of the dependent and the explanatory variable(s) 
Theoretical concept Variable Operationalization 
Dependent variable 
Dependent variable Vote for the feminine party 
Dummy variable. Coded 1 if the judge 
votes for a party where a mother is 
represented. A vote for a party 
representing the father alone or the public 
interest is coded 0. 
Individual level explanatory variables 
Gender  Female judge 
Dummy variable: Coded 1 if the judge is a 
woman and 0 if the judge is a man. 
Critical actors Critical actors 
One dummy variable for each relevant 
judge. Coded 1 if the voting judge is the 
judge in question. All other coded 0. 
Panel level explanatory variables 
Gender and critical mass 
At least one woman present;  
Female majority in panel;  
Presiding judge is female 
Dummy variables. Coded 1 if the panel 
consists of a majority of female judges; 
one woman is present; or the presiding 
judge in the panel is female.  
All other coded 0. 
Percentage of women in panel 
Metric variable. Percentage of women in 
each panel. Values: 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 
and 1. 
Critical actors’ peer effect Critical actors present in the panel 
Dummy variable. Coded 1 if one of the 
identified “critical actors” are present. All 
other coded 0. 
Case particular explanatory variables 
Case particularities 
Feminine party’s lawyer is female; 
Opposing party’s lawyer is female 
Dummy variables. Coded 1 if the lawyer 
of the feminine party is female. All other 
coded 0. 
Opposing party represents the 
public interest  
(child welfare service) 
Dummy variable. Coded 1 if the party 
opposing the female party is represented 
by the public. In all other cases, the 
opposing party is the child father. These 
are coded 0. 
Time 
Years since 1968 
Metric variable. Years since the 
appointment of the first female judge in 
Høgsterett in 1968.  
After 1987 (dummy) 
Dummy variable. Coded 1 if the case was 
conducted after 1987 and 0 if it was coded 
before 1978. 
 
Dependent variable 
As can be seen in Table 4.1, the dependent variable in this analysis is a dummy variable 
measuring whether an individual judge has voted in favour of the claim presented by a 
feminine party or the opposing party in cases of child custody.  
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A “feminine party” is here understood as any party where a woman (i.e. a mother) is 
represented
50
. Specifically, the concept includes observations where a) a mother stands alone, 
and b) where both the mother and the father is represented together. On the other hand, the 
concept excludes any party where no mother is present, such as where c) only the father is 
represented, or d) the public interest (the Child Welfare Service) is represented.  
 
Essential to the coding of this variable lies a qualitative evaluation within each case of which 
party the judges in the judicial panel has ruled in favour of. At the start of every trial, both 
parties enter a formal claim. The evaluation consists of comparing each party’s initial claim to 
the verdict that the judge voted in favour of. Although the verdict is seldom equal to any of 
the two initial claims, it is always closer to one of the two. That party, whose initial claim is 
nearest to the verdict that the individual judge voted for, is considered to have been voted in 
favour of
51
.  
Explanatory variables 
The main explanatory variable on the individual level is a dichotomous measure of the voting 
judge’s gender.  
 
To measure the collegial effects of gender, four measures of the panel gender balance is 
included in the analysis. The first three of these are dummy variable. The first identifies all 
panels where there is at least one woman present. The second identifies panels with female 
majority and the third identifies panels where the presiding judge is female. Finally, a metric 
variable is included to measure the percentage of women in the panel 
Critical actors 
As described in the analytical strategy presented in the previous chapter, Critical actors are 
identified as part of the analysis. To do this an individual level dummy variable is coded for 
all judges who have partaken in ten or more cases within this selection. To measure any 
collegial effects of the critical actors, panel level dummies are coded to identify the panels in 
which the relevant critical actor is present. 
                                                 
50
 Duly noted, in absolutely all cases the child’s mother was represented on one or the other side. 
51
 This is not unproblematic. According to Høgsterett, its purpose is “to ensure uniformity, clarity and 
development of the law”. As such, arguably, judges in Høgsterett are supposedly more concerned with precedent 
than the actual case at hand. 
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Case particularities 
Dummy variables have been coded to identify panels in which either the feminine party or the 
opposing party is represented by a female lawyer.  
 
To measure time, a metric variable has been coded, centred at the first year of the selection, 
which is the year when Lily Bølviken was appointed the first female judge in Høgsterett. In 
effect, cases set before the court in 1968 are given the value 0 on this variable, 1969 has got 
the value 1, etc. until 2011, which is represented by the value 43. Centring the variable to a 
zero-point that can be observed in the selection is important for meaningful interpretation of 
the coefficients in the analysis. 
 
An additional dummy variable has been coded to provide a crude measure of the most and 
least recent time-period of the selection. The dummy “After 1987” roughly splits the selection 
in two parts over the temporal dimension. 
4.4.2 Control variables 
Individual level control variables 
As can be seen in Table 4.2 on the following page, Leftist appointment is a measure of 
whether the justice was appointed by a government under a Labour party prime minister.  
 
Grendstad et al. (2011b) found ideology, operationalised as a function of whether the justice 
had been appointed by a leftist government to be a significant factor in explaining the 
outcome of a selection of 63 non-unanimous cases of economic disputes where one of the 
parties represented the public interest in Høgsterett in the period between 2000 and 2007. 
Judges appointed by leftist governments were more likely to vote for the public party than 
others were. Similarly, Bentsen (2012) found that the propensity of justices in Høgsterett to 
dissent rises with the ideological spread in the panel in which they sit. Although it is hard to 
theorise an effect of the latter factor on the final outcome of cases of child custody, it is an 
indication of the importance of including a measure of judges’ ideology in analyses of judicial 
behaviour within the context of Høgsterett.  
 
Notably, as can be seen in Table 4.2, the variable has been given an operational definition 
including all governments with a Labour party prime minister. This means that the present 
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ruling coalition of Labour, the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party is included although 
the Centre Party is not traditionally understood to be a left wing party.  
 
Table 4.2: Operationalisation of all control variables 
Theoretical concept Variable Operationalisation 
Individual level control variables 
Ideological 
background 
Leftist appointment 
Dummy variable: Coded 1 if the judge 
was appointed by any government under 
a Labour party prime minister. All other 
coded 0. 
Geographical 
background 
Oslo-born 
Dummy variable: Coded 1 if the judge 
was born in Oslo. All other coded 0. 
Experience 
Age (c) 
Metric variable: The original values 
were a measure of each judge’s age at 
the time of voting. The variable has been 
centred at its mean value of ~60 (c). 
Seniority 
Metric variable. Counts the number of 
years the judge has been serving 
Høgsterett at the time of vote. 
Year of graduation (c) 
Metric variable. The original values 
were the years of graduation for each 
individual judge. The variable has been 
centred at its mean value of ~1952 (c). 
Graduated after 1968 
Dummy variable. Coded 1 if the judge 
graduated after the year of employment 
for the first female justice in Høgsterett.  
All other coded 0. 
Former work place 
Previously employed as judge;  
by the Attorney General of Civil Affairs;  
by the Director of Public Prosecution;  
or by the Legislation department 
Dummy variables: Coded 1 if the judge 
previously held the position in question. 
All other coded 0. 
Panel level control variables 
Geographical 
background 
Oslo-majority 
Aggregate from individual level. 
Dummy variable: Coded 1 if three or 
more of the judges in panel are Oslo-
born. All other coded 0. 
Experience Mean graduation year in panel (c) 
Aggregate from individual level.  
Metric variable. 
Case particularities Consensus 
Dummy variable. Coded 1 if there are no 
dissenting votes in the panel. Coded 0 if 
one or more judges dissent. 
 
 
The variable Oslo-Born is a dummy, identifying judges who are born in the capital of 
Norway, Oslo. In the aforementioned analysis, Grendstad et al. (2011b) also found that the 
justice’s geographical background, with the operational definition of whether or not the 
individual justice was born in Oslo had a significant effect on the outcome of the cases in their 
selection. Specifically, Oslo-born judges were more likely to vote for the public interest. 
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Age is a metric variable, identifying the age of the judge at the time of voting. Studying 
criminal cases before Høgsterett in the period from 1996 to 2011, Bentsen (2012) found age 
to have a significant and negative effect on the Supreme Court judges’ propensity to take out 
dissent. As study of child custody cases conducted by Drammens tidende (2009) on three 
local district courts also indicated that age had an effect on judges’ votes. This variable has 
been centred at its mean value of ~60 to enable meaningful interpretation of its coefficients in 
the analysis. This means that a value 1 on the variable is equal to one year older than the mean 
age, and consequently the values span both above and below 0. 
 
Seniority is a metric variable measuring how many years the judge has served Høgsterett at 
the time of voting. Skiple (2012) found judicial experience to significantly affect judges 
propensity to vote in favour of the public party. In this thesis, seniority has been added to 
control for potential similar effects. Because this variable has a natural zero-point that is 
observable within the selection, there is no need to centre this variable. 
 
Year of graduation
52
 is a metric variable measuring the year a judge was graduated. The 
farther back in time a judge has graduated, the longer time has this judge been acting her or 
his profession knowing of a female judge in the Supreme Court. This variable has been 
centred at its mean value of ~1952 to enable meaningful interpretation of its coefficients in 
the analysis. This means that a value 1 on the variable is equal to graduation one year later 
than the mean graduation year, and consequently the values span both above and below 0. 
 
The variable “Graduated after 1968” is a dummy variable which provides a rougher measure 
of the aforementioned effect. 
 
The four Former work place variables are dummies identifying votes cast by judges who have 
had the relevant work experience. There are good reasons to assume that the judges’ former 
work place might affect their perspectives and thus their voting pattern. Jacobsen (2012) 
found that judges who had been formerly employed in the Legislation Department in the 
Ministry of Justice and Public Security were significantly more prone to vote in favour of the 
                                                 
52
 This variable and the other measures of age and seniority has been tested for multicollinearity as accounted for 
in section 3.2.7 
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state in both unanimous and non-unanimous civil cases where the state was a party in the 
period from 1990 to 2010. This was also the case for judges who had been formerly employed 
as judges.  Skiple (2012) found similar effects for the legislation department, but not for 
former employment as judge. Bentsen (2012) found former employment by the Attorney 
General of Civil Affairs
53
 to significantly affect judges’ propensity to dissent. Similarly, 
former employment by the Director of Public Prosecution
54
 had a marginally significant effect 
on the judges’ propensity to dissent.  
 
On the panel level, the “Oslo-Majority” variable and the “Mean graduation year in panel” 
variables are aggregates of aforementioned individual level variables. The first identifies 
panels in which more than 50% of the judges are Oslo-born. The latter is the mean graduation 
year within each panel. These variables are constants within each panel and vary only 
between panels.  
 
Finally, Consensus is a dummy identifying panels in which all judges voted the same.  
                                                 
53
 Regjeringsadvokaten 
54
 Riksadvokaten 
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5 Empirical analysis 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Most of the variables included in the analysis are dichotomous, coded as dummy variables, 
ranging from 0 to 1. Thus, the variables function as “on/off switches” for the relevant 
phenomena (Midtbø, 2007:33-34). Because of this property, the mean value of a dummy 
variables can be interpreted as the proportion of observations in the sample that is equal to 1 
(Steele, 2009a:35). The only non-dichotomous variables are metric measures of time in one 
way or another. 
5.1.1 Dependent and explanatory variables 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables
55
 
   Female Male Total 
 Min Max Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. 
Dependent         
Vote for feminine party 0 1 .41 .49 .46 .50 .45 .50 
Individual level         
Female judge 0 1 1 0 0 0 .21 .41 
Panel level         
Collegial factors         
One woman present 0 1 1 0 .60 .49 .68 .47 
Female majority 0 1 .22 .42 .03 .16 .07 .25 
Presiding judge is female 0 1 .37 .48 .17 .37 .21 .41 
Percentage of women in  
panel 
0 1 .39 .20 .16 .16 .21 .19 
Case particularities         
Feminine party’s lawyer  
is female 
0 1 .23 .42 .14 .35 .16 .37 
Opposing party’s lawyer  
is female 
0 1 .21 .41 .17 .38 .18 .38 
Opposing party represents  
the public interest 
0 1 .35 .48 .36 .48 .35 .48 
Years since 1968 0 43 ~24 ~11 ~18 ~11 ~19 10.98 
After 1987 0 1 .64 .48 .46 .50 .49 .50 
Note: There are in total N=750 units at the individual level, 155 for female part and 595 for the male part of the 
sample. At the panel level, there are N=150 units, 31 for the female part and 119. There is no loss of 
observations. Source: Doranoh (Grendstad et al., 2013a) 
                                                 
55
 Descriptive statistics for variables identifying critical actors are presented where these have been identified. 
See section 5.2.3 Step 3: Identifying critical actors   
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Figure 5.1: Mean vote split by opposing party 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this analysis is dichotomous, coded as a dummy variable. We see 
from Table 5.1 that 45% of all votes cast in this sample have been cast in favour of the 
feminine party. There is a slight difference between the mean vote of male and female judges, 
where only 41% the female judges’ votes have been cast in favour of the female party.  
 
The slight overall tendency for judges to vote in disfavour of the female party in this selection 
immediately seems to counter the literature in the field
56
. There, the tendency has been a 
slight favouring of the female party as opposed to a male party. However, as we know from 
the data section, the present selection includes both cases where the opposing party is a 
representative of the public interest, and cases where the opposing party is the child father. 
This is the reason for the apparent divergence. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that there is a large 
difference between the mean vote
57
 in 
cases where the opposing party represents 
an individual man and cases where the 
opposing party represents the public 
interest. Specifically, where the opponent 
is an individual man, 57% of the votes are 
cast in favour of the female party, while 
only 24% of the votes are cast in favour of 
the female party where the opponent is a representative of the public. This tendency is more 
similar to what has been found in similar types of cases in the lower courts, where there also 
is a slight tendency for the female party to be favoured
58
. 
Individual level 
Looking back at Table 5.1, on the individual level, only 21 % of the total number of votes is 
cast by female judges. Table 5.2 below shows why this tendency should not be surprising. 
The first female judge in Høgsterett was justice Bølviken in 1968 – which is the very year 
marking the start of the case selection for this thesis. She was accompanied by justice 
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 See e.g. Drammens tidende (2009) and Skjørten (2005) in Ministry of Children and Equality (2008:22). These 
present calculations for the lower Norwegian courts, not Høgsterett. 
57
 Duly noted, this is the total vote (both female and male judges).  
58
 See previous footnote.  
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Schweigaard Selmer in 1971 and justice Holmøy in 1976. However, although Bølviken left 
her position in 1984, a fourth female judge was not appointed until justice Gjølstad entered 
the collegium in 1988. Thus, for the first twenty-year period since 1968, no more than three 
female judges had served the court at the same time, and not until justice Gussgard was 
appointed in 1990 did the number of female judges increase to more than three.  
 
Table 5.2: All permanent female judges in Høgsterett, by year of commencement 
Start date Name Birth Birth city Ending date 
31.05.1968 Lilly Bølviken 1914 Arendal 30.03.1984 
01.01.1971 Elisabeth Schweigaard Selmer 1923 Christiania* 30.09.1990 
01.10.1976 Vera Louise Holmøy 1931 Oslo 30.04.2001 
01.09.1988 Liv Gjølstad 1945 Tønsberg 2015 at the latest 
01.10.1990 Karenanne Gussgard 1940 Sandefjord 01.02.2010 
15.08.1994 Kirsti Coward 1940 Kristiansand 31.12.2010 
06.10.1997 Karin Maria Bruzelius 1941 Lund, Sweden 28.02.2011 
01.05.2000 Nina Frisak 1950 Oslo 14.11.2001 
01.05.2001 Ingse Stabel 1946 Oslo 2016 at the latest 
01.08.2004 Toril Marie Øie 1960 Oslo 2030 at the latest 
01.04.2007 Hilde Indreberg 1957 Oslo 2027 at the latest 
15.08.2009 Bergljot Webster 1966 Oslo 2036 at the latest 
09.08.2010 Kristin Normann 1954 Oslo 2024 at the latest 
01.10.2010 Ragnhild Noer 1959 Oslo 2029 at the latest 
Note: Except justice Noer, all female judges have cast one or more votes in the selection. The judges marked by 
grey background have cast votes in ten or more of the cases in the present selection of cases.  Temporary 
assignments are not included. *Christiania was the name of the capital, Oslo until 1925. 
 
Collegial factors 
In the twenty years following 1990, the number of women appointed to the collegium has 
increased considerably. Looking back at Table 5.1, we see that there has been at least one 
female judge present in 68% of the panels in this selection, with a mean panel-percentage of 
female judges of 21%. Female majority is seen in only 7% of the cases. In 21% of the cases, 
the presiding judge was female. Naturally, these numbers are higher for the votes cast by 
female judges, where – by definition – at least one female judge has to be present in all 
observations.  
Case particularities 
Further, Table 5.1 shows that the feminine party’s and the opposing party’s lawyer was 
female in 16% and 18% of the cases respectively. These numbers are slightly higher for votes 
cast by female judges. This is likely to be due to the time factor. Although the number of 
female Supreme Court lawyers is still very low (Aschehough, 2011), during the same period 
that more women have entered the judicial collegium, there has also been a slight increase in 
female Supreme Court lawyers. Thus, the likelihood of a female lawyer present increases with 
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the presence of female judges. Additionally, 35% of the votes are cast in cases where the 
opposing party is a representative of the public, while in the remaining 65% the opponent is 
the child father. This is equally distributed for both female and male votes. 
 
The last two explanatory variables are measures of time, assuming that the perception of 
gender roles will have changed over time. The first of these, Years since 1968, has the 
minimum value 0 (for 1968, the year of appointment for the first female Høgsterett justice 
and first year of the selection) and the maximum value 43 (for the last year in the selection, 
2011). The total mean vote in this selection was cast 19 years after 1968, i.e. in 1987. The 
standard deviation for this measure is approximately 11, indicating that the cases are evenly 
spread over the period. Note that there is a slight difference between the mean male and 
female vote on this variable. This is due to more female judges being employed in the court in 
the latter than the earlier years of the period. 
 
The last variable shows that 49% per cent of the cases are dated to a year between (and 
including) 1988 and 2011. The remaining 51% are dated to a year between (and including) 
1968 and 1987. The variable thus splits the observations in two approximately equally sized 
groups over the time scale, as intended. For the female votes, however, as many as 64% are 
cast in the latter period. 
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5.1.2  Control variables 
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of control variables 
   Female Male Total 
 Min Max Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. 
Individual level         
Leftist appointed judge 0 1 .60 .49 .66  .48 .64 .48 
Oslo-born judge 0 1 .43 .50 .38 .49 .39 .49 
Age (c) -19.68 10.32 -2.71 6.75 .71 6.49 ~0 6.69 
Seniority 0 28 8.12 5.96 8.87 6.63 8.71 6.50 
Year of graduation (c) -32.40 39.60 6.91 10.77 -1.80 13.92 ~0 13.78 
Graduated after 1968 0 1 .27 .44 .12 .32 .15 .36 
Previously employed as judge 0 1 .50 .50 .44 .50 .45 .50 
Previously employed by the  
Attorney General of Civil Affairs 
0 1 .05 .21 .23 .42 .19 .39 
Previously employed by the  
Director of Public Prosecution 
0 1 0 0 .08 .27 .06 .24 
Previously employed by the  
Legislation department 
0 1 .57 .50 .34 .47 .38 .49 
Panel level         
Collegial factors         
Oslo-majority 0 1 .34 .48 .32 .47 .33 .47 
Mean graduation year  
in panel (c) 
-26.40 27 4.86 11.71 -1.27 11.96 ~0 12.16 
Case particularities         
Consensus 0 1 .76 .43 .74 .44 .74 .44 
Note: There are in total N=750 units at the individual level, 155 for female part and 595 for the male part of the 
sample. At the panel level, there are N=150 units, 31 for the female part and 119. There is no loss of 
observations. Source: Grendstad et al. (2013a) 
 
Studying judges’ background in the present sample, Table 5.3 shows that 64 % of the total 
number of votes is cast by judges appointed by leftist-oriented governments. The slightly 
higher percentage for male votes on this variable is likely due to the historical fact that there 
were more leftist-oriented governments in Norway in the early period than in the latter part of 
the period. Additionally, 39% of the votes are cast by Oslo-born judges, a percentage that is 
somewhat higher (five percentage points) for the female votes than for the male. 
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Because the age variable is centred, its mean value is zero. The total standard deviation tells 
us that the mean spread around the mean age is approximately 6.5 years. Not surprisingly, we 
can also observe that the mean female vote is cast by a woman who is 2.71 years younger than 
the total mean, and almost 3.5 years younger than for the mean vote cast male judges. For the 
seniority variable, the difference between the two gender groups is more even, with less than a 
year difference between the two groups.  
 
A bit more surprising is to see that the difference in graduation year is as high as it is. The 
mean female vote is cast by a judge who has graduated almost seven years later than the total 
mean, almost nine years after the mean graduation for male judges. This could indicate that 
the female judges in this panel have spent quite a lot less time between their graduation and 
their accentuation into the collegium of the Supreme Court, than their male colleagues have. 
We should remember, however, that this is the mean of the 750 votes. It is clearly biased with 
the vote of some judges observed more than thirty times, while many of the judges have cast 
less than 10 votes in the selection.  
 
While only 15% of the votes are cast by judges who graduated after 1968, the remaining 85% 
are cast by judges who had never heard of a female Supreme Court judge before their 
graduation year. Clearly more female votes are cast by judges graduated after 1968. 
 
While half of the female votes are cast by judges previously employed as judges, only five per 
cent are cast by judges previously employed by the Attorney General. While the first of these 
does not differ very much from the male mean, the latter is clearly much lower. This is also 
the case for the Director of Public Prosecution, where the judges behind 8% of the male votes 
have been employed, while the same number for female votes is zero. For employment at the 
Legislation department, the tables are clearly turned. 
 
33% of all votes are cast in panels where the majority is Oslo-born. Not surprisingly, this is 
similar for the two gender groups. Notably is, however, that the female votes are cast in 
panels where the mean panel graduation year is notably lower than the similar for male votes. 
This is, however, explainable by the big difference at the individual level.  
 
Lastly, 74% of the votes are cast in unanimous panels. This will be further elaborated upon in 
the coming section.  
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5.2 Multi-level analysis 
5.2.1 Step 1: Empty models and intra-class correlations 
Table 5.4: Four empty two-level models of judges' propensity to vote for the feminine party 
 Full data set Only cases of dissent 
 Empty model 1 Empty model 2 Empty model 3 Empty model 4 
 Intra-panel 
dependencies 
Intra-individual 
dependencies 
Intra-panel 
dependencies 
Intra-individual 
dependencies 
 N = 150 (panels) 
N = 750 (votes) 
N = 88 (judges) 
N = 750 (votes) 
N = 39 (panels) 
N = 195 (votes) 
N = 61 (judges) 
N = 195 (votes) 
 coeff. s.e. p coeff. s.e. p coeff. s.e. p coeff. s.e. p 
intercept - .81 .58 .165 -.18 .10 .060 .01 .15 .943 .05 .20 .820 
Random      
level 2 res. 
variance 
(   
 ) 
36.48 .17 .02 .71 
ICC .92 .05 .01 .18 
LR test  
vs. flat 
logistic 
regression 
*** 
p<.001 
*** 
p=.006 
 
.460 
** 
.011 
AIC / BIC 588.643 / 597.883 1030.224 / 1039.464 274.312 / 280.858 269.008 / 275.554 
Note: The dependent variable is individual judges’ propensity to vote for the feminine party. 
The analysis is run using the xtmelogit command with 24 integration points in Stata. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
 
The first step in the analysis is to estimate the intra-class correlation (ICC) in an empty 
model assuming votes to be grouped within the panels in which they are cast. This can be 
seen in Empty model 1 in Table 5.4. As explained in section 3.3.2, the ICC in this estimation 
is a statistical measure of how much of the variance that happens between the five-judge 
panels, rather than within the panels. A naïve interpretation of the ICC presented in the table 
is that 92% of the variance in the dependent variable needs to be explained by factors on the 
second level of analysis (related either to the composition of the panel or to particularities of 
the individual case at hand). This leaves 8% per cent of the variance, remaining to be 
explained by factors related to the individual judges.  
 
This result is well within the limits of what Acock (2010:239) describes as an “extremely high 
level of agreement”, and needs a bit of explanation. First, consensus is the norm of the court.  
Cases of dissent make out approximately 20% of all cases in general (Aschehough, 2012). In 
the present selection, this number is somewhat higher with dissenting votes in one out of four 
cases
59
. Second, even when there is dissent in a panel, normally only one of the judges 
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 To be precise, there is one or more dissenting votes registered in 41 out of 150 (26%) in this selection.  
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dissent. This can be illustrated by comparing the percentage of individual dissents with the 
previously calculated percentage of dissent cases: Although there is dissent in 26% of the 
cases, only 8%
60
 of the votes are actual dissents. The remaining 92% vote with the majority of 
the panel, which is the same estimation as was given by the ICC.  
 
In other words, the ICC simply tells us how many votes are cast in consensus with the 
majority fraction of the class we define. This can help understanding and interpreting the ICC. 
In this particular case, the class was defined by the panels, but in Empty model 2 in Table 5.4, 
analysed in the following section, the class is defined by the judges rather than the panels as a 
measure of whether the judges “agree” with themselves. 
 
Although the ICC does not tell us anything we could not have found by simply calculating the 
rate of dissent, it is still a useful statistic. The ICC is a statistic commonly used to evaluate 
whether or not we should assume a certain hierarchical structure in the analysis of our data. 
An ICC close to 92% tells us that the data does have a hierarchical structure, with parts of the 
explanation belonging to two different levels. This is a strong statistical argument in favour of 
the chosen multilevel structure (see Hox (2010:4-5)), rather than a “flat” logistical analysis. 
This conclusion is further supported by a likelihood-ratio test showing that the explanatory  
power of the hierarchical model is significantly improved from that of a “flat” logistic 
model
61
.  
Intra-individual dependencies in the full data set 
A similar empty model with the data clustered in judges rather than panels gives a quite 
different and interesting result. The intra-class correlation is calculated to 0.05, naïvely 
interpreted to meaning that five per cent of the variance in the dependent variable is due to 
intra-individual dependencies. In the previous section, we calculated an expected 8% of the 
variance to be due to changes related to neither panel composition nor case particularity. The 
present result is only two percentage points lower and ought to be seen as pretty close. 
Notably, since we assume two completely different data structures in the two calculations, it 
would be unreasonable to expect the two calculations to overlap completely.  
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 The frequency of individual dissents is 61 out of 750 votes (8%). 
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 This is explained by Hox (2010:47-50) 
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By comparing the information criteria AIC and BIC
62
 for the first two empty models in Table 
5.4, we see that the goodness of fit is clearly lower when we group the votes by judges rather 
than in panels. This is a strong statistical argument for preferring the chosen two-level design 
where votes are grouped by panels rather than judges. 
Auto-dependencies when including only cases of dissent 
In the two last columns in Table 5.4, we see similar empty models calculated when only cases 
of dissent are included. In these models, we should note that level 1 N is now reduced from 
750 to only 195. On the two potential second levels, the number of panels is reduced to only 
39 from 150, and the number of judges is 66, rather than 88. 
 
Interestingly, the ICC in this is calculated to only 1 % when the votes are clustered in panels. 
This is a striking difference from the 92% intra-class correlation in the full data set including 
consensus cases. Not surprising then, the LR-test also shows that the multi-level structure 
does not provide any significantly improved explanatory power. Following this trail, in the 
fourth model in Table 5.4 the votes in only cases of dissent are grouped by judges rather than 
by panels. The ICC is now calculated to 18%, indicating a significant variance explained at 
the individual level in this part of the data set, and the LR-test shows that the explanatory 
power is significantly improved with this multi-level structure rather than a flat analysis. 
 
Within the selection of dissent cases, the AIC/BIC is slightly improved in the model where 
votes are grouped by judges, opposite from that of the full data set, although the differences 
are notably smaller. Comparing the two selections, however, we see that the models fit much 
better when including only cases of dissent. 
Summing up: a substantial interpretation 
The substantial interpretation of these numbers is that – unsurprisingly – in cases of dissent, 
factors related to the judges themselves (as opposed to the particularities of the individual 
cases or the composition of panels) are much more prominent than in cases of consensus. 
Factors related to individual judges’ background, such as their gender, where they grew up or 
former work places should be expected to explain twice as much of judges voting pattern 
when a judicial panel is split by dissent. See i.e. Bentsen (2012) for an analysis of why judges 
take out dissent in Høgsterett.  
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5.2.2 Step 2: The general effect of gender 
Table 5.5: Exploring the general effect of gender on the individual level 
Variables 
Block 1 
Gender 
Block 2 
Individual  
ideology 
Block 3 
Geographical 
background 
Block 4 
Experience 
Block 5 
Former  
work place
63
 
 coeff. s.e. p coeff. s.e. p coeff. s.e. p coeff. s.e. p coeff s.e. p 
Intercept -.64 .60 .28 -.78 .64 .23 -1.00 .62 .11 -.82 .70 .24 -.51 .69 .456 
Female judge -.86** .42 .04 -.83* .42 .05 -.92** .42 .03 -.80* .45 .08 -.79* .47 .096 
Leftist appointed judge    .19 .33 .56          
Oslo-born judge       .89*** .34 .01 .81** .35 .02 .93*** .36 .009 
Age of judge (c)          -.05 .06 .47    
Seniority of judge          -.03 .04 .41    
Year of graduation (c)          -.09* .05 .07 -.04 .02 .115 
Graduated after 1968          -.01 .76 .99    
Prev. emp. as judge             -.68** .36 .058 
Prev. emp. by the Attorney 
General of Civil Affairs 
            -.46 .54 .389 
Prev. emp. by the Director 
of Public Prosecution 
            -.12 .73 .868 
Prev. emp. by the 
Legislation department 
            -.46 .37 .219 
Random effects      
Level 2 residual variance 38.03 38.11 39.31 42.30 41.03 
Intra-class correlation .920 .921 .923 .928 .926 
LR-test .04** .56 >.01*** .21 .284 
AIC BIC 586.1908 600.051 587.8422 606.3225 580.9869 599.4671 583.0472 620.0078 582.0387 623.6194 
Note: The dependent variable is individual judges’ propensity to vote for the feminine party. There are N=750 observed votes within n=150 panels with five votes in each. 
The analyses are run using the xtmelogit command with 24 integration points in Stata. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. “(c)” indicates variable centred at mean. LR-tests 
compare with the previous block which significantly contributed to the explanatory power of the model. In addition, where the entire block itself does not contribute to the 
explanatory power of the model, but one or some of the explanatory variables do and are included in the following blocks, the LR-test compares with downscaled versions of 
the block, because comparison to a rejected model is meaningless. Stata output for the downscaled versions can be found in the appendix for reference.
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Gender on the individual level 
A different voice: Male judges are more likely to vote in favour of the feminine 
party 
The first block of Table 5.5 shows an estimate of the likelihood for female and male judges to 
vote for the feminine party in cases of child custody when controlling only for the group 
structure chosen in the first step of analysis. The tendency is negative and significant on a five 
per cent level, both in terms of a z-test and an LR-test comparing this block to the previously 
presented empty model. This indicates that female judges are less likely to vote in favour of 
the feminine party than male judges are. Specifically, the odds of a female judge voting in 
favour of the female party in cases of child custody are 58% lower than that of a male judge
64
.  
 
As expected, the intra-class correlation (ICC) remains approximately unchanged from the 
empty model to block 1 in Table 5.5. Because the ICC mainly relies on differences in the 
level-2 variance term in logistic analyses, this implies that the gender distribution does not 
vary a great deal from panel to panel (see section 3.3.2 and Steele (2008:18-21) for reference).  
 
When controlling only for the group structure of the data, we find strong support for 
hypothesis 1, that “Male and female judges vote significantly different from each other”, thus 
the results so far favours all other approaches than the Organisational one (see Table 2.2, 
summarising the analysis’ expected effects).  
 
Despite the significant gender effect, however, we do not find any support for hypothesis 2, 
that “Female judges are significantly more likely to vote in favour of the female party”. The 
effect goes in the opposite direction, thus disfavouring the assumption made on behalf of the 
Representational approach. This will be further discussed later on. 
 
Hypothesis 3, which in effect is the null-hypothesis of the two previously discussed 
hypotheses, assuming that “Any difference found in the voting pattern of male and female 
judges is purely random” does not find any support so far. 
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 The exponential regression coefficient in logistic regression analysis can be interpreted as an odds ratio (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008:252-3, Leckie, 2010b:P6.6.2). The estimated percentage decrease in odds can thus 
be calculated by the formula “              ”, where   is the coefficient (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 
2008:249, Eikemo and Clausen, 2007:92, Leckie, 2010b:P6.6.2).  
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Judges born in the capital are more likely to vote in favour of the feminine party 
In the following four blocks of Table 5.5, this “gender effect” is tested by controlling for 
factors related to each individual judge. In every block, a new group of individual-level 
control variables is introduced.  In block 2 we find that the chosen measure of ideology, 
operationalized as whether the judge was appointed by a leftist oriented government, does not 
provide any significant prediction of judges’ voting pattern in cases of child custody.  
 
However, in the third model, the measure of geographical background, operationalized as 
whether or not the judge is born in Oslo has a clearly significant effect on judges’ voting 
pattern. This block tells us that, controlling for the effects of gender and the chosen group 
structure, the predicted odds of an Oslo-born judge to vote in favour of the feminine party is 
as much as 144% higher than a judge born elsewhere.  
 
Both the LR-test
65
 and the two information criteria supports the conclusion that the geography 
variable improves the model and should be included in the further analysis. The variable does 
not, however, seem to have any significant effect on the estimated coefficient for the gender 
variable.  
 
Block 4 and 5 are both abandoned as a whole based on both the LR-test and a comparison of 
the two information criteria against block 3. In block 4
66
, controlling for judges’ experience, 
however, we see that the judges’ year of graduation provides a marginally significant effect 
on the outcome. A new analysis of this block was therefore run, letting only year of 
graduation measure judges’ experience (see appendix, section 7.4). In this analysis, although 
the variable’s coefficient is still only marginally significant (p=.052), the LR-test showed a 
significant improvement of explanatory power. Based on the LR-test, the graduation year 
variable is therefore included in further analysis, although the two information criteria 
indicate that it has little effect on the model’s goodness-of-fit. 
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 As noted in the table (Table 5.5), the test is run vs. the “previous significant model”, understood as the 
previous model with significantly improved explanatory power. In this case, block 1. 
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 Particularly with regard to block 4, in which several of the explanatory variables can seem to measure the 
same phenomenon, at all steps of the process, the data has been tested for multicollinearity, as accounted for in 
section 3.2.7. 
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As a similar case, in block 5, controlling for former work experience, the variable measuring 
whether the judges have been previously employed as judges in the lower courts before 
entering the high court seems to have a significant effect on the outcome. This block was also 
tested again, with only the significant variable (see appendix, section 7.5). In this reduced 
block, neither the coefficient, nor the LR-test came out significant and the information criteria 
indicated no significant change in the model’s goodness-of-fit. This variable was thus rejected 
together with the rest of block 5. 
Summing up: Gender and geography affects judges’ voting pattern 
On the individual level, we are thus left with two significant predictors: Gender, measured as 
being female and geography, measured as being born in the capital. These two variables are 
included in the further analysis, exploring the effect of gender on the collegial level.  
 
Having controlled for ideology, geographical background, experience and former work place, 
we see in Table 5.6 that female judges are significantly less likely to vote in favour of the 
female party than are male judges. Similarly, judges born in Oslo, as opposed to anywhere 
else
67
, are more likely to vote in favour of the female party. The analysis also indicates that 
the more recently a judge graduated, the lower are the odds that he or she votes in favour of 
the female party. This last effect is only significant on a ten per cent level, and we should 
therefore be careful with assuming that we can generalise based on this result. 
 
Table 5.6: The effect of gender, not controlling for collegial/panel effects or critical actors 
 coefficient standard error p-value Summary 
intercept -1.03 .63 .101 Level 1 units (N)  
750 (judges) 
 
Level 2 units (N) 
150 (panels) 
Female judge -.82* .43 .057 
Born in Oslo .84** .34 .014 
Year of graduation (c) -.04* .02 .052 
level 2 residual variance 40.17 
LR test  
vs.  
flat logistic regression:  
p<.01 
intra class correlation .924 
LR-test vs. empty model <.01 
AIC / BIC 579.0732 / 602.1735 
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Note: The dependent variable is individual judges’ propensity to vote for the feminine party. There are N=750 
observed votes within n=150 panels with five votes in each. The analyses are run using the xtmelogit command 
with 24 integration points in Stata. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. “(c)” indicates variable centred on mean.  
 
Duly noted, the intra-class correlation calculated in the empty model gives a clear indication 
that whatever effects we find on the individual level can contribute to explain only as much 
8% of the total variance in the outcome variable. As expected
68
, this has not changed 
significantly although we have found three explanatory variables on the individual level to 
significantly affect the outcome in the dependent variable. The main remainder of explanatory 
power is left on the collegial or panel level, which is the next step of the analysis. 
 
So far, the analysis of individual level factors supports hypothesis 1 and rejects hypotheses 2 
and 4. Thus, the results weaken the organisational approach and also contradict the direction 
of the gender effect as it is expected on behalf of the representational approach. 
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 The level-1 residual variance is fixed because of the logistical recoding of the dependent variable. See section 
3.3.2. 
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Gender on the collegial level 
Table 5.7 Exploring the effect of gender on the collegial level 
Variables 
Block 1 
Gender 
Block 2 
Aggregate controls 
Block 3 
Case particularities 
Block 4 
Time 
 coeff. s.e. p coeff. s.e. p coeff. s.e. p coeff. s.e. p 
Intercept -1.95* 1.07 .070 -10.39 106.59 .922 .86 1.04 .406 -.76 1.19 .521 
Female judge -.86* .44 .050 -.83* .43 .056 -.86** .43 .043 -.95 .42 .025 
Born in Oslo .83** .34 .015 .79** .34 .021 .85** .34 .012 .89 .34 .008 
Year of graduation (c) -.04* .02 .050 -.04* .02 .090 -.02 -.02 .319    
At least one woman pres. -.09 2.33 .968          
Female majority -5.27 4.06 .194          
Percentage of women 6.44 7.50 .391          
Presiding judge female .01 1.60 .990          
Majority born in Oslo    2.08 1.32 .115       
Panel mean grad. year    .01 .06 .935       
Feminine party has female lawyer       .75 1.55 .630    
Opposing party has female lawyer       -.43 1.53 .780    
Opposing party is public       -5.15*** 1.35 .000 -5.89*** 1.45 .000 
Consensus       -.28 1.18 .814    
Years since 1968          .15 .10 .114 
Last half of the selection          -2.27 2.06 .271 
Random effects     
Level 2 residual variance 38.72 39.70 32.88 30.84 
Intra-class correlation .923 .924 .909 .904 
LR-test .562 .268 .001*** .258 
AIC BIC 584.095 625.6756 580.4362 612.7767 566.6378 603.5984 563.2667 595.6072 
Note: The dependent variable is individual judges’ propensity to vote for the feminine party. There are N=750 observed votes within n=150 panels with five votes in each. 
The analyses are run using the xtmelogit command with 24 integration points in Stata. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. “(c)” indicates variable centred at mean. LR-tests 
compare with the previous block which significantly contributed to the explanatory power of the model. In addition, where the entire block itself does not contribute to the 
explanatory power of the model, but one or some of the explanatory variables do and are included in the following blocks, the LR-test compares with downscaled versions of 
the block, because comparison to a rejected model is meaningless. Stata output for the downscaled versions can be found in the appendix for reference.
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Judges are not affected by the gender of their peers 
The interpretation of Table 5.7 can be conducted in a similar fashion to that of Table 5.5. The 
main difference is that, in addition to the inclusion of the three significant variables from the 
individual level analysis, the variables entered in this part of the analysis are positioned on 
level 2 of the analysis. The observations on these variables vary only between panels, and are 
constant within the panels. 
 
Already in block 1, we see that although they are seemingly affected by their own gender, 
Høgsterett judges are not affected by the gender of their peers in cases of child custody. This 
block introduces four measures of the gender composition of panels, none of which prove 
significant
69
. This leads to the dismissal of hypotheses seven through ten, as presented in 
Table 2.2 on page 14. There are no empirical grounds to assume that the gender effect is 
affected by the presence of a critical mass of female judges (H7); that the gender balance in a 
panel affects the voting pattern of its judges when controlling for individual gender (H8); that 
the voting pattern of all judges in a panel is affected by having just one female judge present 
(H9), nor; that the gender of the presiding judge affects the voting pattern of judges in the 
panel (H10). 
 
The results in the first block are, however, in accordance with hypothesis 11, which in effect 
is the null-hypothesis of all four previous hypotheses, assuming that “The voting pattern of 
judges is not affected by the gender balance in the panel”.  
 
This result strongly disfavours the Informational approach to explaining gendered behaviour 
in the courtroom. In this approach, we would have to assume that men and women vote in 
different fashions because of their differing informational background. A logical consequence 
of this is that information could spread from men to women or the opposite way in 
deliberative forums, which a judicial panel arguably is. Since the judges’ voting pattern was 
not affected by any measure of their peers’ gender composition, we ought to assume that this 
has not happened. This strengthens both the Representational and the Different voice accounts 
of gendered behaviour. 
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 Because of the relative importance of these variables to the research question, the analysis has also been run 
with only one and one of these measures included. None of them proved to be significant. 
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If the public is a party, judges are less likely to vote in favour of the female party 
In block 2, just as in block 1, none of the panel-level aggregates of significant variables from 
the individual level proves significant. The variables are therefore rejected, a conclusion is 
supported by both the LR-test and the information criteria.  
 
Block 3 introduces three measures of case particularities, of which two are related to the 
gender of lawyers. All three prove not to be significant, and we reject hypothesis 14, 
assuming that “Any individual gender effect is strengthened if the party which female judges 
are more likely to vote in favour of is represented by a female lawyer”.  
 
In the same block, however, we find that there is a clearly significant and seemingly strong 
difference in judges’ voting pattern between cases where the female party is opposing a 
representative of the public (i.e. the childcare services) and cases where the female party 
opposes the child’s father. As presented in this block, the odds of voting for the female party 
are as much as 99 % lower if the opposing party is a representative of the public interest, 
rather than the child’s father. This is consistent with the literature on Høgsterett. The public 
interest has a generally lower overall rate of loss than private interest. 
 
Controlling for this variable does not seem to have any particular effect on the other 
coefficients in the analysis, except that the individual measure of judge gender is now 
significant within the five per cent level. This contradicts hypothesis 15, assuming that “Any 
individual gender effect will be strengthened when controlling for whether the female party’s 
opposing party is a male individual or a representative of the public.” This conclusion is 
further supported by the LR test and the two information criteria. 
 
Not surprising
70
, the inclusion of this variable does have a small impact on the estimated 
intra-class correlation, which is reduced by a little more than one percentage points from the 
model of individual effects, presented in Table 5.6 on page 64. This shows that this variable 
controls for a small part of the level 2 variance. When the change in ICC turned out to be 
somewhat low, this is partly related to the low number of votes cast in cases where the 
opposing party is a representative of the public (35%, see section 5.1.1). 
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 See section 3.3.2 for a discussion of the ICC in logistic analyses. 
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The fourth variable introduced in block 3 is a control for whether there is dissent in the panel 
in question or not. This coefficient proves insignificant in explaining the outcome. 
Time has no effect 
Block 4 introduces two measures of time, none of which seems to provide a significant 
prediction of the outcome. This contradicts hypothesis 16, assuming that “Any individual 
gender effect will be alleviated by the number of years women have served alongside men in 
the court”.  
 
This result also disfavours the informational approach. Because the informational background 
is what makes male and female judges act differently, we would have to assume that the more 
time has passed since the first woman was introduced into the judicial collegium, and the 
more women are present in the collegium, the more will judges of both genders have 
deliberated together in different panels. This ought to alleviate the differences in 
informational backgrounds, contrary to the assumptions made in the Representative and – 
especially – the Different voice accounts of gendered behaviour. Thus, the rejection of the 
alternative hypothesis and confirmation of the null-hypothesis is, in this case, effectively to 
the favour of the Representative and Different voice approaches. 
Summing up the collegial effect of gender 
Table 5.8: Effect of gender controlling for collegial/panel effects, but not critical actors 
 coefficient standard error p-value Summary 
Intercept .86 .72 .231 Level 1 units (N)  
750 (judges) 
 
Level 2 units (N) 
150 (panels) 
Gender -.93** .43 .030 
Born in Oslo .89*** .34 .009 
Opposing party is public -5.62*** 1.51 .000 
level 2 residual variance 34.76 
LR test  
vs.  
flat logistic regression:  
p<.01 
intra class correlation .914 
LR-test vs. previous best 
model 
.000 
AIC / BIC 561.8051 / 584.9055 
Note: The dependent variable is individual judges’ propensity to vote for the feminine party. There are N=750 
observed votes within n=150 panels with five votes in each. The analyses are run using the xtmelogit command 
with 24 integration points in Stata. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. “(c)” indicates variable centred on mean.  
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As the Organisational approach was clearly weakened when modelling judicial behaviour on 
individual level variables, the Informational approach has clearly been weakened when 
testing for collegial effects.  
 
We find that the gender effect at the individual level is neither affected by the gender 
composition in the panels, nor is it alleviated over time, indicating that the presence of women 
in court has not led to any significant general change in practice, except in terms of the 
factually different behaviour of male and female judges. 
5.2.3 Step 3: Identifying critical actors 
The next step of the analytical strategy (see section 3.3.4) is to identify potential critical actors 
among the judges in the selection. To recapitulate, the purpose of this is twofold. First, as 
discussed in the methods chapter (see section 3.2.4), the chosen multi-level research design is 
based on a compromise due to computational limitations. There are very good reasons to 
assume both intra-panel dependencies and intra-individual dependencies. The present two-
level research design, however, only accounts for the first of these two. The identification of 
critical actors and introduction of these into the analysis as control variables should thus 
introduce a certain degree of control for the last of the two types of dependencies. Second, 
although of limited immediate interest, the information gained from this part of the analysis 
should be of empirical interest in itself, as it sheds light on the inner workings of the judicial 
collegium in the court.  
Potential critical actors – descriptive statistics 
Table 5.9 below lists the judges in Høgsterett ordered by their frequency of appearances in 
child custody cases (between 1968 and 2011), excluding 56 judges who have appeared in 
fewer than ten such panels. Female judges are marked by grey background. We can see that 
the three female judges who have appeared in most such panels, justices Holmøy, Gjølstad 
and Selmer, have all appeared in more than twenty, ranging from 23 to 30 observations. 
Similarly, for male judges, justices Christiansen, Aasland and Sinding-Larsen are ranging 
from 29 to 35 observations, not surprisingly summing up to a higher share of the cases. 
 
The vote column refers to the dependent variable in the analysis. Being a dummy, this can be 
interpreted as a proportion, a percentage measure, of how many times the judge in particular 
has voted in favour of the female party. For the 56 judges who have voted in fewer than ten 
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panels, the share is approximately 50% in favour of the feminine party. This diverges by only 
five percentage points from the general mean of 45% (see Table 5.1 on page 52). 
 
Table 5.9: Judges in Høgsterett ordered by frequency of appearances in child custody cases 
Name Observations Vote Background Høgsterett 
 Freq. % Cum. % Mean s.d. Birth Birth place Active 
Arne Christiansen 35 4.67 % 4.67 % .46 .51 1926 Oslo 1974-1996 
Gunnar Aasland 33 4.40 %   9.07 % .39 .50 1936 Bærum 1979-2006 
Vera Louise Holmøy 30 4.00 % 13.07 % .67 .48 1931 Oslo 1976-2001 
Tore Sinding-Larsen 29 3.87 % 16.80 % .62 .49 1929 Bergen 1977-1997 
Liv Gjølstad 28 3.73 % 20.67 % .29 .46 1945 Tønsberg 1988- pres. 
Rolv Hellesylt 25 3.33 % 24.00 % .36 .49 1927 Synnylven 1979-1997 
Elisabeth S. Selmer 23 3.07 % 27.07 % .35 .49 1923 Christiania* 1971-1990 
Jan Rasmus Skåre 21 2.80 % 29.87 % .38 .50 1929 Førde 1978-1998 
Jens Bugge 21 2.80 % 32.67 % .52 .51 1930 Oslo 1982-2000 
Knut Blom 21 2.80 % 35.47 % .57 .51 1916 Christiania* 1968-1986 
Steinar Tjomsland 20 2.67 % 38.13 % .15 .37 1948 Kristiansand 1991- pres. 
Finn Backer 19 2.53 % 40.67 % .47 .51 1927 Oslo 1986-1997 
Karenanne Gussgard 19 2.53 % 43.20 % .21 .42 1940 Sandefjord 1990-2010 
Helge Røstad 18 2.40 % 45.60 % .39 .50 1923 Kristiansand 1975-1993 
Tore Schei† 18 2.40 % 48.00 % .33 .49 1946 Oslo 1986-pres. 
Lilly Helena Bølviken 17 2.27 % 50.27 % .47 .51 1914 Arendal 1968-1984 
Kirsti Coward 16 2.13 % 52.40 % .31 .48 1940 Kristiansand 1994-2010 
Hans Methlie Michelsen 14 1.87 % 54.27 % .57 .51 1920 Bergen 1972-1990 
Trond Dolva 14 1.87 % 56.13 % .29 .47 1934 Kongsberg 1984-2004 
Andreas Endresen 13 1.73 % 57.87 % .46 .52 1908 Stavanger 1959-1978 
Egil Endresen 13 1.73 % 59.60 % .23 .44 1920 Stavanger 1977-1988 
Jan Frøystein Halvorsen 13 1.73 % 61.33 % .38 .51 1928 Oslo 1983-1995 
Ketil Lund 13 1.73 % 63.07 % .77 .44 1939 Oslo 1990-2009 
Nils Peder Langvand 13 1.73 % 64.80 % .39 .51 1929 Volda 1984-1996 
Einar Løchen 11 1.47 % 66.27 % .55 .52 1918 Bærum 1977-1985 
Hans Flock 11 1.47 % 67.73 % .46 .52 1940 Melhus 1996-2010 
Magnus Aarbakke 11 1.47 % 69.20 % .36 .51 1934 Tysnes 1994-2002 
Rolv Einar Ryssdal† 11 1.47 % 70.67 % .55 .52 1914 Laksevåg 1964-1984 
Carl Ludovico Stabel 10 1.33 % 72.00 % .33 .52 1912 Christiania* 1964-1982 
Charles Philipson 10 1.33 % 73.33 % .50 .53 1928 Oslo 1984-1990 
Jens Christian Mellbye 10 1.33 % 74.67 % .40 .52 1914 Christiania* 1968-1982 
Sigurd Juell Lorentzen 10 1.33 % 76.00 % .80 .42 1916 Sunndal 1972-1979 
Trygve Leivestad 10 1.33 % 77.33 % .30 .48 1907 Tromsø 1958-1977 
56 remaining judges with 
 <10 appearances  
170 22.67 % 100 % .51 .50  
  
Total 750 100 %  .45 .50    
Note: Female judges marked by grey background colour. Only judges who have partaken in the present selection 
of child custody cases are included. *Christiania was the name of the capital, Oslo, until 1925. †Chief justice 
(justice Ryssdal served as chief justice between 1969 and 1984, justice Schei has been serving since 2002. Both 
former chief justices Sandene and Smith have fewer than ten observations). “Observations” refers to how many 
votes are observed from the relevant judge in this sample of judicial panels. “Vote” refers to the dependent 
variable of the analysis. Because this is a dummy variable, the mean vote can be interpreted as a percentage 
measure of how often the relevant judge has voted in favour of the feminine party. The total vote is the mean vote 
for the entire sample. 
 
Compared to this, one judge, justice Tjomsland, stands out with less than 20% of the votes in 
favour of the female party. In addition, justices Leivestad, E. Endresen, Dolva, Gussgard and 
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Gjølstad have all voted in favour of the feminine party in somewhere between 20% and 30% 
of the cases. In the other end of the scale, two judges stand out in particular. Justice Lorentzen 
has voted in favour of the feminine party in 80% of the cases, closely followed by justice 
Lund at 77%. In addition, justices Holmøy and Sinding-Larsen have both voted for the 
feminine party in more than 60% of the cases. 
Identifying consistent voting patterns – the bivariate analyses 
Table 5.10 below provides a summary of the significant results in the process of identifying 
critical actors in the present selection of cases
71
. As stated in the analytical strategy (section 
3.3), any judge whose identifying dummy variable is found to predict the outcome in the 
dependent variable on a five per cent level, is understood to have a consistent voting pattern. 
Coefficients significant on a ten per cent level are considered marginally significant and 
introduced in further analysis. Notably, these analyses are bivariate, and do not control for any 
potential effect of other judges. 
 
Table 5.10: Judges identified as potential critical actors 
Judge level Bivariate – consistent voting pattern Trivariate – peer effect 
  coeff. s.e. p-value LR-test coeff. s.e. p-value LR-test 
          
Leivestad individual -3.69** 1.84 0.046 ** 
0.016 
-3.90** 1.98 0.049  
0.623 n:10 in panel    1.17 2.39 0.623 
          
Tjomsland individual -2.83** 1.29 0.029 *** 
0.010 
-2.59** 1.25 0.039 * 
0.090 n: 20 in panel    -2.88* 1.75 0.099 
          
Schw. Selmer individual -2.07** 1.03 0.045 ** 
.030 
-2.12** 1.05 0.044  
.739 n: 23 in panel    0.54 1.62 0.739 
          
Sinding-Larsen individual 1.76* .94 0.061 ** 
.046 
1.64* .93 0.078  
.318 n: 29 in panel    1.47 1.49 0.322 
          
Holmøy individual 1.69** .86 .050 ** 
.038 
1.51* .85 .074 * 
.091 n: 30 in panel    2.41 1.47 .100 
Note: The dependent variable is individual judges’ propensity to vote for the feminine party. In the bivariate 
analyses, the LR-test compares with an empty, unconstrained model, while in the trivariate analyses the LR-test 
compares to the respective bivariate model. The analysis is run using the xtmelogit command with 24 integration 
points in Stata. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. n=the frequency of panel attendance by the judge in question. 
 
We can see from the results in the bivariate models that – when controlling for nothing but the 
chosen multi-level structure of the data – justices Leivestad, Tjomsland (male) and 
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 Only those judges who are identified as critical actors are included. A full overview, including all judges (with 
10 or more observations), is presented in the appendix for reference. 
 
Empirical analysis 
Kurt-Rune Bergset    Page 73 of 92 
 
Schweigaard Selmer (female) seem to have been voting significantly consistent in disfavour 
of the female party. The bivariate predictions range from 87% (Schw. Selmer), via 94% 
(Tjomsland) to 97% (Leivestad) lower odds of these judges voting for the female party than 
the other judges in the selection. 
 
On the opposite, we find justice Holmøy (female), who seemingly – and controlling only for 
the data structure – have been voting significantly consistent in favour of the female party. In 
addition, we find that the pattern of justice Sinding-Larsen’s (male) votes is similar to that of 
Holmøy, but only marginally significant, on a ten per cent level. These two judges are 
predicted to have between four and five times higher odds of voting for the female party than 
other judges in the selection. 
 
Finally, a test analysis run with all five potential critical actors included as explanatory 
variables can be found in the appendix (see section 7.3.2). When modelling the dependent 
variable on all critical actors at once, the p-value of almost all coefficients increased, but all 
remain marginally significant on the ten per cent level and will be included in the further 
analysis. 
 
Inter-individual dependencies revisited 
Controlling only for the chosen multi-level structure of the data, the results of the bivariate 
critical actors analyses lend support to hypothesis 4, assuming that “Some individual judges – 
so-called critical actors – will vote consistently either in favour of disfavour of the female 
party throughout the cases”. This is another72 indication that there are significant inter-
individual dependencies in the present data, and that it is unreasonable to run an analysis of 
these data without any mechanism to control for these effects.  
Critical actors diverge from the general trend 
The results seem not to support to hypothesis 5 either. This hypothesis sets out that “A large 
majority of the judges who are identified as critical actors will vote consistently in favour of 
the female party throughout the cases”. Only one of the two female critical actors, justice 
Holmøy, seems to be leaning towards the female party, while the second female judge, justice 
Schweigaard Selmer, however, seems to lean in the opposite direction. While justice Holmøy 
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is accompanied by male critical actor justice Sinding-Larsen, justice Schweigaard Selmer is 
accompanied by both justices Leivestad and Tjomsland. 
 
This divergence within the gender groups for the critical actors also contradicts hypothesis 6, 
assuming that “Any judges identified as critical actors will vote consistently in favour of their 
gender group’s preferred party”. Of the female judges, only Schweigaard Selmer votes in 
agreement with the gender effect found in the previous models of gendered behaviour, where 
female judges are less likely to vote for the female party than male judges are. Justice 
Holmøy, on the other hand, stands out as an anti-woman, with a voting pattern contrary to the 
predicted pattern of her gender group. With regard to the three male critical actors, we see the 
same pattern, where two of three, justices Leivestad’s and Tjomsland’s predicted voting 
pattern has the opposite direction of their gender group’s voting pattern. These results 
disfavour the Different voice approach, in which we should assume that male and female 
perspectives are fundamentally different. 
 
Notably, any final conclusions with regard to these hypotheses are dependent on the outcome 
of step four of the analysis, adding the effect of critical actors to the gender model. 
Some statistical reservations with regard to the critical actors analysis 
The similar direction of effect in Leivestad’s, Tjomsland’s and Schweigaard Selmer’s 
coefficients could be due to a high degree of “panel overlap”. These three judges could have 
coincidentally partaken in several of the same panels, in which the case particularities were so 
clear that the outcome was given. However, Schweigaard Selmer and Leivestad only served 
together in two panels (Rt-1971-1253 and Rt-1976-644), while the combinations Schweigaard 
Selmer and Tjomsland, and Tjomsland and Leivestad never occur in the same panel. Seeing 
that all of these judges have served in at least ten panels (excepting Tjomsland, at least 
twenty, see Table 5.9 above), this is not a high overlap. Similarly, we can count three cases in 
which both justices Holmøy and Sinding-Larsen partake in the same panel (Rt-1984-728, Rt-
1985-179 and Rt-1987-598). This does not constitute a high overlap either. 
 
Additionally, because dissenting votes stand out as variation within panels, we could imagine 
that the bivariate analyses in this test mainly picks out only those judges with high dissent 
rates, i.e. votes in opposition to their peers in panel. This would exclude any judges who 
actually affect their peers’ voting pattern and do not need to dissent. As presented in section 
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5.2.1, the average rate of dissent against the majority vote in this selection is 8%. Compared 
to this, three of the identified critical actors do have somewhat higher dissent rates: As much 
as 20% of justice Leivestad’s votes; 17% of justice Schweigaard Selmer’s votes; 13% of 
justice Holmøy’s votes are dissenting votes. However, justice Tjomsland’s dissenting votes 
count 10%, only slightly above the mean, while justice Sinding-Larsen’s dissenting votes 
count 7%, slightly below. This gives an average dissent rate for the five critical actors of 11%, 
only 3 percentage points higher than the general mean. 
Identifying peer effects – the trivariate analyses 
The rightmost column of Table 5.10 shows us that, of the five justices identified as critical 
actors in the bivariate analyses, only in the case of Tjomsland does the aggregate “Tjomsland 
in panel” variable show a marginally significant effect on the outcome. In the case of Holmøy, 
however, as with Tjomsland, the LR-test also shows marginally significant improvement of 
the model’s explanatory power when including the aggregate variable. With a preferred 
significance level of five per cent, these results lend little support to hypothesis 13, assuming 
that “The presence of a critical actor in a panel significantly raises the likelihood of a judge 
voting in favour of the critical actor’s preferred party”. This disfavours the Informational 
approach, in which we should assume that a critical actor would be able to provide unique 
information to any deliberative panel about his or her attitudes to a matter, thus also affecting 
her or his peers’ attitudes.  
 
The general impression from the final part of identifying and measuring the effect of critical 
actors on their peers is that however much some judges seem to vote significantly consistent, 
this is mainly an expression of individual particularity. The critical actors identified here do 
not seem to affect their peers’ voting pattern in any significant manner, but rather show a 
slight tendency of divergence. 
 
The next step of the analytical strategy is to add the effects of the identified critical actors to 
the gender model as a control for inter-individual dependencies. 
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5.2.4 Step 4: Adding the effect of critical actors to the gender model 
Table 5.11 Exploring the impact of critical actors  
Variables 
Block 1 
Critical actors individually 
Block 2 
Critical actors peer effects 
Block 3 
Summing up: the significant effects 
 coeff. s.e. p coeff. s.e. p coeff. s.e. p 
Intercept 1.12 .81 .167 1.09 .84 .193 1.40* .72 .053 
Gender -1.32** .61 .031 -1.76*** .51 .001 -1.77*** .51 .001 
Born in Oslo .72* .39 .069       
Opposing party is public -6.24*** 1.67 .000 -5.41*** 1.52 <.001 -5.55*** 1.38 <.001 
Justice Leivestad (m) -4.19** 2.12 .048 -4.16** 2.00 .038 -4.30** 2.00 .031 
Justice Tjomsland (m) -2.38* 1.30 .067 -2.74** 1.26 .030 -2.74** 1.26 .030 
Justice Schweigaard Selmer (f) -1.24 1.29 .337       
Justice Sinding-Larsen (m) 1.83* 1.04 .080       
Justice Holmøy (f) 2.31** 1.10 .036 2.92*** .99 .003 3.04*** .99 .002 
Justice Leivestad in panel    -.64 2.37 .787    
Justice Tjomsland in panel    -.13 1.94 .948    
Justice Holmøy in panel    1.57 1.46 .284    
Random effects    
Level 2 residual variance 42.56 35.66 36.01 
Intra-class correlation .928 .916 .916 
LR-test <.001
73
 .726
74
 <.001
75
 
AIC BIC 547.9386 594.1394 553.3541 599.5548 548.6695 581.0101 
Note: The dependent variable is individual judges’ propensity to vote for the feminine party. There are N=750 observed votes within n=150 panels with five votes in each. 
The analyses are run using the xtmelogit command with 24 integration points in Stata. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. “(c)” indicates variable centred at mean. LR-tests 
compare with the previous block which significantly contributed to the explanatory power of the model. In addition, where the entire block itself does not contribute to the 
explanatory power of the model, but one or some of the explanatory variables do and are included in the following blocks, the LR-test compares with downscaled versions of 
the block, because comparison to a rejected model is meaningless. Stata output for the downscaled versions can be found in the appendix for reference.
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 LR-test against the best possible combination of variables from block 1 in this table (excluding Born in Oslo, Justice Selmer and Justice Sinding-Larsen from the equation).  
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 LR-test against the best model of both individual and collegial controls on the gender effect (see page 55). An LR-test comparing block 1 and three in this table 
automatically assumes that the third block is nested in the first because of the number of variables. This shows that the increase in explanatory power for block 1 compared to 
block three is only marginally significant (p=.081), favouring a rejection of block 1 for block 3. 
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Exploring the impact of potential critical actors 
The first block of Table 5.11 is a presentation of the gender model when controlling for the 
individual-level dummy variables identifying critical actors. The second block introduces the 
aggregate variables for those critical actors that are found to be significant on the basis of 
block 1 (this is further elaborated upon below). Block 3 is a presentation of the end product of 
this analysis, summing up all those effects found to be significant in the previous two blocks.  
 
All explanatory variables from the temporarily final model in step two of the analysis (see 
page 69) are reintroduced in this step of analysis, and the LR-test in both blocks 1 and 3 
compares to this temporarily final model. The main interest of this step is to examine to which 
degree inter-individual dependencies function as a bias in the analyses. First, each coefficient 
will be interpreted and investigated, before the effect on other coefficients can be analysed. 
The latter happens mainly on basis of block 3. 
Interpreting the critical actors’ coefficients 
Block 1 in the table confirms justices Leivestad’s and Holmøy’s significantly consistent 
voting pattern. These are included in the further analysis. Further, when controlling for 
gender, geography and the role of the opposing party, Schweigaard Selmer’s voting pattern no 
longer seems significantly consistent, and is excluded from further analysis.  
 
Although the direction of Justices Tjomsland’s and Sinding-Larsen’s coefficients is still the 
same, when controlling for the significant effects from previous parts of the analysis, these are 
now only marginally significant and fosters further investigation. Stata outputs of the stepwise 
removal of explanatory variables from block 1 to block 2 in the table above can be found in 
the appendix (see section 7.8). The model has been gradually reduced by first removing 
Schweigaard Selmer, continuing with the Oslo-variable
76
, Sinding-Larsen and, in the end 
Tjomsland. Each reduced block was tested by LR-tests, concluding that controlling for neither 
Schweigaard Selmer, the Oslo effect, nor Sinding-Larsen contributes significantly to the 
explanatory power of the model as a whole. In the opposite direction, the model including a 
control for the Tjomsland variable seems to have significantly improved explanatory power 
compared to a reduced model without the Tjomsland variable, indicating that this coefficient 
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should be refined in further analysis. This leaves us with justices Leivestad, Holmøy and 
Tjomsland as controls for inter-individual dependencies. 
 
Unsurprisingly, introducing the aggregate critical actors’ variables in block 2 provides little 
improvement. In accordance with the previous step of the analysis, none of the coefficients 
are significant or contribute to the model, a conclusion supported by the LR-test.  
 
Block 3 is the summary of the two previous blocks, including only the explanatory variables 
found to have a significant effect on the outcome. This forms the basis for the following step 
of analysis, which is to examine whether inter-individual dependencies function as bias in the 
analyses. 
The Oslo effect is a spurious critical actors effect 
First, the coefficient for the geography variable is fairly similar from Table 5.8 to block 1 in 
Table 5.11 above. When controlling for critical actors, however, geography has gone from 
being clearly significant on a one per cent level to being only marginally significant, raising 
its p-value almost seventyfold. Seemingly, this is a spurious effect, where diverse inter-
individual dependencies coincidentally have been lying in the background dragging this 
coefficient up.  
 
To explain this, we need to have a look at the critical actors themselves: On one side, justice 
Holmøy, who tends to vote in disfavour of the feminine party, is Oslo-born and has boosted 
the “Oslo effect”. On the other side, justices Tjomsland and Leivestad are both born outside of 
Oslo and tend to vote in disfavour of the feminine party. Thus, they have similarly contributed 
to the negative effect of not being from Oslo. All together, these three justices have voted 60 
times in this selection of cases, enough to have a strong influence on the Oslo variable. Thus, 
methodologically, the observation that only three strong individuals – critical actors – can 
account for an entire spurious effect illustrates the importance of controlling for inter-
individual dependencies in future analyses of judicial behaviour. In this case, a potential type 
II error has been avoided. 
The gender effect is strengthened 
With regard to the gender coefficient, we see that this is both severely strengthened and has 
gone from being marginally significant (p=.053) before controlling for critical actors, to being 
clearly significant on a one per cent level in block 3 of the table above. This contradicts 
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hypothesis 12, assuming that “Parts of any individual gendered voting pattern found in the 
analysis can be explained by the presence of a critical actor in the panel”. To reject the null-
hypothesis in this regard we would have to see a significant weakening of the gender effect, 
not a strengthening. Similar to several results before, this disfavours the informational 
approach, which assumes that information contributed from critical actors in deliberative 
panels would affect other judges’ voting pattern. 
 
The fact that gender comes out as a strengthened predictor of individual judges’ voting pattern 
can be explained in a similar fashion as with the spurious Oslo effect. Justice Holmøy, a 
female judge, has been voting consistently in favour of the feminine party, while justices 
Tjomsland and Leivestad, both male judges, has been voting consistently in disfavour of the 
feminine party. In a manner of speaking, we can say that Holmøy has been voting as an anti-
woman, while Tjomsland and Leivestad have been voting as anti-men. All three have thus 
significantly weakened the general effect of gender, another conclusion illustrating the 
importance of testing for inter-individual dependencies. In this case, a potential type I error 
has been avoided. 
5.2.5 Steps 5 and 6: Varying slopes and cross-level interactions 
So far, only random intercept models have been run. The next step of analysis is a random 
coefficient model, as recommended by Hox (2010) and according to the analytical strategy 
presented in sections 3.3.6 and 3.3.7. Because this is a very demanding process (Hox, 
2010:58), one and one coefficient is tested for varying slopes and compared to the previous 
block with an LR-test. Stata outputs of this process can be found in the appendix (see section 
7.9). They are not included here because none of the slopes proved to have any significant 
variance components between the panels. Because this process forms the basis for the last step 
of the analytical strategy, there is no basis to move forward to the last step of the analysis, 
examining cross-level interactions. 
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5.2.6 The final model of gendered behaviour in Høgsterett  
Table 5.12: The final model  
 coefficient standard error p-value Summary 
Intercept 1.40* .72 .053 
Level 1 units (N)  
750 (judges) 
 
Level 2 units (N) 
150 (panels) 
Gender -1.77*** .51 .001 
Opposing party is public -5.55*** 1.38 <.001 
Justice Leivestad -4.30** 2.00 .031 
Justice Tjomsland -2.74** 1.26 .030 
Justice Holmøy 3.04*** .99 .002 
level 2 residual variance 36.01 
LR test  
vs.  
flat logistic regression:  
p<.01 
intra class correlation .916 
LR-test vs. previous best 
model 
<.001 
AIC / BIC 548.6695 / 581.0101 
Note: The dependent variable is individual judges’ propensity to vote for the feminine party. There are N=750 
observed votes within n=150 panels with five votes in each. The analyses are run using the xtmelogit command 
with 24 integration points in Stata. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. “(c)” indicates variable centred on mean.  
 
Table 5.12 is a presentation of the end-result of the analysis and, because step 5 and 6 of the 
analytical strategy proved unfruitful, this is equal to block 3 of Table 5.11, which summed up 
the effects of adding controls for critical actors to the analysis. 
 
Studying the final model, we see that female judges in Høgsterett are significantly less likely 
to vote for the female party in child custody cases than are male judges. Controlling for the 
structure of the data, the nature of the opposing party and three critical actors, we find that the 
odds of female judge voting in favour of the female party is as much as 83% lower than that 
of a male judge
77
. Additionally, and with the same constraints, we see that the odds of a judge 
– regardless of gender – voting in favour of the female party is as much as 99% lower if the 
opposing party is a representative of the public, rather than a male individual. 
Male and female judges are likely to exercise discretion differently 
When interpreting these results, however, we should keep in mind that this analysis controls 
for the panelled structure of the data. This means that calculated odds cannot be interpreted as 
straightforward as in a flat logistic analysis. The intra-class correlation (ICC) has remained 
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quite stable at approximately 92% during the entire analysis
78
. As discussed at the first step of 
the analysis (section 5.2.1), this leaves only 8% of the variance in the outcome to be explained 
by variables on the individual level. Variables measuring collegial factors related to gender, 
geographical background and experience in Table 5.7 did not turn out to have any significant 
effect on the outcome. The only variable on the collegial level to show significant effect on 
the outcome is a measure of case particularities, the nature of the opposing party, but adding 
this variable did not have a large impact on the ICC. 
 
What this shows us is that this model explains just a fraction of the variance in the dependent 
variable, and we should therefore not assume that this is a good model to predict the outcome 
of child custody cases, or even to predict the voting pattern of judges within this category of 
cases.  
 
What it does tell us something about is the nature of the impact of gender on judicial 
behaviour: In this respect, it gives us a clear indication that when judges exercise discretion, 
female and male judges are likely to end up with quite different conclusions.  
 
To gain insight into why this is the case, we need to evaluate to which degree any of the four 
general approaches to gendered behaviour seem to be strengthened by the results of the 
analysis. The following section is an evaluation of the four approaches in lieu of the empirical 
analysis.  
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Table 5.13: Summary of the hypothesis evaluation 
Theory Expected effect Actual effect Evaluation 
Expected individual effects 
Different voice, Informational, 
Representational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Organisational 
H1: “Male and female judges vote 
significantly different from each 
other” 
Gender is a 
significant factor 
in predicting 
judges’ votes. 
Hypothesis 
confirmed 
Representational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Organisational 
H2: “Female judges are 
significantly more likely than male 
judges to vote in favour of the 
female party” 
The effect of 
gender goes in the 
opposite 
direction. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
Organisational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Different voice, Representational, 
Informational. 
H3: “Any difference found in the 
voting pattern of male and female 
judges is purely random” 
Gender is a 
significant factor 
in predicting 
judges’ votes. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
Informational, Representational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Organisational 
H4: “Some individual judges – so-
called critical actors – will vote 
consistently either in favour or 
disfavour of the female party 
throughout all cases” 
Several critical 
actors were 
identified. 
Hypothesis 
confirmed 
Representational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Organisational 
H5: “A large majority of the judges 
who are identified as critical actors 
will vote consistently in favour of 
the female party throughout the 
cases” 
Critical actors 
voted in both 
ways within each 
gender group. In 
the final model, 
only one of three 
voted for the 
female party. This 
was also the only 
woman.  
Hypothesis 
rejected 
Different voice 
 
Disfavouring: 
 
H6: “Any judges identified as 
critical actors will vote consistently 
in favour of their gender group’s 
preferred party” 
Critical actors 
voted in both 
ways regardless 
of gender 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
Expected collegial/panel effects 
Informational, Representational,  
 
Disfavouring: 
Different Voice 
H7: “Any individual gender effect 
will be strengthened in panels with 
a critical mass – a majority – of 
women.” 
No measures of 
gender on the 
panel level were 
significant. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
Informational 
 
Disfavouring:  
Representational, Different voice, 
Organisational 
H8: “Controlling for any 
individual effect of gender, the 
voting pattern of judges is affected 
by the gender balance of the panel 
in which they vote.” 
No measures of 
gender on the 
panel level were 
significant. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
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Informational 
 
Disfavouring:  
Representational, Different voice, 
Organisational 
H9: “Having at least one woman 
present will affect the voting 
behaviour of all judges in the 
panel.” 
No measures of 
gender on the 
panel level were 
significant. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
Informational 
 
Disfavouring:  
Representational, Different voice, 
Organisational 
H10: “Controlling for any 
individual effect of gender, the 
gender of the presiding judge will 
affect the voting pattern of other 
judges in the panel.” 
No measures of 
gender on the 
panel level were 
significant. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
Organisational, Representational 
Different voice 
 
Disfavouring: 
Informational. 
H11: “The voting pattern of judges 
is not affected by the gender 
balance in the panel” 
No measures of 
gender on the 
panel level were 
significant. 
Hypothesis 
confirmed. 
Informational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Representational, Organisational, 
Different voice 
H12: “Parts of any individual 
gendered voting pattern found in 
the analysis can be explained by 
the presence of a critical actor in 
the panel in which they cast their 
vote.” 
Controlling for 
critical actors 
strengthened the 
gender effect. We 
should have 
expected the 
opposite effect. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
Informational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Different voice, representational, 
organisational 
H13: “The presence of a critical 
actor in a panel significantly raises 
the likelihood of a judge voting in 
favour of the critical actor’s 
preferred party.” 
None of the 
critical actors 
significantly 
affected their 
peers’ voting 
pattern. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
Expected effects of case particularities 
Different voice 
 
 
H14: “Any individual gender effect 
is strengthened if the party which 
female judges are more likely to 
vote in favour of is represented by 
a female lawyer” 
The gender of 
lawyers does not 
have significant 
effect on judges’ 
votes. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
Representational 
H15: “Any individual gender effect 
will be strengthened when 
controlling for whether the female 
party’s opposing party is a male 
individual or a representative of 
the public.” 
Controlling for 
who the opposing 
party represents 
had no significant 
effect on the 
gender 
coefficient. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
Informational 
 
Disfavouring: 
Representational, Different voice 
H16: “Any individual gender effect 
will be alleviated by the number of 
years women have served alongside 
men in the court” 
None of the time 
measures were 
significant. 
Hypothesis 
rejected. 
Note: This is summary of the hypothesis evaluation conducted section 5.2, as part of the analysis.  
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5.3 Evaluating the four approaches 
The table below summarises the evaluation of hypotheses conducted throughout the analysis 
section. In the following section, each theoretical approach’s ability to explain the observed 
gendered behaviour is evaluated based on the outcome of the hypothesis tests.  
 
Both the Organisational and the Informational approaches are rejected based on the 
hypothesis tests, and these two are evaluated first. After this, the weaknesses and strengths of 
the two most promising approaches, the Representational and the Different Voice approaches, 
are evaluated. The implications of the present evaluation are presented in the next and final 
chapter of the thesis. 
5.3.1 The Organisational approach is weakened 
Table 5.13 provides a summary of the hypothesis evaluation conducted throughout the 
analysis chapter. The first hypothesis to be tested was the suggestion that “male and female 
judges vote significantly different from each other” (H1). Because the Organisational 
approach assumes that gender has no influence on the behaviour of judges, a confirmation of 
this hypothesis clearly disfavours this approach. It would also be an automatic dismissal of 
H3: “Any difference found in the voting pattern of male and female judges is purely random”, 
which is inferred from the Organisational approach and in effect is the null-hypothesis of H1.  
 
The confirmation of H1 and dismissal of H3 clearly weakens the Organisational approach’s 
rejection of gendered behaviour. The present analysis shows that male and female judges do 
have significantly different voting patterns. The confirmation of hypothesis 4, that “Some 
individual judges – so-called critical actors – will vote consistently either in favour or 
disfavour of the female party throughout all cases”, further weakens the Organisational 
approach. In combination, these two findings give a clear impression that judges are more 
than their education and professional background. 
 
However, although the Organisational approach seems to fail in its assumptions on gendered 
behaviour, we should not reject it all together. The final gender model in the analysis seems to 
explain only a fraction of the outcome in the dependent variable. By far, most of the variation 
in the judicial votes is explained by either collegial factors or case particularities which the 
gender approaches in this analysis do not (and does not intend to) touch. This accords with the 
most recent statistical analyses of judicial behaviour in Høgsterett, concluding with the need 
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for a stronger focus on case particularities in future analyses (see Bentsen (2012:88), Skiple 
(2012:87) and Jacobsen (2012:93)). Similarly, Sunde (2012a:196-7) has called for the 
addition of measures of how judges make use of the sources of law. It also accords with the 
international development of the field of judicial behaviour, as scholars are increasingly 
calling for models that incorporate a wider range of explanatory factors (see e.g. Epstein and 
Knight (2013:25)). 
5.3.2 The Informational approach does not explain the gender effects 
The Informational approach is the only approach to gendered behaviour within which we can 
expect general collegial effects of gender. The hypotheses 7, 8, 9 and 10 (see Table 5.13), 
inferred from the Informational approach, all assume that a panel’s gender balance – in some 
form – affects the votes of its judges. Hypothesis 7 set out that serving on a panel with a 
critical mass of female judges would change the gender effect for judges. Hypothesis 8 is the 
assumption that the gender balance in itself affects the vote. Hypothesis 9 suggests that having 
just one woman present affects the vote of the panel peers, and, finally; hypothesis 10 is the 
assumption that a female presiding judge can affect the votes of her peers.  
 
All of these hypotheses were rejected through the empirical analysis. The only significant 
effect found on the collegial level was a measure of case particularity – whether the opposing 
party is a representative of the public or a private party – and not a collegial effect per se. 
Consequently, hypothesis 11, which in effect is the null-hypothesis of the three 
aforementioned hypotheses, assuming that “The voting pattern of judges is not affected by the 
gender balance in the panel” was confirmed.  
 
No critical actors were found to have any collegial effects on their peers’ votes. What should 
be noted, however is that controlling for the individual effect of critical actors did 
strengthened the gender effect. The hypothesis inferred from the Informational approach, 
however, was an assumption of the opposite effect. Furthermore, hypothesis 16, assuming that 
“Any individual gender effect will be alleviated by the number of years women have served 
alongside men in the court”, was also rejected. None of the two measures of time have any 
effect on the voting pattern of judges in child custody cases.  
 
As a conclusion, although female and male judges generally seem to exercise discretion in 
differing manner, this analysis gives no indication of any collegial effects of gender. The 
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results of the empirical analysis clearly contradict the explanations inferred from the 
Informational approach, within which we need to assume that gender differences are rooted in 
the two gender groups’ differing informational background. Female and male judges are 
assumed to bring different general experiences with them into their profession, and this 
affects their reasoning and voting behaviour. Through deliberation in the judicial panel judges 
should thus be able to affect each other’s reasoning and voting behaviour. This does not seem 
to be a good explanation of gendered behaviour in child custody cases before the Supreme 
Court of Norway.  
 
This conclusion is added to a line of mutually contradicting analyses of gendered judicial 
behaviour in different contexts. For example, it contradicts Boyd et al.’s (2010) results from 
the US context, but concurs with the findings of Ostberg and Wetstein (2007) who found “no 
evidence that justices from the opposite sex moved toward each other’s ideological positions” 
in the Canadian Supreme Court. 
5.3.3 The Representative and Different Voice approaches 
The final two approaches to gendered behaviour are the Different Voice approach and the 
Representative approach. Both approaches assume differences between male and female 
judges and none of the two assume any collegial gender effects. As such, they fare better in 
explaining the gendered behaviour in this category of cases than the two previously evaluated 
approaches. On the other hand, both of these seem to have weaknesses in explaining the 
gendered behaviour of judges in child custody cases.  
Evaluating the Different Voice approach 
Where the Representational approach assumes that female judges (and perhaps a few male 
judges) act as representatives of a perceived “female class”, the Different Voice approach 
assumes that male and female reasoning is fundamentally different altogether. Hypothesis 6 
inferred from the Different Voice approach suggest that “Any judges identified as critical 
actors will vote consistently in favour of their gender group’s preferred party”. This is 
reasonable because female judges should be reasoning in a female manner if the Different 
Voice assumption was true. What the analysis showed, however, is that the two female judges 
identified as critical actors in section 5.2.3, voted in both ways regardless of gender. 
Additionally, all three critical actors who were included in the final model voted in dis-
accordance with their gender group association. Clearly, individual exceptions to any norm 
exist, and we should also expect that in this case. These are but a few individuals, but the 
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results do indicate that gender differences are not as deeply rooted as would be assumed with 
a Different Voice approach.  
 
An additional assumption made particularly on behalf of the Different Voice approach is that 
“Any individual gender effect is strengthened if the party which female judges are more likely 
to vote in favour of is represented by a female lawyer” (H14). This is based on a similar 
argument as above: If male and female reasoning differs in a fundamental manner, we can 
imagine that women are better equipped to convince other women than other men. 
Additionally, because female lawyers before Høgsterett are still the anomaly, we can assume 
that any differences between judges are strengthened particularly when a female lawyer is 
present.  
 
The hypothesis was rejected. The analysis gives no indication that judges are affected by the 
gender of the lawyers before the court.  
Evaluating the Representational approach 
The Representational approach is the only approach from which a particular direction of the 
gender effect was assumed in the theory section: “Female judges are significantly more likely 
than male judges to vote in favour of the female party” (H2). The rationale behind this 
hypothesis is that a representative of the interests of women should vote in favour of the 
woman in child custody, rather than e.g. the farther or the public interest. Partly as a logical 
consequence of this assumption, hypothesis 5 was also inferred from the Representative 
approach: “A large majority of the judges who are identified as critical actors will vote 
consistently in favour of the female party throughout the cases”. Critical actors in the 
Representational approach are understood to be “more class-conscious” than other actors. 
Because the critical actor’s by definition are diverging from the norm of the court, and 
because we should assume that the “male paradigm” is the norm, most critical actors’ 
divergence is likely to favour the female interest – regardless of the actors’ own gender. 
 
Both of these two hypotheses were rejected, weakening the Representational approach. A 
review the theoretical basis for these hypotheses could be fruitful, however
79
. The assumption 
made on behalf of the Representational approach is that voting in favour of “the female 
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interest” is equal to voting in favour the female party in a trial. Arguably, this assumption is 
narrower than need be. Behuniak-Long (1992), criticising Sherry’s (1986) seminal adaption of 
the Different Voice theory to the study of jurisprudence, separates between the two concepts 
“feminist jurisprudence” and “feminine jurisprudence”. In her study of Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s behaviour as the first female judge at the US Supreme Court, she argues that 
O’Connor’s jurisprudence could be both feminine and “deleterious to feminists”. With this 
criticism in mind, if we assume that female judges act as representatives of the female class, it 
is reasonable to assume that they vote in a feminist way. We can further assume that feminist 
jurisprudence is oriented towards a gender role pattern that is different from the traditional, 
and that a traditional gender role pattern is one where the best interest of a child is to be with 
its mother. As such, we could equally well infer from the Representative approach a 
hypothesis saying that female judges could be prone to vote in favour of the non-feminine 
party. 
 
As was mentioned under the evaluation of the Informational approach, serving on a panel 
with a critical mass of female judges does not seem to change the gender effect for judges in 
any way, leading to the rejection of hypothesis 7. The rationale for this hypothesis in the 
Representative approach is not one of direct collegial effects of gender, but that judges are 
rational actors who might abstain from voting for their preferred party unless they are in a 
favourable situation (see section 2.3.2).  
 
Furthermore, hypothesis 15, assuming that “Any individual gender effect will be strengthened 
when controlling for whether the female party’s opposing party is a male individual or a 
representative of the public” was also rejected. The nature of the opposing party has a very 
strong and significant effect on the voting pattern of judges, but the effect of gender is similar 
both before and after controlling for this factor. 
 
Finally, the confirmation of hypothesis 4, resulting from the identification of several critical 
actors fits well with the Representational approach, although the direction in which the actors 
voted is ill-fit with the assumptions in the theory chapter. 
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6 Implications for our understanding of gendered behaviour  
The introduction to this thesis was opened with a reference to journalist Inge D. Hansen’s 
(2010) summary of the process of a disputed child custody case after the split between a 
young couple with a child in common. Hanssen had observed that on every court level, this 
case had a different outcome, and on every level the outcome of the case seemed to correlate 
with the gender of the judges who cast the verdicts. One female district judge and a panel of 
only female Supreme Court judges (the only in this selection) voted in favour of the child 
mother. In the middle level, a panel of three male appellate judges found for the father. 
Hanssen’s open question question was: could this be a coincidence? 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine how gender affects the voting pattern of Norwegian 
Supreme Court judges in cases of disputed child custody, and it provides Hanssen with an 
answer
80
: It is a well-known story that humans are better at recognising patterns than 
recognising that the patterns are in fact coincidental. This seems to be the case also with 
Hanssen’s observation. The present analysis shows that, in child custody cases, female 
Supreme Court judges do tend to vote somewhat different from male judges in the same court. 
The tendency in the two gender groups is, however, opposite from the effect Hanssen meant 
to have seen. In addition, gender seems to explain only a fraction of why judges vote the way 
they do. As such, gender alone would be a very poor tool to predict how judges would vote in 
child custody cases. In an elaborate answer to Hanssen’s question, we could also add that the 
difference between male and female judges is likely to be best explained either in a class-
perspective or as an expression of fundamental differences in how men and women reason.  
 
This chapter summarises the results and lists the main implications of the analysis. The 
implications are split into three different categories: empirical, methodological, and 
theoretical implications. Suggestions for further research are given as part of the implications. 
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6.1 Empirical implications 
The thesis’ analysis has led to three main empirical observations:  
1) There is a significant difference in the voting behaviour of male and female judges in 
child custody cases.  
2) Some judges, so-called critical actors, exercise voting patterns that differs significantly 
from the norm of the collegium. 
3) Seemingly, most of the variation in judges’ voting pattern is related to particularities 
of the cases. 
1) Gender affects the judges of the Supreme Court of Norway 
Male and female justices do have voting patterns that significantly differ. Observing the final 
model of the analysis, we can calculate that the odds of a male Høgsterett judge voting in 
favour of the female party in a case of disputed child custody is 83% higher than for a female 
judge
81
. This result is strongly moderated by the fact that only 8% of the variation in the 
judicial vote is explainable by individual factors. We should therefore assume that the 
difference is more prominent in e.g. cases of dissent and when exercising judicial discretion. 
 
Controlling for a range of factors has not identified this to be a spurious effect. Rather, when 
adding the effect of critical actors to the model, gender stood out as a stronger explanatory 
variable than before.  
2) Critical actors 
One of the major findings in this analysis is the identification of critical actors who seem to 
diverge from the norm of the collegium by voting consistently either in favour or disfavour of 
the female party. The identification of critical actors in this analysis is interesting in itself. The 
present analysis provides little information about why theses judges stand out as critical 
actors, however. What makes justices Holmøy, Tjomsland and Leivestad diverge from the 
common pattern? 
 
A potential analysis of that question could be modelled on Skivenes’ (2010) Habermasian 
discursive analysis of three child custody cases before Høgsterett. Not focusing on how the 
legal method is implemented, Skivenes’ focus is on the logical consistency of the judges’ 
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argumentation, finding clear variance between the selected cases, both as to which arguments 
were included, and as to the quality of the justification of these arguments. Implementing this 
method to analyse the argumentation in child custody cases where the three critical actors 
were first-voters (i.e. writers of the judicial argument), could provide interesting insights into 
the behaviour of judges. 
3) Particularities of the cases seems to be important explanatory factors 
This analysis explains only a fraction of what makes judges vote in the manner that they do. 
In addition, it provides indications that a large part of the explanations is to be found in 
hitherto unmeasured factors related to case particularities. In this sense, the analysis accords 
with recent analyses of judicial behaviour in Høgsterett (see Bentsen (2012:88), Skiple 
(2012:87) and Jacobsen (2012:93)) and legal scholars (e.g. Sunde (2012a:196-7)) who has 
called for measures judges’ usage of the sources of law. See also Epstein and Knight 
(2013:25). 
6.2 Methodological implications 
The importance of inter-individual dependencies 
Not only do some individual judges stand out as critical actors - which is interesting in itself – 
but adding these as control variables in the analysis is a seemingly prudent way to control for 
intra-individual dependencies.  
 
In addition, the analysis has clearly shown that failing to take into account inter-individual 
dependencies when modelling judicial behaviour, means risking both type I and II errors (see 
section 5.2.4).  
6.3 Theoretical implications 
In a review of the four contending approaches to gendered judicial behaviour, the 
Organisational approach, assuming no effect, neither related to gender nor to critical actors, 
is considerably weakened. Similarly, the Informational approach, assuming collegial effects 
of gender is weakened. Although gendered behaviour does seem to occur on the individual 
level, no evidence of such can be found on the collegial level. In fact, the only significant 
panel level variable in the final model is the control for whether the opponent represents the 
public interest. That variable does not measure any collegial effects, but case particularity. 
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We are then left with two options, the Different Voice approach and the Representational 
approach, of which both correctly predicted a significant difference in voting pattern between 
male and female judges individually. A major difference between the two is, however, that the 
latter assumes critical actors, while the first only “tolerate” critical actors insofar as they vote 
in a manner similar to the general pattern of their gender group. All three critical actors in the 
thesis’ final model vote in discordance with the general gender trend. 
 
On the other side, where the Different Voice approach provides no indication as to the 
direction of the gender effect, the Representative approach is understood in this thesis to 
assume a support for one’s own gender. The empirical effect is opposite: male justices are 
more likely to favour the female party. As such, both the Different Voice – and the 
Representational approaches seem to have some weaknesses. However, with a moderation of 
the theoretical perspective assumed on behalf of the Representational approach, the latter 
seems to provide a fairly good explanation of gendered voting behaviour at the court.  
 
Expanding this analysis from studying a single category of cases to several categories could 
be fruitful in separating between these two approaches. The Different voice approach assumes 
gendered effects to be found within all types of cases, while the Representational approach 
restrict these effects to only gender-related issues. An analysis including – and controlling for 
– both gender-related and non-gender-related issues would therefore effectively separate 
between the two approaches.  
 
[[TEKNISK: GJELD Teljing av sider. Referansepunkt 1: Siste side]]
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Appendix 
7.1 Cross-classification. Stata output. 
 
Note: This is an illustrative excerpt.  
 
 
  
                                                                                                                
      129                                                                                                1      
      127                                                                  1                                    
      126                                                                  1           1                        
      125                                          1     1                                         1           1
      121            1                                                                                          
      120            1                 1                                                                        
      119                  1     1                                                                              
      118                                          1                                                            
      117                                                1     1                                                
      116                        1                                   1           1           1                 1
      115            1                                   1                                         1            
      114            1     1           1           1           1                                                
      113      1                                                                       1                 1      
      112                                          1                                               1            
      111                                    1                             1     1                              
      110                              1     1                       1                 1                        
      109                                                                                    1                  
      107      1           1                             1     1     1     1                 1           1     1
      106                                    1     1                 1           1                              
      105      1                             1           1     1                       1                       1
      104                        1     1                                   1                                    
      103            1     1                                   1     1           1     1     1     1     1     1
      102                        1           1                                   1           1                  
      101      1                                                                                                
                                                                                                                
      JNR   3306  4703  4734  4742  4789  4815  4890  5013  5014  5084  5146  5148  5224  5339  5383  5478  5482
                                                           DomNr                                                
                                                                                                                
. table JNR DomNr if inrange(JNR, 101, 130) & inrange(DomNr,3306, 5482)
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7.2 Frequency of observations per judge appointment 
  
                                 Total          750      100.00
                                                                           
               Sverre Dragsten, 176, 0            1        0.13      100.00
         Reidar Dick Henriksen, 424, 0            1        0.13       99.87
                  Peter Lødrup, 444, 0            1        0.13       99.73
                  Peter Lødrup, 441, 0            1        0.13       99.60
                  Peter Lødrup, 258, 0            1        0.13       99.47
               Per Lykke Anker, 141, 0            1        0.13       99.33
                 Otto Helgesen, 217, 0            1        0.13       99.20
                   Nina Frisak, 132, 1            1        0.13       99.07
               Magnus Aarbakke, 469, 0            1        0.13       98.93
               Kristin Normann, 363, 1            1        0.13       98.80
             Kristen Syvertsen, 426, 0            1        0.13       98.67
        Knut Herbrand Kallerud, 462, 0            1        0.13       98.53
           Jørgen Berner Thrap, 333, 0            1        0.13       98.40
                 Jens Fagereng, 185, 0            1        0.13       98.27
   Gustav M. Sverdrup-Thygeson, 335, 0            1        0.13       98.13
                 Erling Haugen, 212, 0            1        0.13       98.00
         Christian Borchsenius, 466, 0            1        0.13       97.87
        Birger Stuevold Lassen, 438, 0            1        0.13       97.73
        Birger Stuevold Lassen, 437, 0            1        0.13       97.60
              Bergljot Webster, 359, 1            1        0.13       97.47
        Astri Sverdrup Rynning, 471, 1            1        0.13       97.33
             Arne Christiansen, 453, 0            1        0.13       97.20
               Toril Marie Øie, 118, 1            2        0.27       97.07
                 Sverre Mitsem, 126, 0            2        0.27       96.80
            Rolv Einar Ryssdal, 293, 0            2        0.27       96.53
               Ole Bjørn Støle, 117, 0            2        0.27       96.27
               Hilde Indreberg, 121, 1            2        0.27       96.00
                Federik Zimmer, 446, 0            2        0.27       95.73
              Clement Endresen, 120, 0            2        0.27       95.47
                Marius Nygaard, 269, 0            3        0.40       95.20
     Georg Fredrik Rieber-Mohn, 112, 0            3        0.40       94.80
                Erik Arnt Foss, 188, 0            3        0.40       94.40
                   Bård Tønder, 119, 0            3        0.40       94.00
            Magnus Matningsdal, 111, 0            4        0.53       93.60
            Lars Oftedal Broch, 109, 0            4        0.53       93.07
              Karl Arne Utgård, 115, 0            4        0.53       92.53
                Erling Sandene, 299, 0            4        0.53       92.00
                Erling Sandene, 298, 0            4        0.53       91.47
              Trygve Bendiksby, 152, 0            5        0.67       90.93
                    Tore Schei, 102, 0            5        0.67       90.27
               Karsten Gaarder, 204, 0            5        0.67       89.60
                   Finn Backer, 431, 0            5        0.67       88.93
     Oscar Christian Gundersen, 203, 0            6        0.80       88.27
                  Ingse Stabel, 116, 1            6        0.80       87.47
         Ernst Fredrik Eckhoff, 178, 0            6        0.80       86.67
                 Carsten Smith, 129, 0            6        0.80       85.87
           Harald Magne Elstad, 181, 0            7        0.93       85.07
                  Axel Heiberg, 216, 0            7        0.93       84.13
                   Per Tønseth, 338, 0            8        1.07       83.20
         Karin Maria Bruzelius, 113, 1            8        1.07       82.13
       Johan Eilert Stang Lund, 323, 0            8        1.07       81.07
                 Finn Hiorthøy, 221, 0            8        1.07       80.00
          Atle Roll-Matthiesen, 290, 0            8        1.07       78.93
            Rolv Einar Ryssdal, 294, 0            9        1.20       77.87
         Jens Edvin A. Skoghøy, 114, 0            9        1.20       76.67
      Henrik Eiler Støren Bahr, 382, 0            9        1.20       75.47
              Trygve Leivestad, 249, 0           10        1.33       74.27
        Sigurd Juell Lorentzen, 253, 0           10        1.33       72.93
               Magnus Aarbakke, 131, 0           10        1.33       71.60
        Jens Christian Mellbye, 260, 0           10        1.33       70.27
             Charles Philipson, 276, 0           10        1.33       68.93
          Carl Ludovico Stabel, 320, 0           10        1.33       67.60
                    Hans Flock, 110, 0           11        1.47       66.27
                  Einar Løchen, 354, 0           11        1.47       64.80
                    Tore Schei, 101, 0           13        1.73       63.33
           Nils Peder Langvand, 245, 0           13        1.73       61.60
                    Ketil Lund, 104, 0           13        1.73       59.87
       Jan Frøystein Halvorsen, 206, 0           13        1.73       58.13
                 Egil Endresen, 183, 0           13        1.73       56.40
              Andreas Endresen, 182, 0           13        1.73       54.67
                   Trond Dolva, 127, 0           14        1.87       52.93
        Hans Methlie Michelsen, 262, 0           14        1.87       51.07
                   Finn Backer, 356, 0           14        1.87       49.20
                 Kirsti Coward, 107, 1           16        2.13       47.33
         Lilly Helena Bølviken, 170, 1           17        2.27       45.20
                  Helge Røstad, 295, 0           18        2.40       42.93
            Karenanne Gussgard, 105, 1           19        2.53       40.53
             Steinar Tjomsland, 106, 0           20        2.67       38.00
                     Knut Blom, 159, 0           21        2.80       35.33
                    Jens Bugge, 133, 0           21        2.80       32.53
              Jan Rasmus Skåre, 316, 0           21        2.80       29.73
  Elisabeth Schweigaard Selmer, 307, 1           23        3.07       26.93
                Rolv Hellesylt, 218, 0           25        3.33       23.87
                  Liv Gjølstad, 103, 1           28        3.73       20.53
           Tore Sinding-Larsen, 311, 0           29        3.87       16.80
            Vera Louise Holmøy, 130, 1           30        4.00       12.93
                Gunnar Aasland, 125, 0           33        4.40        8.93
             Arne Christiansen, 355, 0           34        4.53        4.53
                                                                           
                      NamnNummerKvinne        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
Note: This table lists the frequency of 
observations per judge appointment, not 
per judge. Each judge is listed for every 
time they have been appointed, e.g. Peter 
Lødrup is registered with one child 
custody case for each of his three 
appointment periods (almost at the 
bottom of the table). Similarly, Tore 
Schei is appointed two times, the first 
time as Supreme Court judge, and the 
second time as chief justice 
(“justitiarius”) of the Supreme Court. As 
can be observed in the table on the next 
page, these two sets of observations are 
added together when counting how many 
observations a judge has partaken in. 
Rather than either 5 or 13 observations, 
Schei is thus listed with 18 observations 
in the following table, which is the 
correct number. 
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7.3 Identifying critical actors 
Table: Identifying critical actors - the full table 
Judge Bivariate – consistent voting Trivariate – peer effect 
(frequency in selection) coeff. s.e. p-value -2LL
†
 coeff. s.e. p-value -2LL
†
 
Leivestad individual -3.69** 1.84 .046 ** 
.016 
-3.90** 1.98 .049 
.623 
(10) in panel    1.17 2.39 .623 
          
Lorentzen individual 2.33 1.42 .102 * 
.068 
2.13 1.39 .126 
.170 
(10) in panel    3.01 2.26 .183 
          
Aarbakke individual -1.14 1.39 .410 
.400 
-1.11 1.39 .426 
.843 
(10) in panel    -.44 2.22 .843 
          
Mellbye individual .32 1.34 .808 
.809 
.37 1.35 .784 
.785 
(10) in panel    -.63 2.29 .785 
          
Philipson individual .68 1.84 .713 
.709 
.67 1.86 .720 
.978 
(10) in panel    .06 2.39 .979 
          
Stabel individual -.38 2.82 .894 
.893 
<.00 2.89 >.99 
.458 
(10) in panel    -2.35 3.20 .463 
          
Flock individual .374 1.31 .775 
.776 
.35 1.32 .789 
.897 
(11) in panel    .29 2.21 .897 
          
Løchen individual 1.41 1.62 .384 
.361 
1.40 1.64 .392 
.979 
(11) in panel    .06 2.26 .979 
          
Schei individual -.36 1.12 .747 
.400 
-.24 1.12 .826 
.744 
(18) in panel    -1.50 1.79 .402 
          
Langvand individual -1.50 1.60 .351 
.338 
-1.47 1.62 .365 
.915 
(13) in panel    -.23 2.15 .915 
          
Lund individual 2.45 1.72 .153 * 
.088 
2.12 1.60 .185 
.136 
(13) in panel    3.02 2.06 .142 
          
Halvorsen individual .52 1.29 .689 
.689 
.69 1.33 .603 
.336 
(13) in panel    -2.01 2.10 .341 
          
E. Endresen individual -1.50 1.37 .275 
.249 
-1.32 1.36 .332 
.233 
(13) in panel    -2.45 2.08 .240 
          
A. Endresen individual -.66 .95 .485 
.483 
-.73 .96 .451 
.532 
(13) in panel    1.22 1.95 .533 
          
Dolva individual -2.64 1.78 .138 
.102 
-2.42 1.74 .164 
.518 
(14) in panel    -1.35 2.10 .520 
          
Michelsen individual .731 1.65 .657 
.651 
.52 1.63 .751 
.420 
(14) in panel    1.65 2.06 .422 
          
Backer individual 1.62 1.12 .149 
.141 
1.75 1.16 .133 
.513 
(14) in panel    -1.17 1.79 .514 
          
Coward  -2.10 1.39 .131 .095 -2.08 1.40 .137 .933 
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(16)     -.16 1.90 .933 
          
Bølviken  -1.48 .96 .123 
.115 
-1.64* .99 .098 
.224 
(17)     2.18 1.80 .226 
          
Røstad  .88 1.34 .510 
.511 
1.17 1.42 .407 
.243 
(18)     -2.19 1.91 .250 
          
Gussgard  -1.59 1.11 .152 
.123 
-1.43 1.10 .193 
.146 
(19)     -2.51 1.75 .153 
          
Tjomsland  -2.83** 1.29 .029 *** 
.010 
-2.59** 1.25 .039 * 
.090 (20)     -2.88* 1.75 .099 
          
Blom  .14 .91 .878 
.877 
.00 .92 >.99 
.167 
(21)     2.26 1.66 .174 
          
Bugge  .50 .87 .566 
.564 
.45 .87 .604 
.617 
(21)     .82 1.64 .618 
          
Skåre  -.61 1.16 .597 
.593 
-.53 1.16 .648 
.605 
(21)     -.88 .71 .606 
          
Schw. Selmer  -2.07** 1.03 .045 
.030 
-2.12** 1.05 .044 
.739 
(23)     0.54 1.62 .739 
          
Hellesylt  -.30 .97 .755 
.753 
-.19 .97 .847 
.335 
(25)     -1.51 1.58 .339 
          
Gjølstad  -.99 1.26 .433 
.418 
-.60 1.24 .630 ** 
.037 (28)     -3.21** 1.60 .044 
          
Sinding-Larsen  1.76* .94 .061 ** 
.046 
1.64* .93 .078 
.318 
(29)     1.47 1.49 .322 
          
Holmøy  1.69** .86 .050 ** 
.038 
1.51* .85 .074 * 
.091 (30)     2.41 1.47 .100 
          
Aasland  -.11 .92 .906 
.906 
<-.01 .93 >.99 
.366 
(33)     -1.29 1.43 .369 
          
Christiansen  .14 .83 .865 
.865 
.17 .83 .843 
.812 
(34)     -.33 1.39 .813 
          
Note: The dependent variable is individual judges’ propensity to vote for the feminine party. †-2LL in the 
bivariate models are comparisons with the empty model. Equally, the trivariate model is compared to the 
bivariate. The statistic is given as a p-value. The analyses are run using the xtmelogit command with 30 
integration points in Stata. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. See also note to the table in appendix section 7.2. 
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7.3.1 Justice Gjølstad 
Justice Gjølstad is not identified as a critical actor in the bivariate model. Counter-intuitively, 
in the trivariate model the panel level variable indicates that in the panels she has partaken, 
her peers have been voting significantly consistent to the disadvantage of the female party. 
The direction of this effect is similar to Gjølstad’s own (non-significant) voting pattern in this 
selection of cases. Gjølstad is not, however, identified as a critical actor, because the 
operational definition of a critical actor demands that the judge’ individual voting pattern is 
significant on a five per cent level. For the sake of interest, an attempt at adding Gjølstad to 
the analysis saw the “Gjølstad effect” turn insignificant in a model including the significant 
variables from the steps before the critical actors analysis. Outputs of this particular analysis 
is not added to the appendix, but can be presented on demand. 
  
Appendix 
Kurt-Rune Bergset Appendix x 
7.3.2 All critical actors in one model 
 (Assumption: Tom nested in .)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0002
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(5)  =     23.84
. lrtest Tom
                                                                              
                       DomNr     .9267267    .020313      .8755727    .9578626
                                                                              
                       Level          ICC   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Residual intraclass correlation
. estat icc
               Note:  N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note
                                                                             
           .      750           .   -280.4003      7     574.8006    607.1411
                                                                             
       Model      Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC
                                                                             
. estat ic
LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) =   452.35 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                  var(_cons)     41.60875    12.4469      23.15022    74.78495
DomNr: Identity               
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                               
        _cons    -.7846909   .6181144    -1.27   0.204    -1.996173    .4267911
SindingLarsen     1.651037   .9762051     1.69   0.091    -.2622894    3.564364
       Holmoy      1.60954   .8838198     1.82   0.069    -.1227153    3.341795
       Selmer    -1.981709   1.050226    -1.89   0.059    -4.040114    .0766949
    Tjomsland    -2.638332   1.325319    -1.99   0.047     -5.23591   -.0407533
    Leivestad    -3.761165   1.886738    -1.99   0.046    -7.459103    -.063227
                                                                               
VoteForFemi~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
Log likelihood =  -280.4003                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0038
Integration points =  24                        Wald chi2(5)       =     17.41
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =       5.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: DomNr                           Number of groups   =       150
Mixed-effects logistic regression               Number of obs      =       750
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7.4 Individual block 4.1 
‘                                                                                
                       DomNr     .9243047   .0214535      .8700435     .957029
                                                                              
                       Level          ICC   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Residual intraclass correlation
. estat icc       
               Note:  N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note
                                                                             
  Indblokk41      750           .   -284.5366      5     579.0732    602.1735
                                                                             
       Model      Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC
                                                                             
. estat ic
(Assumption: Indblokk3 nested in Indblokk41)          Prob > chi2 =    0.0479
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      3.91
. lrtest Indblokk41 Indblokk3
LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) =   450.40 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)     6.338149   .9717316       4.69311    8.559811
DomNr: Identity               
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     -1.03266    .629973    -1.64   0.101    -2.267385     .202064
   c_YGRADCJ    -.0420392   .0216116    -1.95   0.052    -.0843971    .0003187
    OsloBorn      .838048   .3409328     2.46   0.014     .1698321    1.506264
         SEX    -.8220402   .4324963    -1.90   0.057    -1.669717     .025637
                                                                              
VoteForFem~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -284.53658                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0031
Integration points =  30                        Wald chi2(3)       =     13.86
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =       5.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: DomNr                           Number of groups   =       150
Mixed-effects logistic regression               Number of obs      =       750
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Model Indblokk41
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7.5 Individual block 5.2 
                Note:  N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note
                                                                             
  Indblokk51      750           .   -283.0821      6     578.1643    605.8847
                                                                             
       Model      Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC
                                                                             
. estat ic
                                                                              
                       DomNr     .9252592   .0212291      .8715103    .9576177
                                                                              
                       Level          ICC   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Residual intraclass correlation
. estat icc       
(Assumption: Indblokk41 nested in Indblokk51)         Prob > chi2 =    0.0881
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      2.91
. lrtest Indblokk41 Indblokk51    
LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) =   450.58 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)     6.381785    .979539      4.723799    8.621701
DomNr: Identity               
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons    -.7867589   .6481388    -1.21   0.225    -2.057088    .4835698
   FormJudge    -.5694841   .3369143    -1.69   0.091    -1.229824    .0908558
   c_YGRADCJ    -.0442879   .0218006    -2.03   0.042    -.0870164   -.0015594
    OsloBorn     .8451549   .3465025     2.44   0.015     .1660224    1.524287
         SEX    -.8151085   .4385422    -1.86   0.063    -1.674635    .0444184
                                                                              
VoteForFem~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -283.08215                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0032
Integration points =  30                        Wald chi2(4)       =     15.90
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =       5.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: DomNr                           Number of groups   =       150
Mixed-effects logistic regression               Number of obs      =       750
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Model Indblokk51
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7.6 Panel level block 3.1 
                 Note:  N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note
                                                                             
 Kollblokk32      750           .   -275.9876      5     561.9753    585.0756
                                                                             
       Model      Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC
                                                                             
. estat ic
                                                                              
                       DomNr     .9058255   .0239698      .8472215    .9434501
                                                                              
                       Level          ICC   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Residual intraclass correlation
. estat icc       
(Assumption: Kollblokk31 nested in Kollblokk3)        Prob > chi2 =    0.8517
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =      0.32
. lrtest Kollblokk31 Kollblokk3
(Assumption: IndEndeleg nested in Kollblokk31)        Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =     18.11
. lrtest Kollblokk31 IndEndeleg
LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) =   397.18 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)     5.745003   .8195544      4.343721    7.598337
DomNr: Identity               
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                                
         _cons     .7404696   .6988971     1.06   0.289    -.6293435    2.110283
OpponentPublic    -5.164881   1.325916    -3.90   0.000    -7.763629   -2.566133
     c_YGRADCJ    -.0215477   .0215833    -1.00   0.318    -.0638501    .0207547
      OsloBorn      .855175    .339838     2.52   0.012     .1891048    1.521245
           SEX    -.8595779    .426734    -2.01   0.044    -1.695961   -.0231946
                                                                                
VoteForFemin~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood = -275.47937                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Integration points =  24                        Wald chi2(4)       =     25.28
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =       5.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: DomNr                           Number of groups   =       150
Mixed-effects logistic regression               Number of obs      =       750
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Model Kollblokk31
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7.7 Panel level block 3.2 
                Note:  N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note
                                                                             
 Kollblokk32      750           .   -275.9876      5     561.9753    585.0756
                                                                             
       Model      Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC
                                                                             
. estat ic
                                                                              
                       DomNr     .9058255   .0239698      .8472215    .9434501
                                                                              
                       Level          ICC   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Residual intraclass correlation
. estat icc       
(Assumption: Kollblokk32 nested in Kollblokk3)        Prob > chi2 =    0.7202
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(3)  =      1.34
. lrtest Kollblokk32 Kollblokk3
LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) =   398.25 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)     5.625288   .7903157      4.271266    7.408546
DomNr: Identity               
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                                
         _cons     .8233884    .681637     1.21   0.227    -.5125956    2.159372
OpponentPublic    -5.337178   1.294662    -4.12   0.000    -7.874669   -2.799688
      OsloBorn      .877114   .3373312     2.60   0.009      .215957    1.538271
           SEX    -.9099165   .4205004    -2.16   0.030    -1.734082   -.0857508
                                                                                
VoteForFemin~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood = -275.98764                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Integration points =  24                        Wald chi2(3)       =     25.35
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =       5.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: DomNr                           Number of groups   =       150
Mixed-effects logistic regression               Number of obs      =       750
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Model Kollblokk32
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7.8 Critical actors: gradual removal of variables  
7.8.1 First: removing Schweigaard Selmer 
 (Assumption: KritAkt11 nested in KritAkt1)            Prob > chi2 =    0.1896
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      1.72
. lrtest KritAkt11 KritAkt1
               Note:  N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note
                                                                             
           .      750           .   -264.8298      9     547.6596    589.2403
                                                                             
       Model      Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC
                                                                             
. estat ic
                                                                              
                       DomNr     .9177693   .0219324      .8632822    .9517549
                                                                              
                       Level          ICC   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Residual intraclass correlation
. estat icc
LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) =   406.69 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                  var(_cons)     36.71794    10.6708      20.77333    64.90088
DomNr: Identity               
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                                
         _cons     1.084701   .7449848     1.46   0.145    -.3754423    2.544845
        Holmoy     2.615655   1.026348     2.55   0.011     .6040502     4.62726
 SindingLarsen     1.748753   1.018185     1.72   0.086    -.2468536    3.744359
     Tjomsland    -2.405556   1.272608    -1.89   0.059    -4.899822    .0887111
     Leivestad    -4.085986    2.00167    -2.04   0.041    -8.009187   -.1627852
OpponentPublic     -5.63004   1.396446    -4.03   0.000    -8.367023   -2.893057
      OsloBorn     .5946888   .3700231     1.61   0.108    -.1305432    1.319921
           SEX    -1.600196   .5206363    -3.07   0.002    -2.620625   -.5797678
                                                                                
VoteForFemin~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood = -264.82982                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Integration points =  24                        Wald chi2(7)       =     35.82
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =       5.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: DomNr                           Number of groups   =       150
Mixed-effects logistic regression               Number of obs      =       750
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Model KritAkt11
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7.8.2 Second: removing the geographical variable 
 (Assumption: KritAkt12 nested in KritAkt11)           Prob > chi2 =    0.1059
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      2.61
. lrtest KritAkt12 KritAkt11
(Assumption: KritAkt12 nested in KritAkt1)            Prob > chi2 =    0.1144
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =      4.34
. lrtest KritAkt12 KritAkt1
               Note:  N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note
                                                                             
           .      750           .   -264.8298      9     547.6596    589.2403
                                                                             
       Model      Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC
                                                                             
. estat ic
                                                                              
                       DomNr     .9177693   .0219324      .8632822    .9517549
                                                                              
                       Level          ICC   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Residual intraclass correlation
. estat icc
LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) =   407.02 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                  var(_cons)     36.42564   10.57521      20.61976    64.34738
DomNr: Identity               
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                                
         _cons     1.339123   .7276914     1.84   0.066    -.0871259    2.765372
        Holmoy     3.034191   .9967032     3.04   0.002     1.080689    4.987694
 SindingLarsen     1.474396   .9969353     1.48   0.139    -.4795611    3.428353
     Tjomsland    -2.610799   1.265762    -2.06   0.039    -5.091647   -.1299518
     Leivestad    -4.280411   1.995509    -2.15   0.032    -8.191536    -.369286
OpponentPublic     -5.60689   1.390891    -4.03   0.000    -8.332986   -2.880793
           SEX    -1.688566   .5169975    -3.27   0.001    -2.701862   -.6752694
                                                                                
VoteForFemin~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood = -266.13724                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Integration points =  24                        Wald chi2(6)       =     34.26
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =       5.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: DomNr                           Number of groups   =       150
Mixed-effects logistic regression               Number of obs      =       750
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Model KritAkt12
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7.8.3 Third: removing justice Sinding-Larsen  
 
(Assumption: KritAkt13 nested in KritAkt11)           Prob > chi2 =    0.0817
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =      5.01
. lrtest KritAkt13 KritAkt11
(Assumption: KritAkt13 nested in KritAkt1)            Prob > chi2 =    0.0810
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(3)  =      6.73
. lrtest KritAkt13 KritAkt1
               Note:  N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note
                                                                             
           .      750           .   -264.8298      9     547.6596    589.2403
                                                                             
       Model      Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC
                                                                             
. estat ic
                                                                              
                       DomNr     .9177693   .0219324      .8632822    .9517549
                                                                              
                       Level          ICC   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Residual intraclass correlation
. estat icc
LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) =   408.05 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                  var(_cons)     36.00468   10.40239      20.43769    63.42873
DomNr: Identity               
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                                
         _cons     1.399448   .7231134     1.94   0.053    -.0178279    2.816724
        Holmoy     3.039316   .9930617     3.06   0.002     1.092951    4.985681
     Tjomsland    -2.737883   1.260377    -2.17   0.030    -5.208175   -.2675902
     Leivestad    -4.296769   1.994673    -2.15   0.031    -8.206256   -.3872807
OpponentPublic    -5.551661   1.379305    -4.02   0.000    -8.255049   -2.848274
           SEX    -1.765401    .514283    -3.43   0.001    -2.773377   -.7574249
                                                                                
VoteForFemin~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood = -267.33477                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Integration points =  24                        Wald chi2(5)       =     33.29
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =       5.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: DomNr                           Number of groups   =       150
Mixed-effects logistic regression               Number of obs      =       750
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Model KritAkt13
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7.8.4 Fourth: testing a model without Tjomsland 
   (Assumption: KritAkt14 nested in KritAkt11)           Prob > chi2 =    0.0106
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(3)  =     11.22
. lrtest KritAkt14 KritAkt11
(Assumption: KritAkt14 nested in KritAkt1)            Prob > chi2 =    0.0116
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(4)  =     12.94
. lrtest KritAkt14 KritAkt1
               Note:  N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note
                                                                             
           .      750           .   -264.8298      9     547.6596    589.2403
                                                                             
       Model      Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC
                                                                             
. estat ic
                                                                              
                       DomNr     .9177693   .0219324      .8632822    .9517549
                                                                              
                       Level          ICC   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Residual intraclass correlation
. estat icc
LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) =   404.65 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                  var(_cons)     34.59947   9.912335      19.73378    60.66364
DomNr: Identity               
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                                
         _cons      1.34034   .7085682     1.89   0.059    -.0484284    2.729108
        Holmoy     3.076648   .9850448     3.12   0.002     1.145995      5.0073
     Leivestad    -4.219383   1.961388    -2.15   0.031    -8.063633    -.375133
OpponentPublic    -5.598784   1.357781    -4.12   0.000    -8.259986   -2.937583
           SEX    -1.677458   .5089478    -3.30   0.001    -2.674978   -.6799391
                                                                                
VoteForFemin~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood = -270.43787                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Integration points =  24                        Wald chi2(4)       =     29.92
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =       5.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: DomNr                           Number of groups   =       150
Mixed-effects logistic regression               Number of obs      =       750
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Model KritAkt14
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7.9 Testing for varying slopes 
7.9.1 Varying slope: gender 
  
 Note: The reported degrees of freedom assumes the null hypothesis is not on the boundary of the parameter space.  If this is not true, then the reported test is conservative.
(Assumption: KritAkt3 nested in RSsex)                Prob > chi2 =    0.8255
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =      0.38
. lrtest RSsex KritAkt3
Note: LR test is conservative and provided only for reference.
LR test vs. logistic regression:     chi2(3) =   408.43   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
             corr(SEX,_cons)    -.5714386   1.534522     -.9999279    .9990316
                   sd(_cons)     6.187708    .961168      4.563609    8.389793
                     sd(SEX)     .8049932   1.283331      .0353831    18.31425
DomNr: Unstructured           
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                                
         _cons     1.435956   .7451064     1.93   0.054    -.0244258    2.896338
        Holmoy     2.979628   1.149635     2.59   0.010     .7263845    5.232871
     Tjomsland    -2.782206   1.277825    -2.18   0.029    -5.286697   -.2777139
     Leivestad      -4.3693    2.05611    -2.13   0.034    -8.399201   -.3393992
OpponentPublic    -5.679116   1.418795    -4.00   0.000    -8.459904   -2.898329
           SEX    -1.692499   .5980194    -2.83   0.005    -2.864596   -.5204028
                                                                                
VoteForFemin~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood = -267.14296                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Integration points =  24                        Wald chi2(5)       =     28.50
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =       5.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: DomNr                           Number of groups   =       150
Mixed-effects logistic regression               Number of obs      =       750
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Model RSsex
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7.9.2 Varying slope: justice Leivestad 
 (Assumption: KritAkt3 nested in RSleiv)               Prob > chi2 =    1.0000
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =     -0.00
. lrtest RSleiv KritAkt3
Note: LR test is conservative and provided only for reference.
LR test vs. logistic regression:     chi2(2) =   408.05   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)      6.00039    .866809      4.520807    7.964216
                sd(Leives~d)     2.81e-09   4.068471             0           .
DomNr: Independent            
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                                
         _cons     1.399449   .7231133     1.94   0.053    -.0178275    2.816724
        Holmoy     3.039317   .9930618     3.06   0.002     1.092951    4.985682
     Tjomsland    -2.737882   1.260376    -2.17   0.030    -5.208175   -.2675898
     Leivestad     -4.29677   1.994674    -2.15   0.031    -8.206259   -.3872818
OpponentPublic    -5.551662   1.379305    -4.02   0.000    -8.255049   -2.848274
           SEX    -1.765401    .514283    -3.43   0.001    -2.773377    -.757425
                                                                                
VoteForFemin~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood = -267.33477                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Integration points =  24                        Wald chi2(5)       =     33.29
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =       5.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: DomNr                           Number of groups   =       150
Mixed-effects logistic regression               Number of obs      =       750
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Model RSleiv
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7.9.3 Varying slope: justice Tjomsland 
 (Assumption: KritAkt3 nested in RStjom)               Prob > chi2 =    0.9425
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      0.01
. lrtest RStjom KritAkt3
Note: LR test is conservative and provided only for reference.
LR test vs. logistic regression:     chi2(2) =   408.05   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)     6.007496   .8743487      4.516553    7.990609
                sd(Tjomsl~d)     .7062069   5.212163      3.69e-07     1352784
DomNr: Independent            
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                                
         _cons     1.401208   .7244073     1.93   0.053    -.0186037    2.821021
        Holmoy     3.045216   .9966453     3.06   0.002     1.091827    4.998605
     Tjomsland    -2.818157   1.747187    -1.61   0.107     -6.24258    .6062658
     Leivestad    -4.300346   1.997119    -2.15   0.031    -8.214627   -.3860647
OpponentPublic    -5.555392   1.381839    -4.02   0.000    -8.263746   -2.847038
           SEX    -1.767587   .5156193    -3.43   0.001    -2.778182   -.7569919
                                                                                
VoteForFemin~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood = -267.33217                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Integration points =  24                        Wald chi2(5)       =     30.69
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =       5.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: DomNr                           Number of groups   =       150
Mixed-effects logistic regression               Number of obs      =       750
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Model RStjom
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7.9.4 Varying slope: justice Holmøy 
  
(Assumption: KritAkt3 nested in RSholm)               Prob > chi2 =    0.7553
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      0.10
. lrtest RSholm KritAkt3
Note: LR test is conservative and provided only for reference.
LR test vs. logistic regression:     chi2(2) =   408.15   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)      6.05271   .8936833      4.531791    8.084066
                  sd(Holmoy)     1.158954   2.138947      .0311245     43.1549
DomNr: Independent            
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                                
         _cons     1.401246   .7291664     1.92   0.055    -.0278941    2.830386
        Holmoy     3.151903   1.135263     2.78   0.005     .9268291    5.376978
     Tjomsland    -2.751529   1.264999    -2.18   0.030    -5.230882   -.2721764
     Leivestad    -4.321762   2.008295    -2.15   0.031    -8.257949   -.3855754
OpponentPublic    -5.576088   1.393265    -4.00   0.000    -8.306838   -2.845339
           SEX    -1.778039   .5179159    -3.43   0.001    -2.793136   -.7629427
                                                                                
VoteForFemin~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood =  -267.2862                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Integration points =  24                        Wald chi2(5)       =     32.01
                                                               max =         5
                                                               avg =       5.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: DomNr                           Number of groups   =       150
Mixed-effects logistic regression               Number of obs      =       750
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Model RSholm
                                                                                                                                                                                  
